The rise of Strongmen leaders : a threat to global security by Beck, Cassidi




Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Political Science in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at 
Stellenbosch University 




By submitting this thesis/dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work 
contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the 
extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch 
University will not infringe any third-party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety 
or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. 
March 2020 
Copyright © 2020 Stellenbosch University 






The first thank you must go towards my Supervisor Dr Derica Lambrechts. Thank you for the 
guidance, support and utmost patience throughout this entire process. For always being 
available and offering help, no matter how crazy your own life was. Thank you for guiding me 
the last two years, for reminding me that I am not the moral police nor was I writing a George 
Orwell post-1984 movie script. I have really come to appreciate your “dramatic epic gladiator 
music background” notes, they perfectly summed up what not to do.  
A big thank you to my dad, for supporting me in every way possible, financially and 
emotionally. Thank you for providing me with all the opportunities to pursue my academic 
goals, especially without any pressure and giving me the freedom to pursue my interests. Thank 
you for being one of the few who was more than willing to go head to head in political debate 
and consistently making me ask questions and seek more knowledge.  Thank you for your love 
and support, it means the world to me.  
To my brother Darian for the endless banter and superhero move nights, my little sister Bailey 
for telling all her friends one day I will be president of the world, reminding me that anything 
is possible, and to Princess and Abbie for the love and litres of tea and coffee consumed while 
typing away. Lastly to my mommy for being my therapist, best friend and advisor – I don’t 
know what I’d do without you.  
 
Hopefully this isn’t the end, but just the beginning.  





Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter One: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Background to the Study and an Introduction to the Topic ............................................ 1 
1.2. Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 5 
1.3. Relevance of Research .................................................................................................... 8 
1.4. Research Design & Methodology ................................................................................... 9 
1.4.1. Research Question .................................................................................................. 10 
1.4.2. Limitations .............................................................................................................. 11 
1.5. Chapter Outline for Research Study.............................................................................. 12 
1.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Conceptualising Key Terminology ..................... 14 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2. Francis Fukuyama – The End of History ...................................................................... 14 
2.3. Conceptualising Key Terminology ............................................................................... 18 
2.3.1. Geopolitical Insecurity ........................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1.1. Geopolitics ....................................................................................................... 18 
2.3.1.2. Geopolitical Insecurity ..................................................................................... 22 
2.3.2. “Strongman” Leadership ........................................................................................ 25 
2.3.2.1. Four Defining Characteristics of the Strongman ............................................. 28 
2.3.2.1.1. Violation of Human Rights ....................................................................... 29 
2.3.2.1.2. Undermining Key Democratic Institutions ............................................... 29 
2.3.2.1.3. The Imitation of Populist Nationalism ...................................................... 31 
2.3.2.1.4. Violation of Sovereignty and International Law ....................................... 34 
2.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Chapter Three: The Rise of the Strongman – Russia, Hungary and Turkey ........................... 38 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 38 
3.2. Russia – President Vladimir Putin ................................................................................ 38 
3.2.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions ......................................................................... 38 
3.2.1.1. Complete Control of the Media ....................................................................... 39 
3.2.1.2. The Vertical of Power ...................................................................................... 39 
3.2.1.3. The Erosion of Free, Fair and Competitive Elections...................................... 40 
3.2.2. The Violation of Human Rights ............................................................................. 41 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
iv 
3.2.2.1. Political Murder ............................................................................................... 42 
3.2.2.2. Chechnya.......................................................................................................... 43 
3.2.3. Nationalistic Populism ............................................................................................ 44 
3.2.4. Break Sovereignty & International Law ................................................................. 45 
3.2.4.1. International Interference ................................................................................. 45 
3.2.4.2. Invasion of Ukraine & the Annexation of the Crimea ..................................... 46 
3.2.4.3. Interference in the US 2016 Presidential Election ........................................... 47 
3.2.5. Reflection of Vladimir Putin .................................................................................. 49 
3.3. Hungary and Prime Minister Viktor Orban................................................................... 50 
3.3.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions ......................................................................... 50 
3.3.1.1. The End of the Separation of Powers .............................................................. 51 
3.3.1.2. Weakening the Opposition ............................................................................... 52 
3.3.2. Violation of Human Rights..................................................................................... 53 
3.3.2.1. Closing the Border – Keeping out the ‘Enemy’............................................... 54 
3.3.2.2. Political Incarceration – The Roma People ..................................................... 55 
3.3.2.3. Authority over Everyday Life .......................................................................... 56 
3.3.3. Orban’s Nationalistic Populism .............................................................................. 57 
3.3.4. Break Sovereignty & International Law ................................................................. 59 
3.3.4.1. Failure to Adhere to the EU Criteria & Rule of Law ....................................... 60 
3.3.5. Reflection of Viktor Orban ..................................................................................... 61 
3.4. Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ............................................................... 62 
3.4.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions ......................................................................... 62 
3.4.1.1. Undermining Checks and Balances ................................................................. 62 
3.4.1.2. Taming the Media ............................................................................................ 64 
3.4.1.3. Weakening of the Opposition .......................................................................... 65 
3.4.2. Violation of Human Rights..................................................................................... 66 
3.4.2.1. Islamic Social Engineering .............................................................................. 67 
3.4.2.2. Freedom of Political Opinion and Expression ................................................. 68 
3.4.2.3. The Kurdish Minority ...................................................................................... 69 
3.4.3. Erdogan’s Nationalistic Populism .......................................................................... 69 
3.4.4. Break Sovereignty and International Law .............................................................. 71 
3.4.4.1. Iraq & Turkey Subjugation .............................................................................. 71 
3.4.4.2. Syria & Turkey Illegal Occupation .................................................................. 72 
3.4.4.3. Failure to Adhere to the Copenhagen Criteria ................................................. 73 
3.4.5. Reflection of Recep Erdogan .................................................................................. 74 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
v 
3.5. Comparing Putin, Orban and Erdogan and Their Leadership ....................................... 74 
3.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 75 
Chapter Four: The End of History and Implications for Geopolitical Security ....................... 77 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 77 
4.2. The End of History – A Reflection of Fukuyama in light of the Strongman Rise ........ 77 
4.3. The Strongman’s Ramifications for Geopolitical Security ........................................... 82 
4.3.1. A New Global Order............................................................................................... 83 
4.3.2. European Uncertainty ............................................................................................. 86 
4.3.2.1. European Union Instability .............................................................................. 87 
4.3.2.2. Breakdown of Relations between Turkey and the EU ..................................... 89 
4.3.2.3. The Refugee Crisis ........................................................................................... 91 
4.3.2.4. The Rise of Challenger Parties ........................................................................ 92 
4.3.3. The Rise of Identity Politics ................................................................................... 94 
4.3.4. The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare ........................................................................ 97 
4.3.5. Deteriorating Economic Conditions ....................................................................... 98 
4.3.5.1. Protectionism & Isolationism .......................................................................... 99 
4.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 101 
Chapter Five: Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 103 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 103 
5.2. Evaluation of the Research Question and Main Findings ........................................... 103 
5.3. Limits of the Study ...................................................................................................... 106 
5.4. Conclusion & Avenues for Future Study .................................................................... 108 






After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War future 
was one characterised by democratic liberalism, economic prosperity and a global liberal order. 
However, after decades of the spread and success of democratic liberalism, the world is seeing 
a global democratic recession. Instead of liberal democracy, the present and future is seemingly 
being characterised by growing illiberal democracy. A key element to the rise of these other 
political regimes and the global decline of democracy, is the rise of political Strongmen. 
Defined as elected leaders who use a political style characterised as populist, authoritarian and 
assertive, these Strongmen pose a risk to liberal democracy. This thesis examines the rise of 
these Strongmen, and specifically, how Strongman leadership threatens global security.  
The thesis also made reference to Francis Fukuyama’s famous argument The End of History 
and Last Man as his theory is commonly referenced in the examination of these leaders, as well 
as in the exploration of the current worldwide democratic decline.  The use of Fukuyama’s 
thesis sought not to critique his argument, but rather to show how the rise of these Strongmen 
and their political leadership, bears as an obstacle to the stable, prosperous, democratic future 
that Fukuyama foresaw. 
Willing to go to extremes to protect their vote share, change the rules of the political game, 
preach politics of fear and resentment, and undermine democratic principles such as civil 
liberties and the separation of powers, the Strongman can be seen to not only threaten regional 
security but potentially increase geopolitical insecurity. The study chose to comparatively 
study Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Recep Erdogan of Turkey and Viktor Orban of Hungary. These 
three leaders and their respective nations were chosen as following the end of the Cold War, 
they were considered most likely to democratically consolidate. Further, similarly all three 
leaders came to power through democratic elections and lastly, all three nations are influential 
global actors. The study examined the three leaders on four variables seen as intrinsic elements 
of Strongman leadership; the violation of human rights, the erosion of key democratic 
institutions, the violation of human rights, populist nationalism, and the violation of 
sovereignty and international law. These variables were chosen not only for their identification 
of Strongman leadership but were also analysed as the most likely to threaten global security 
and stability. Using these principles also aided in establishing the presence/ extent of 






In conclusion, the study found that Strongman leadership does threaten global security through 
various facets. Specifically, through the four intrinsic variables, the Strongman’s actions, 
policies and ideologies can lead to further geopolitical insecurity. Focusing on Russia, Hungary 
and Turkey and their respective leaders, showed how their leadership can create or exacerbate 
instability, and ultimately erode global security.  
Opsomming 
Na die einde van die Koue Oorlog en die ontbinding van die Sowjet Unie, waqs die toekoms 
van die post Koue Oorlog gekenmerk deur demokratiese liberalisme, ekonomiese voorspoed 
en ‘n internasionale toestand van liberale orde.  Na dekades van die uitbreiding en sukses van 
demokratiese liberalisme, sien die wêreld egter tans die resessie van globale demokrasie.  In 
plaas van liderale demokrasie, word die hede en toekoms oënskynlik deur groeiende onliberale 
demokrasie gekenmerk. ‘n Kenmerkende element van hierdie en ander politieke regimes, asook 
die agteruitgang van globale demokrasie, is die die opkoms van individuele politieke 
magsfigure.  Hulle word gedefinieer as verkose leiers wat ‘n politieke styl, gekenmerk deur 
populisme, magsbeheptheid en sekerheid ten toon stel, maar wat ‘n bedreiging vir globale 
liberale demokrasie daarstel.  Hierdie verhandeling ondersoek die opkoms van die magsfigure 
en in besonder, op watter wyse magsfiguur-leierskap globale sekerheid bedreig. 
Die verhandeling verwys ook na die bekende argument van Francis Fukuyama, “The End of 
History and Last Man”, omdat daar in die algemeen daarna verwys word wanneer hierdie leiers 
ondersoek word, sowel as die ondersoek van die wêreldwye agteruitgang van demokrasie.  Die 
gebruik van Fukuyama se verhandeling, het nie ten doel om hom te kritiseer nie, maar eerder 
om aan te dui hoe die opkoms van hierdie magsfigure en hulle politiek leierskap ‘n hindernis 
vir die stabiele, voorspoedige en demokratiese toekoms wat Fukuyama voorsien is. 
Die magsfigure is bereid om tot uiterstes te gaan vir die beskerming van hulle kiesers aandeel, 
die wysiging van die reëls van die politieke spel, die prediking van politieke vrees en verwyt, 
asook die ondermyning van demokratiese beginsels, soos burgerlike vryhede en die skeiding 
van magte.  As sulks kan hierdie magsfigure nie alleen as ‘n bedreiging vir streeksveiligheid 
gesien word nie, maar ook ‘n toename in geo-politiese onsekerheid te weegbring.  Die studie 
het ten doel om ‘n vergelykende studie van Rusland se Vladimir Putin, Turkye se Recep 
Erdogan en Hongarye se Viktor Orban, te doen.  Hierdie drie leiers en hulle onderskeie nasies, 
post Koue Oorlog, was as onderwerp gekies, aangesien hulle  as die mees waarskynlik beskou 





verkiesings aan bewind gekom en aldrie lande is invloedryke wêreldmagte.  Hierdie studie het 
die genoemde drie leiers ondersoek aan die hand van vier verandelikes, wat as intrinsieke 
kenmerke van magsfiguur-leierskap gesien kan word; die aantasting van mense regte, 
aftakeling van demokratiese instansies, populistiese nasionalisme en die skending van 
soewereiniteit en Volkereg.  Hierdie veranderlikes was nie net vir hulle indentifikasie van 
magsfiguur-leierskap gekies nie, maar is ook geanaliseer as die mees voor die handliggende 
bedreiging vir wêreld sekerheid en stabiliteit.   Die toepassing van hierdie beginsels, het ook 
daartoe bygedra dat die aard en omvang van magsfiguur-leierskap in elke land vasgestel kon 
word. 
Ter afsluiting, hierdie ondersoek het bevinfd dat magsfiguur-leierskap inderdaad die 
wêereldorde in vele opsigte bedreig.  In besonder, deur middel van die vier onderliggende 
veranderlikes, kan die magsfiguur-leiers se optredes, beleide en ideologieë verder tot geo-
polities onsekerheid aanleiding gee.  Deur of Rusland, Hongarye en Turkye en hulle onderskeie 
leiers te focus, word daar aangedui in watter mate hulle leierskap onstabiliteit en uiteindelik 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Background to the Study and an Introduction to the Topic  
Following the ‘third wave’ of democratization that saw dozens of countries around the globe 
rejecting their authoritarian regimes and calling for reform across the world, the belief was that 
liberal democracy and its associated capitalist economic system would become dominant 
(Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:83; Diamond, 2019:17; Fukuyama, 2018). The argument was that 
liberal democracy offered the best political and economic system – it allowed citizens to freely 
choose their beliefs, while also ensuring higher living standards and reduced inequality. Such, 
the belief that liberal democracy was “the only game in town” swept throughout the west 
(Mainwaring & Bizarro, 2019:99).  
However, currently there is evidence to suggest a growing mistrust in democracy, as the growth 
towards democratisation has since reversed itself with the total number of democratic countries 
having declined (Fukuyama, 2018). Worldwide liberal democracy is consistently being 
challenged by political leaders, citizens and movements, with many countries having seen their 
freedom decrease, reversing the post-Cold War trend of the expansion of democracy (Diamond, 
2019:17). Democratic principles such as the rule of law, civil liberties, electoral rights and the 
value of plurality have been steadily declining. Elected leaders across the world have started 
using the power of elections to undermine democratic institutions and principles. Nations 
across the globe such as Thailand, Pakistan, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland as well as Kenya 
and Tanzania all form part of this trend (Freedom House, 2019). While in Europe, right-wing, 
populist political parties such as Jobbik in Hungary, Front National in France, Law and Justice 
(Pis) in Poland and Austria’s Freedom Party have all gained significant political popularity and 
power. In the United States (US), a country known as the protector of liberal democracy, under 
the leadership of a recently elected populist, the nation has seen a surge in the presence and 
support of ‘white supremacists’ and ‘alt-right’ movements (Hawley, 2017; Wendling, 2018). 
Authors (Emmott, 2017; Grayling, 2018; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2019; 
Mounk, 2018; Richards, 2017; Runciman, 2018) point to a set of specific reasons to explain 
the acceleration of the distrust and resulting decline of democracy. The first key issue identified 
by scholars is what Inglehart and Norris (2016) call the “cultural backlash thesis” as the surge 
for the distrust in democracy is a reaction to “progressive cultural change”. Scholars argue that 
many citizens feel anxiety over world integration as they see rising levels of immigration, 
changing cultural values and, as such, the sense of a decline in their national identity (Mounk, 





alienated in their own country as rising progressive, cosmopolitan, multicultural values erode 
their own ‘traditional’ values. Another element of this is, with the increasing number of 
refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers integrating themselves into societies, citizens feel 
they threaten their national identity as they represent the “possible destruction of the national 
groups historic identity and established ways of life” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:131).  
Scholars argue this cultural fear develops out of concern over the cultural incompatibility of 
these ‘foreigners’ and the possible destruction of their national community. Their fears evolve 
from anxieties about immigrants who cannot speak the language and practice different cultural 
traditions that challenge their established community, or ethnic and religious groups which 
cannot integrate into the wider society (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
On explaining the rising mistrust of democracy across the globe, another central argument 
scholars highlight is the importance of positively perceived socioeconomic conditions and the 
resulting sustainability of a democratic regime (Richards, 2017; Gusterson, 2017; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2016; Emmott, 2017). These authors argue that if citizens perceive their economic 
circumstances, development and opportunities positively the more likely democracy will 
endure. With the expansion of democracy following the end of the Cold War, many citizens 
expected an increase in their living standards and way of life. However, with growing social 
inequalities, increased long-term unemployment, poverty and poor economic development 
across developing and developed nations, many individuals have become increasingly 
disillusioned with democracy (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). According to these scholars, this 
anger and disillusionment, extending from a sense of socioeconomic disparity, is what is 
currently driving the growing mistrust of democracy (Emmott, 2017; Gusterson, 2017; Mishra, 
2017; Richards, 2017). Inglehart and Norris (2016) argue that, with rising economic insecurity 
and social deprivation, it has made those who feel less secure, i.e., the unskilled, low wage 
workers, unemployed, family’s dependent on shrinking social benefits and poorer populations, 
inclined to support other regimes which may offer an alternative to their current situation.  
Many authors tie the concern of rising socioeconomic issues to the rise of a powerful and 
dominant elite who have failed to provide for the worsening socioeconomic conditions 
(Ikenberry, 2018; Emmott, 2017; Mickey, Levitsky & Way, 2017; Colgan & Keohane, 2017; 
Mishra, 2017). Ikenberry (2018:3) comments, “Western publics have increasingly come to 
regard the liberal international order not as a source of stability and solidarity among like-
minded states but as a global playground for the rich and the powerful.” These authors argue 





in crisis as the security once offered by liberal democracy no longer exists. Rather, these publics 
increasingly see the system as a “neoliberal project aimed at benefitting the likes of 
globetrotting capitalists” (Ikenberry, 2018:9). Tired of feeling overlooked and disadvantaged, 
citizens increasingly see democracy as a game rigged by the powerful and, as such, turn away 
from the established political parties and leaders. The result is the increased likelihood of 
citizens turning to the anti-established, populist and nationalistic voices of other parties and 
leaders (Ikenberry, 2018; Emmott, 2017; Mickey, Levitsky & Way, 2017). 
With a growing mistrust in democracy across the globe and the resulting declining momentum 
of the liberal international order, the phenomena of electing a Strongman1 into office has 
become a popular occurrence across the world. In both developing and developed worlds, East 
to West, nations like the United States, Russia, Brazil, Hungary, Turkey as well as states like 
Italy, Venezuela, the Philippines and China, have placed autocrats (who tend to have a 
proclivity to pay little attention to democratic norms and have strong illiberal populist 
tendencies) into the presidential seat.  
The issue with this strengthening authoritarianism trend is its current and possible future 
implications for the geopolitical environment. With the rise of Strongman leadership across the 
globe and its implications, it can be argued that the global order that has prevailed since the 
end of World War Two is currently wearing away, lending itself to a period of uncharacteristic 
political instability (Bremmer, 2019:4; Haass, 2019:22).  
As key geopolitical institutions become increasingly volatile and dysfunctional; the European 
Union (EU), the transatlantic affiliation, American political institutions, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and the current liberal democratic order (Bremmer, 2019:3), resulting in  
greater uncertainty concerning possible political outcomes, the prospect of higher insecurity at 
a regional and a global level are far more probable. These institutions will not collapse 
tomorrow but while they become increasingly unstable, the possibility for negative 
consequences in the future arises. Critical to liberal democracy across the globe, the collapse 
of these institutions could be detrimental to democratic prosperity.  
 
1   Originated from the leadership styles associated with the fascists of the 21st century. The term has become 
synonymous with the meaning of a political style that is characterised as populist, authoritarian and assertive 
(Roxburgh, 2012).  In essence, Strongmen are leaders who are willing to go to extremes to protect their vote share, 
change the rules of the political game as needed in order to protect their advantages, preach politics of fear and 
resentment, renounce free media if it does not function as an arm of the government and give little regard to civil 





The liberal democratic order needs to concern itself with the global rise of Strongmen and their 
more assertive, muscular style of leadership, as this current phenomenon exposes the world to 
increased geopolitical insecurity. If the world begins to see value in authoritarian types of rule, 
the less likely democratic liberalism will succeed. It holds many risks for the future of human 
rights and international collaboration, and may give way to a more aggressive and autocratic 
world order. With the current G-Zero2 world being characterised by a global governance 
vacuum, sooner or later this could give way to a new world order, one characterised by 
international fragmentation, the collapse of key global regimes and the breakdown of important 
global democratic institutions (Haass, 2019:30). 
Currently the rule of Strongmen can be seen to be bringing about a variety of concerns that 
pose problems for a G-Zero world. In nations across the world, there has been an increase in 
illiberal democracy and thus a decline in liberal politics. With the election of Strongmen, the 
world has seen the growing trend of the allowance for far-right political parties and coalitions: 
challenging the ideas of tolerance and diversity. European populism is increasingly impacting 
Europe’s capacity as a geopolitical player and its role of ensuring human rights are protected 
and advanced across the world. Nations like Italy and Hungary, at the heart of Europe, continue 
to contend with the EU and its democratic institutions. Both nations continually show little 
regard for civil liberties and democratic norms. President Recep Erdogan of Turkey continually 
pushes for deeper control, ignoring democratic values, and acting in whatever manner ensures 
a hold on political power. While Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, continually finds ways 
to ensure its subversion of the Western mode of democracy while assaulting democracy across 
Europe and the United States, ensuring autocracy is the rule of law at home.  
Examining specific nations that have elected a Strongman into power, inference can be made 
on how their rule poses risks to geopolitical security. This study will assess to what extent three 
specific Strongman characteristics are present in each case in order to measure Strongman rule 
in that specific state. The chosen states are Turkey under President Recep Erdogan, Russia 
under President Vladimir Putin and Hungary under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor 
Orban. Each country will be assessed on the extent of the presence of four aspects that have 
been identified as core characteristics of Strongman leadership. The extent of the existence of 
 
2 The term G-Zero was coined to refer to a world without global leadership and an emerging vacuum of power in 
international politics (Bremmer, 2019). Where the US was initially seen as the world’s policeman after World 
War Two, their abdication of global leadership has resulted in a vacuum on a geopolitical space which will have 





these four aspects can be used to measure Strongman rule. Further, these four aspects, if 
present, can show how Strongman leadership may contribute to geopolitical insecurity. 
1.2. Literature Review  
So secure in the legitimacy of liberal democracy, for decades liberal democracy has been 
constituted as “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human 
government” (Fukuyama, 1992). Francis Fukuyama (1992) famously argued that the overthrow 
of communism and success of liberalism following the end of the Cold War and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as remarkable because it represented a revolution; “the state that emerges 
at the end of history is liberal, in so far as it recognises and protects through a system of law 
man’s universal right to freedom and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of 
the governed”. Fukuyama (1992) argued that what would develop was a global marketplace 
where ideas, capital and goods would flow freely while people would promote democratisation 
throughout their societies. Global ideas would be free to cross borders; as a result, a liberal 
conception would win over hearts and minds. As the champion of liberal democracy, 
Fukuyama argued that the West (the US) would set about transforming the rest of the world 
while ensuring that, at the same time, the world found the best ways to imitate the West. While 
Fukuyama (1992) argued that democracy was the best and final form of human governance, he 
did note that not all countries would succeed at emulating the model, however, they would have 
no alternative to trying.  
However, more and more actors have come to realise that the world is drifting; the global order 
as we know it is changing and instead a more autocratic, aggressive, uncooperative form is 
taking shape (Bremmer, 2018a; Rose, 2019; Snyder, 2018). According to Francis Fukuyama 
(2018), the Western world has been so secure in the belief that democratic liberalism was the 
final form of governance, no plan for democratic backsliding has been put in place. Fukuyama 
(2018) argues that, even amongst authors who disagreed with his thesis, there was still a mutual 
consensus that established democracies would remain consolidated. Thus, most surprising is 
not the decline of democracies in “new would-be democracies” but the threats to democracy 
arising from established democracies across the West (Fukuyama, 2018). Having failed to 
envision or plan for a future where autocratic and illiberal leadership becomes the norm, 
scholars are becoming increasingly concerned over the risk to the security of geopolitics 





With growing disillusionment with liberal democracy, evidence suggests the public of various 
nations across the globe are demanding more authoritative leadership; Strongmen who are 
willing to move away from liberal democracy in order to ensure the representation and progress 
of ordinary people. However, many authors note that with the rise of these Strongman leaders, 
there is a serious risk to the endurance and status quo of liberal democracy (Albright, 2018; 
Bremmer, 2019; Burleigh, 2018; Diamond, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Kearns, 2018; 
Krastev, 2018; Mounk, 2018; Rose, 2019; Snyder, 2018).  
A frequent reference regarding the embodiment of Strongman leadership is given to Russia’s 
current leader, Vladimir Putin. Under the leadership of Putin, Haass (2019:27) argues that 
Russia has seen a leader who frequently shows a growing disposition to create disorder. Putin 
has enacted various policies that can be seen as representative of his rejection of the principal 
constraints associated with the liberal, democratic world order (Haass, 2019:27). Under Putin, 
Russia has promoted the use of force in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, undiscerning 
military intervention in Syria, and the hostile use of cyberwarfare to affect political outcomes 
in the US (Haass, 2019:27). According to Snyder (2018:19), what makes leadership like 
Vladimir Putin’s so dangerous is that is follows a philosophy which regards “fascism as the 
politics of the world to come”. For years, Putin’s government has engaged in a relentless assault 
to undermine democracy and the rule of law across the Western world, creating geopolitical 
insecurity as he wishes to promote a climate more conducive to Russia’s anti-democratic 
behaviour (Sampson, 2018:153).  
In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, although elected democratically, has continued to 
manipulate the political system to remain in power. Following an attempted coup in 2016, 
Erdogan has only become stronger, “giving him carte blanche to move against whomever he 
chooses and to do so in the name of fighting treason” (Albright, 2018:149). Erdogan’s 
clampdown on dissent has been ruthless and consistent, jailing an extraordinary number of 
journalists, academics and opponents (Cagaptay, 2017).  
But the character of strongman is also making a comeback across Europe. From Hungary’s 
Viktor Orban, “illiberal democracy” (Albright, 2018; Mounk, 2018) has spread within Europe, 
as political systems come with free elections but scarce regard for civil liberties. To many 
outside observers, Orban is a “xenophobic, anti-democratic nationalist with a cruel anti-refugee 
agenda” (Albright, 2018:171). With Hungary situated in Europe, the nation poses a “systemic 





Burleigh (2017) argue that the rise of a leader like Orban in the centre of Europe, is reflective 
of a far bigger issue at hand; the deterioration of the liberal order and the rise of the populist-
right, increased Euroskeptism and EU disarray across Europe and the globe. 
Although authors point to the risks of having such Strongmen in power (Albright, 2018; 
Bremmer, 2019; Burleigh, 2018; Diamond, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Kearns, 2018; 
Krastev, 2018; Mounk, 2018; Rose, 2019; Snyder, 2018), they have failed to paint a holistic 
picture. While these authors have focused on specific nation states and its illiberal democratic 
leader, focus is placed typically on America under Donald Trump and Russia under the guise 
of Vladimir Putin. Little attention has been given to nations outside these two global players, 
but, fundamentally, the literature fails to give a global perspective and highlight the 
interconnectedness between each of these Strongmen. By way of illustration, Madelaine 
Albright (2018) focuses on Russia, and the US under President Donald Trump, Michael 
Burleigh (2018) focuses on Russia and the US but also examines China under the leadership 
of President Xi Jinping, while Timothy Snyder (2018) focuses on Russia and America and the 
general decline of democracy in Europe. Other authors such as Diamond (2019), Eatwell and 
Goodwin (2018) and Kearns (2018) also place their focus on states such as Russia and America 
while giving brief mention to nations such as Turkey, Hungary, Poland and Europe as a whole.  
Further, these scholars (Albright, 2018; Burleigh, 2018; Diamond, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 
2018; Kearns, 2018; Snyder, 2018) continue to look at the regional effects of the rise of 
autocratic leaders, while few have examined how their style of leadership can impact 
geopolitics and lead to increased global insecurity. Another issue within the current available 
literature is the inclination for most academics to focus solely on the US and its leadership 
under Donald Trump, and instead ignore the power of nations such as Hungary and Turkey. 
For instance, Viktor Orban of Hungary has been eroding the country’s democracy for years, 
but only very recently has more attention been paid to his leadership. Further, there is little 
literature and acknowledgement on nations like Brazil, Italy and Venezuela who have also 
elected Strongmen. Although this study will not examine these nations, these represent a status 
that can have far reaching global effects. Under financial stress, if Italy were to collapse, it 
would send shockwaves throughout the EU, while in Venezuela, under Nicolas Maduro, the 
country’s crisis has been impacting the entirety of South America (Bremmer, 2019). In Brazil, 
the fourth largest democracy in the world, in October 2018 the people elected Jair Bolsonaro – 
a far-right populist. Bolsonaro openly defends the defunct military regime, police autonomy 





Brazil’s possible status as a declining democracy will also have significant contributions to 
geopolitical security and the global decline of democracy.  
More research is needed in this every changing and important topic. Continued, in-depth 
research is needed in order to create a bigger picture that fully acknowledges the dangers of the 
rise of strongmen leadership and how it can lead to increased geopolitical security. Further, as 
pointed out by Fukuyama (2018), the world became far too secure in the US-led global, 
democratic order, and consequently, state-actors as well as none-state actors have failed to plan 
for a future where democracy and its core values are no longer the foundation by which the 
world is governed. While some authors argue it is too late to continue the global led order as 
we know it (Bremmer, 2019; Burleigh, 2017; Haass, 2019; Rose, 2019), it is vital that its 
current decline is acknowledged so that a different and less foreseeable future can be planned 
for. 
1.3. Relevance of Research 
In the decades since the end of the Cold War, it had been widely assumed that after the fall of 
communism, the Western model of free-market liberal democracy and free-trade would 
become “the world’s final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1992). Now, at a moment 
when liberal democracy seems to be in decline across the West, and its general acceptance 
becomes less secure across the globe, it has become crucial to examine the variables that 
contribute to the decline of liberal democracy. An important factor in the examination of 
declining world democracy is the growing trend for nations to elect political “Strongmen”, who 
often follow a policy of illiberal democracy.   
As the US turns inwards from its role as the linchpin of this order, Europe is troubled with 
populist nationalism and consistently growing Euroskeptism, and as Russia and China continue 
their move towards autocratic world leadership, understanding how strongmen influence this 
trend as well as the likelihood of geopolitical insecurity is critical. Examining the rule of 
Strongmen across various nations can show commonality in their rule and the risk it poses not 
only at a regional level but on a geopolitical level. Their leadership is full of potential risks for 
security on a regional and global scale, as well as the continuation of championing the liberal 
democratic order. Fundamentally, the goal of this study is to bring attention to the growing 
trend of the election of Strongman politicians into office and in doing so, the study anticipates 





1.4. Research Design & Methodology  
The purpose of this section is to highlight and describe the idea and importance of research 
design and the process of research that will be conducted. Every research project has a logic 
that provides the framework for the research and guides the research strategy (Burnham, Lutz, 
Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:39). Research design, the research questions, possible 
limitations, and the chapter outlines for the study will be discussed. This section will set out 
the priorities of the research and the process that will be undertaken in order to conduct the 
study.  
In order to engage in meaningful and productive research, it is important that the researcher 
establishes a logical structure and strategy before the investigation can begin. Research design 
is thus an important initial step as it provides the framework for the creation and analysis of 
data according to the priorities set by the researcher (Burnham et al., 2008:39). Therefore, in 
order to demonstrate the outcomes of the research, the research design specifies how the data 
will be collected, systematised and integrated into the study.  
Qualitative data/research for this thesis will prove to be most useful as it will provide the means 
for collecting in-depth information. The qualitative research methodology is also most effective 
for this study as a large amount of theoretical information will need to be collected and 
analysed. The research study will draw on existing secondary data from newspaper articles, 
journals and academic books in order to provide evidence for the research question/s. This 
study will also make use of multiple sources as it is necessary for this study to focus on multiple 
perspectives. The study is built on existing secondary data in order to analyse the causal 
relationship that the research question sets out to answer concerning Strongman leadership and 
geopolitical insecurity. As the research question focuses on a current event that is continually 
changing, data will be collected throughout the research process in order to allow for alterations 
throughout the process. The study will be explanatory, descriptive and casual as it firstly aims 
to provide a better understanding of the rise of Strongman leadership and its core 
characteristics. It will seek to provide probable events with the rise of geopolitical insecurity, 
and, furthermore it aims to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the placement of 
a Strongman in office and increased geopolitical insecurity (Burnham et al., 2008). Another 
reason for the use of qualitative data is that it generally allows for interpretation which, in this 
specific research case, will be most useful as the data studied as well as how it is interpreted 





The comparative method of research will be most useful for this research study as the goal of 
comparative research is to identify similarities and differences between social entities while 
allowing the research to be reasoned in terms of variables. Ultimately this means that the 
distinctiveness of each case (in this case, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey) is less important than 
the case understood as a combination of values and specific variables (Burnham et al., 
2008:69). To understand fully the significant political consequences of placing a Strongman in 
presidential power and the possible resulting geopolitical insecurities, it will be most beneficial 
to compare nations, and in this way integrate old and new knowledge. Although each nation 
and their Strongman in power can be argued to be representative of a case-study, the research 
is part of a larger, comparative body of research. By using more than one state, it will provide 
the empirical basis for building and sustaining the research and its proposed argument 
(Burnham et al., 2008:70). The comparative method centres on observing and comparing 
carefully selected cases on the basis of some variables being present, thus it is most useful for 
this specific study. A comparative study rests on the importance of choosing cases that are 
representative, thus the use of three different nations that specifically relate to the research 
question will allow for wider generalisations to be made as well as to enable the argument to 
be evidently justified (Burnham et al., 2008:73). The careful selection of multiple cases will 
provide a much more robust test of a theory and can specify the conditions under which 
hypotheses and theories may or may not hold (Burnham et al., 2008:65). The cases of Hungary, 
Russia and Turkey all pertain to the research question and embody several features that 
characterise how strongman leadership can lead to increased global insecurity.  
1.4.1. Research Question  
With a world once committed to a US-led global order and the institutions it was built upon, 
increasing interest and concern in the growing coalition of world leaders unwilling to uphold 
the global liberal order has become a critical event which several actors are attempting to 
understand. With the architecture of the world global order at risk and the rise of leaders across 
the globe who challenge the institutions and consensus they represent, more research has 
become a necessity. 
By researching the link between Strongman leadership and the probability of increased 
geopolitical insecurity, the aim is to confirm or falsify this relationship, specifically through 
the examination of three nations who have recently elected and/or re-elected strongmen into 
power who tend to casually disrespect the norms and values of liberal democracy. Based on 





- How does Strongman leadership threaten global security? 
Four variables3 will be used to assess/measure Strongman rule in three specific nations; Turkey, 
Russia and Hungary. Once this has been achieved, these variables and the extent to which they 
are present, can show how geopolitical stability is threatened. The four identified variables are: 
1) The violation of human rights 
2) The erosion of key democratic institutions 
3) Populist Nationalism 
4) The violation of sovereignty & international law 
The aim of the research study is thus to analyse the process of a definite style of leadership 
present in a specific three states and how this leadership, present at a regional level, will apply 
to a geopolitical setting, and if it will increase geopolitical insecurity. Orban, Putin and Erdogan 
are all leaders who disparage the essential elements of democratic life and show a casual 
disrespect for the norms and values of liberal democracy itself (Ikenberry, 2018:2). By 
examining the Strongman style of leadership and casual disregard for liberal democracy, the 
study will thus determine what the impact of this is on the architecture of geopolitics and if it 
contributes to increased geopolitical insecurity. 
1.4.2. Limitations  
The issue with the use of comparative qualitative research designs is that many researchers 
argue they can only be used to generate hypotheses and theories. Thus, in order to truly 
determine if there is a relationship between Strongman leadership and increased geopolitical 
insecurity, further testing needs to be done through other forms of research design (Burnham 
et al., 2008:64). Simply gaining data from only secondary desktop research provides for a 
limited foundation for the study and may lead to generalisation and subjectivity over the 
content. Consequently, although generalisations are made, there is no clear data to indicate 
such generalisations are accurate, and instead may seem to be oversimplifications.  
Another limitation of the research design is that the use of internet sources and secondary data 
may bring authenticity into question. Academic reliability and validity may be at risk if 
inauthentic sources and data are used. Thus, utmost care must be taken to ensure authentic, 
reliable and valid data is collected and used in order to draw valid conclusions and arguments. 
 





This also leads to the issue of the sheer volume of information that is available for the research 
question. Careful attention will need to be utilised in order to ensure relevant, authentic and 
objective data is used and not simply the first data found. 
1.5. Chapter Outline for Research Study 
Chapter Two examines the theoretical frameworks, which serve as the foundation for this 
research study. Attention will be given to Francis Fukuyama’s original thesis The End of 
History and the Last Man, as in light of the ascension of the political Strongman, this brings 
an obstacle to what Fukuyama perceived for our political and economic future. Essential terms 
related to geopolitics and the literature on democracy are conceptualised, as are the key terms 
crucial for this research study, such as Strongman leadership and its core characteristics. 
Chapter Three will examine the three chosen states, Hungary, Russia and Turkey, and under 
their respective current leadership. Four variables identified as core characteristics of 
Strongman leadership will be assessed in each case study to measure the presence of Strongman 
rule. While examining these core variables, the chapter will also discuss why these variables 
can be argued to be problematic.   
Chapter Four will offer a reflection on Fukuyama’s thesis in light of the research gathered in 
Chapter Three. The aim of this is to not disagree or critique his original thesis but rather show 
that the rise of Strongmen across the globe may act as an obstacle to the achievement of his 
hypothesis. The chapter will then focus on the examination how these Strongmen, and more 
specifically, how their four core characteristics, may contribute to increased geopolitical 
insecurity.  
Chapter Five will focus on the main findings of the study and provide an analysis. The research 
question will be answered, and accomplishments of the research will be reflected upon. 
Furthermore, possible improvements and avenues for further research are addressed. The goal 
is to make secondary parties more aware of the risk of Strongman leadership and its potential 
to increase geopolitical insecurities and renounce the liberal democratic order. 
1.6. Conclusion  
This chapter serves as a general introduction to this research study. Moreover, it provides a 
technical outline of the methodology, research design, limitations as well as a chapter guide. 
The objective of this study is to investigate how Strongman leadership can contribute to 





Russia. The next chapter provides the foundations for this research study and will conceptualise 






Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Conceptualising Key 
Terminology 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical foundations for this study as well as to 
conceptualise key terms and concepts that were briefly discussed in the previous chapter. 
Firstly, Francis Fukuyama’s thesis The End of History and the Last Man will be discussed as 
it is often a focal point in research conducted by other scholars, specifically in their discussion 
of the global democratic decline. This will be followed by the conceptualisation of key 
terminology that will be critical for the advancement of this research. Key term geopolitical 
insecurity will be discussed, thereafter Strongman leadership will be conceptualised based on 
four key aspects that are found to be core characteristics of this style of leadership.  
2.2. Francis Fukuyama – The End of History  
Francis Fukuyama, an acclaimed American political philosopher, entered the global 
imagination when he prophesied that after the fall of communism, free-market liberalism had 
won out and would become the world’s final form of governance. Fukuyama’s initial argument, 
in its most simplistic form, argued that the end of the Cold War was “the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government” (Fukuyama, 1992). Proclaiming the “end of history”, Fukuyama stated 
that, after the fall of communism, free-market liberal democracy had shown to be the most 
successful form of government and would become the world's “final form of human 
government”.  History had ended in the sense that civilisation had finally reached an answer to 
one of the key questions of the purpose of human civilisation, one that had spirited human 
curiosity for centuries. States would have to adopt the principles of liberal democracy and free 
market capitalism to keep up within an increasingly globalised world. Closed communist 
societies, such as the Soviet Union, had shown themselves to be too uncreative and 
unproductive to compete economically and militarily with liberal states. Their political regimes 
were also unstable, since no social form other than liberal democracy provided enough freedom 
and dignity for a contemporary society to remain stable (Fukuyama, 1992). For Fukuyama 
(1992:8), there are no fundamental contradictions in human life that cannot be resolved in the 
context of modern liberalism.  
At the core of his argument, Fukuyama contended that there was/is no conceivable ideological 





govern the material world in the long run (Fukuyama, 1992). Accordingly, liberal democracy 
would undoubtedly triumph for there was no coherent alternative to it (Fukuyama, 1992). 
Communism had failed, Islamic theocracy had precious little support outside the Middle East 
and China’s unique system of state capitalism under the banner of communism could hardly 
be emulated by countries that did not share its unusual history. Thus, Fukuyama contended that 
few people could be persuaded that there was a higher form of civilisation that that of liberal 
democracy found in Europe, the United States and other developed democracies. Henceforth, 
no other system of governance could emerge that would pose a challenge, and as such, the 
future it seemed belonged to liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992).  
While there were also many authors to criticise Fukuyama and his thesis (Gat, 2007; Kagan, 
2008; Barber, 1992), warning that liberal democracy might not triumph all over the world, 
these authors were as sure that it would remain stable in democratic heartlands of North 
America and Western Europe. The argument was that once a country was both affluent and 
democratic, and key democratic benchmarks were attained, the political system would prove 
to be incredibly stable (Fukuyama, 1992). Liberal democracy seemed immutable and it quickly 
took root in formerly autocratic countries from Eastern Europe to South America and was 
making rapid inroads across Asia and Africa. Democracy would reign victorious, for despite 
all its shortcomings, most citizens seemed deeply committed to this form of government 
(Fukuyama, 1992).  
Fukuyama (1992; 2014) also argued that the post-Cold War world would be one of peace and 
prosperity as the world was still bound by a formal order, where borders between states would 
endure but no longer provide the power and incentive to provoke war and conflict. Fukuyama 
envisioned the spreading of the postmodern idea of the state, one in which values trump 
interests. It is important to note that Fukuyama understood that liberal democracy still had its 
limits, however, he argues that he did not see his task as answering “the challenges to liberalism 
promoted by every messiah around the world”.  
To qualify his argument, Fukuyama was adamant to point that the “end of history” did not 
mean all states would automatically become liberal societies or that international conflict 
would end. This is because not all states would recognise or welcome the End of History, in 
large part since liberalism threatens the power and status of illiberal elites. Fukuyama (1992:13-
14) further highlighted two broad movements that might motivate enduring conflict: religious 





liberalism had discredited nationalism as “mild cultural nostalgia” and it was simply a response 
to liberalism failures. Fukuyama (1992:24) argues that “many proponents of liberal democracy 
do not understand the ways in which moderate nationalism can contribute to the success of 
democracy as a matter of practical politics”, as a strong national identity can positively 
reinforce democracy. For Fukuyama (1992:26), national identity can coexist with liberalism (if 
it is a form of tolerant nationalism) as democracy is the only form of government that is 
equipped to deal with a proliferating number of interest groups. Henceforth, the potential rise 
of destructive forms of nationalism and fundamentalism were unlikely to prevail, leading 
Fukuyama to justify why liberalism was likely to be permanent. 
Until recently, Political Scientists had long ago thought that democracy had been set in stone, 
specifically in places like the United States, and Western Europe. So confident were academics 
in this assumption that few considered the conditions under which democratic consolidation 
might risk running in reverse (Tharoor, 2017:5). But recent events call this democratic self-
confidence into question. Until recently most citizens of liberal democracy were satisfied with 
their governments and institutions, however, more and more citizens grow increasingly hostile 
and disillusioned with democracy, questioning its reliability. Post-war liberal consensus has 
come apart under the strain of nationalist populism and intensifying geopolitical competition 
as nations across the globe put Strongmen into power (Snyder, 2019:55). Many authors argue 
that global democracy is experiencing the worst setback since the 1930s and will only continue 
to retreat unless something is done (Inglehart, 2018; Mounk, 2019; Russel-Mead, 2018), while 
others fear the game is already over and that democratic dominance has ended for good 
(Inglehart, 2018:20).  
Miller (2019) argues that if Fukuyama missed anything in his argument, it was the possibility 
of the “marriage of three of the potential challengers to the End of History he identified: the 
union of historical nostalgia with the forces of religious fundamentalism and nationalism” 
(Miller, 2019). These phenomena are driving a wide array of challenges, undermining the 
democratic liberal order. Democracies in several rich, consolidated and established nations now 
face authoritarian, xenophobic populist movements that threaten democracies’ long-term 
health (Russel-Mead, 2018:10). With frequent problematic political developments, society is 
increasingly finding the current political structure and ideas irrelevant (Inglehart, 2018:20).  
This latest democratic setback could prove to be permanent as authoritarian populists are 





are offering citizens a standard of living that increasingly rivals that of the richest countries in 
the West (Mounk & Foa, 2018:35). Authoritarian states are starting to compete with liberal 
democracies, combining a strong state with relatively free market and reasonably secure 
property rights (Mounk & Foa, 2018:33). What we are seeing instead is the rise of illiberal 
democracy, or democracy without rights (Mounk, 2018:14), a working alternative to the liberal 
democracy that has been championed by the West since the end of the Cold War.  
Liberal democracy it seems is being undermined as geopolitical and ideological rivals contend 
with the liberal order (Russell-Mead, 2018:15). The collective economic might of authoritarian 
powers now outweighs that of advanced liberal democracies, and it is probable that the future 
will be characterised as a renewed struggle for global ideological supremacy (Russell-Mead, 
2018:15). With the return of antiliberal nationalism in both emergent and consolidated liberal 
democracies, as well as the emergence of leaders who violate the basic norms of liberal 
democracy, the stability of democracy and security is potentially at risk.  
The use of Fukuyama’s original essay The End of History and the Last Man is not to disagree 
or critique his thesis. Rather to highlight that current events are in contrast to the belief (held 
by many) that the future would be one of democracy, stability and security. It is rather a 
reflection on his thesis and that political events currently arising pose an obstacle to this 
perceived future.   
The assessment of Strongman leadership and the fluctuations such leadership may bring 
towards geopolitics are an important contrast to what Fukuyama predicted and, thus, must be 
important to take note of. The turbulence of current geopolitics does not have to be read as a 
rebuttal of Fukuyama’s original thesis, but it does bring into question whether democracy is 
the last form of human governance. Recently, Fukuyama has also come to doubt his own thesis 
on the End of History, agreeing that in recent years, the number of fallen democracies and 
retreat in virtually all regions of the world does conflict with his original argument (Fukuyama, 
2014, 2018; Tharoor, 2017). With a growing clout of authoritarian states and political leaders, 
the backlash of right-wing nationalism and populism, liberal democracy seems to be in decline 
across the West, which has Fukuyama too, wondering about the prospects of liberal democracy. 
When Fukuyama first wrote his thesis, he did not have a sense or a theory about how 
democracies “could go backwards” as it gave evidence that it was the only credible political 
system (Tharoor, 2017). However, with recent geopolitical events, Fukuyama has come to 





to recognise the current decline, “globalization really does seem to produce these internal 
tensions within democracies that these institutions have some trouble reconciling” (Tharoor, 
2017). This, coupled with the slow erosion of democratic institutions, the weakening of 
democratic norms, and the ascension of political Strongmen, has Fukuyama concerned over 
the possibility of the weakening of liberal democracy.   
2.3. Conceptualising Key Terminology 
The objective in this section is to conceptualise the key terms that are essential to the study. 
The foundation that is built in the following sections is crucial, as it will provide the framework 
for presenting and analysing the research data in the following chapters. First, the term 
“Geopolitical Insecurity” will be conceptualised followed by a discussion of why this is an 
important theme in the current political climate. Each term will be defined in its own context 
before two are combined under one definition. This will offer a more holistic picture and better 
understanding of the concept. Secondly, the concept of ‘Strongman leadership’ will be 
examined, followed by an inspection of the key characteristics that can be commonly found in 
the ideology, rhetoric and actions of Strongmen across the world.  
2.3.1. Geopolitical Insecurity 
2.3.1.1. Geopolitics 
In recent years there has been a debate between scholars about whether geopolitics is 
compatible in the changing world in which we live. Included within this debate is whether or 
not the world is reverting “to traditional power dynamics with untraditional players” or whether 
a “new geopolitics” is emerging based on the importance of soft power rather than traditional 
military hard power (Baylis, 2014:184). In its most simplistic form, some authors also use the 
geopolitical label to simply depict Great Power international relations in general, however, 
many scholars argue there are more layers and elements to the concept (Kelly, 2016:3). 
Brian Blouet (2001:19) defines geopolitics as “policies that seek to establish national or 
imperial control over space and the resources, routeways, industrial capacity and population 
the territory contains”. For Kruger and Frost (2001), traditional geopolitics centres around the 
balance of power and inter-state conflict, rendering it largely irrelevant within the current 
globalised world. Kelly’s (2016:23) definition for geopolitics is “the study of the impact or 
influence of certain geographic features, positions and locations of regions, states, and 
resources, plus topography, climate, distance, state’s size and shape, demography, upon the 





and to policy”. For Kelly (2016), geopolitics should not be equated with ideas such as power 
politics, hegemonic dominance or economic instability but should rather only be “neutral” in 
definition, based upon its geographic heritage, that being states’ and regions’ unique spatial 
positions and locations as impacting upon their foreign relations. Tim Marshall (2015:x), in his 
examination of how geography has shaped the current political world as it is, broadly defines 
geopolitics as “the ways in which international affairs can be understood through geographical 
factors; not just physical landscape – the natural barriers of mountains or connections of river 
networks – but also climate, demographics, cultural regions and access to natural resources”. 
Marshall (2015:10) continues that these factors have an important impact on many different 
aspects of our civilisation, as geography “is clearly a fundamental part of the ‘why’ as well as 
the ‘what’ and in sum, one should see the connection between power and geography”.  
Although Marshall (2015) and Kelly (2016) place a vast amount of emphasis on geography on 
influencing foreign policy and global influence, it can be argued that while geography has its 
place, its importance must not be overstated. Baylis (2014), Falk (2012) and Russell-Mead 
(2014) rather, maintain that if a nation wishes for certain actions and events to take place, it 
will ensure whatever it can to do so, no matter what geographical factors may influence or 
hinder their policies. 
Although some scholars render geopolitics incompatible in today’s world system, many more 
take the position that traditional geopolitics remains as important as ever in the twenty-first 
century. An element critical today is that of “falling-dominoes” or “contagion patterns” in 
which one sort of action, riots, rebellion, military dictatorship or democracy, for instance, can 
flow across national frontiers (Kearns, 2018:126; Kelly, 2016:3; Zonis, Lefkowitz, Wilkin, & 
Yackley, 2011:215). Accordingly, within geopolitics, it is vital to recognise that outside forces 
have always had a profound influence on the stability and instability of states (Zonis et al., 
2010:216). Traditional geopolitics emphasises ideas such as the importance of preventing the 
emergence of a new hegemon, by thwarting any state from dominating Eurasia or/and 
preventing global hegemons from rising (Baylis, 2014:185). This thought process was echoed 
in the policy of containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the idea that “who 
controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who controls Eurasia controls the world” (Baylis, 
2014:185). Traditional geopolitics can be seen in the strategies of both the US and China 
currently, seen by the US prioritising the Pacific while China places emphasis in relation to 
islands in the South and East China Seas. Baylis (2014:185) gives the example of the Syrian 





directly with a view of achieving a balance of power in a critical region of the world which 
suits their interests. While the US and Turkey provided support for the rebels, Russia and Iran 
in contrast aided the Assad regime.  
While these authors argue old geopolitics is still embedded within policy and studies presently, 
those that take this position also point to the emergence of a “new geopolitics”. Richard Falk 
(2012) argues that the emerging “new geopolitics” rests less on the importance of military 
power and more on the importance of soft power, is more universalistic and less statist in the 
composition of actors providing global leadership and influencing policy. Falk (2012) argues 
this can be seen through the emergence of co-operative international groups such as the BRICS4 
countries which expresses the shift in understanding of a more multi-polar world order 
structure. Parallel to this is the rise in importance of a wide variety of non-state actors; such as 
private sector actors and civil society representatives to establish their own institutional sphere 
in order to put forward their own alternative policy agendas.  
Russell (2014:69) who also supports the notion of the return of geopolitics and the emergence 
of a new geopolitics, however, disagrees with Falk (2012) and sees its return as the resurgence 
in which rivalries between great world powers have returned to centre stage of international 
relations, characterised by old-fashioned power plays and anti-western sentiment. Russell 
(2014:70) argues that this new geopolitics sees the globalised world returning its focus to 
questions of territory, military power and global governance, negating global issues such as 
trade liberalisation, nuclear non-proliferation, human rights and climate change. Russell 
(2014:70) argues that geopolitics which takes this form not only diverts time and energy from 
important matters that concern the future betterment of the globe, but it becomes more and 
more difficult to promote and maintain a positive world order. A key point to Russell’s 
(2014:70) argument is that it was incorrect to have expected “old fashioned geopolitics to go 
away”. With the triumph of liberal capitalist democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War, the biggest issues in world politics was assumed to no longer concern 
boundaries, military bases, national self-determination, or spheres of influence. Instead, with 
liberal democracy at the helm, the world was likely to prosper, and issues of the past were 
unlikely (Russell, 2014:70). This then saw the focus shifted away from geopolitics towards 
development economics and non-proliferation. However, several nations never bought into the 
 
4 BRICS is the acronym coined for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, 





geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War and, as such, there have been attempts to 
overturn it ever since, only reviving geopolitics.  
In line with this argument is the view that the “new geopolitics” signifies the entering of a new 
phase of international affairs, leaving behind a brief history characterised by unbridled 
American dominance (Jones, 2017:1; Bremmer, 2018a). According to Jones (2017) and 
Bremmer (2018a), this new geopolitics has several distinct features, some unique to the current 
political flux. This new phase, according to these authors, can be described as a combination 
of a new Cold War between two major political powers, and a G-Zero world in which the 
sentiment is every country for themselves. This current geopolitics sees heightened relations 
between the states; a new ‘great game’ of competition that is prevalent with risk of 
confrontation and miscalculation. Further, idioms such as “American leadership” and America 
first” no longer dominate the dynamics of a world that can now be characterised as a reality of 
asymmetric multi-polarity (Jones, 2017:2) combined with a lack of global governance only 
leading to uncharacteristic political instability (Bremmer, 2018b:4). A central feature of this 
new geopolitical flux is the active re-evaluation by major states of their security relationships 
with the United States. Major countries are questioning whether they can rely on the US to 
maintain inter-state security in their region and, if not, where new help could be found. Jones 
(2017:3) contends that this only amplifies the struggle over political and economic alignment 
across the world, which fundamentally affects the prospects of peace and development on a 
global scale, as there is less and less international collaboration (Bremmer, 2018b:3). Lastly, 
within this new geopolitics is also renewed geopolitical competition which differs depending 
on the state of play. Jones (2017:5) argues that in advanced economies, a deceptive game of 
“confront and conceal” is being played with cyber intrusions, disguised financial influence, 
and disinformation campaigns to disrupt internal politics. While in less advanced economies 
and unstable environments, old fashioned proxy warfare has re-emerged in order to gain control 
over politics or territory. In closing their argument, Jones (2017) and Bremmer (2018b) 
conclude that it only leaves the international landscape in a much more uncertain, tense and 
untrusting situation which will only reverberate insecurity across international relations.  
For Ian Bremmer (2018a, 2018b), Bruce Jones (2017), Ivan Krastev (2017), Richard Falk 
(2012), Thomas Wright (2017) and Steve Richards (2017), geopolitics must be understood in 
the context of globalisation. Understood as the “cross-border flow of ideas, information, 
people, money, and services” (Bremmer, 2018b:8), the resulting interconnected world have 





livelihoods of citizens. Under globalisation, politics has become forever changed, making 
governing a nation more difficult while creating an environment of increased uncertainty. 
These scholars argue that in the face of ever-changing realities, the world has seen the return 
and intensification of geopolitical competition as unprecedented interdependence has shifted 
the array of possible active measures. This economic, financial and technological 
interdependence means major powers may have leverage over, and be vulnerable to, their 
geopolitical rivals (Wright, 2017:172). These authors argue understanding the impact of 
globalisation in the context of geopolitics is important as while the resulting interdependence 
may encourage cooperation and decreased tensions, at the same time it can have the opposite 
effect – increased tensions and frictions. Globalisation’s integration of the world has made 
nations more strategically exposed and has thus created a more geopolitically competitive 
world (Wright, 2017:284). Globalisation is fundamental in the understanding of geopolitics, 
for the stretching of social, political and economic activities across political frontiers gives rise 
to the ability of events, decisions and activities in one region to have significance in distant 
regions of the world. The growing magnitude of interconnectedness clearly impacts the pace, 
intensity and extensity of global interactions and, as such, with domestic and world politics 
becoming practically inseparable, geopolitics must be understood in this context. Simply, one 
nation’s internal direction and external relations will impact key regional and global dynamics 
(Jones, 2017:3).  
In summary, while each scholar seems to have their own definition of the concept 
“geopolitics”, there is clear overlap. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, geopolitics will be 
conceptualised with a combination of understandings as it can be argued all viewpoints 
correspond with one another. At an expansive level, geopolitics concerns the actions of states 
within a global perspective; interactions that occur upon the regional and international stages 
with regards to realms of war and peace, alliance formations and balances of power, national 
security, and the contagion effects that flow across international borders. In its most simplistic 
conceptualisation, geopolitics concerns the current relations between nation states and their 
actions which affect not only a singular space, but more often than not, have a global impact.  
2.3.1.2. Geopolitical Insecurity 
Insecurities, possible threats and instability remain a key concern of geopolitical security. The 
world is increasingly characterised as unstable and unpredictable, leaving the security 
dynamics of the globe in flux (Larrabee, 2010:34). It is evident that military forces continue to 





regions of the world. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons still exert a powerful influence 
on the security calculations of many states. Irrational, ambitious politicians remain head of 
some governments while the presence of diverse values and clear tensions prevent the 
emergence of global cooperation on a wide range of important issues (Baylis, 2014:186). At 
times of uncertainty and anxiety, individual and societal insecurity is increasingly evident as 
the forces of fragmentation destabilise traditional identities, complicating relationships 
between state and non-state actors.  
In a world of continuing mistrust and uncertainty, geopolitical insecurity is likely to remain as 
political communities look after what they perceive to be their own perceived interests, 
sectional, religious, national, or regional security against threats from within and without 
(Baylis, 2014:186). Acknowledged previously, the actions of states do not function in isolation 
but rather have an influence on a global level. As such, in the creation of new challenges and 
unpredictability, the likelihood of geopolitical insecurity is extremely likely as states battle 
with increased anxiety and uncertainty. Ian Kerns (2018) argues that in today’s political 
landscape, the nature of crisis facing states is not only internal weaknesses but, what mostly 
leaves them vulnerable stems from external threats, either a neighbouring country or a nation 
across the sea (2018:107-116). For Kearns (2018:126), in a world so globalised and 
interdependent, a central concern for nations in the current geopolitical world is the issue of 
geography as countries lend their primary focus to their defence of their neighbouring 
countries. 
Larrabee (2010), Falk (2012), Baylis (2014), Bremmer (2018a, 2018b) and Russell (2014) 
argue that, in this context, there are clear implications for security across the globe. These 
authors argue several developments that can be seen to lead to an increased sense of 
geopolitical insecurity. Larrabee (2010:35) first notes that when nations wish to change the 
current security order, as they believe it does not sufficiently take into consideration its current 
status and interests, this can lead to insecurity as it leads to the unpredictability of what such a 
state may do to alter this. This nation often acts to challenge the global balance of power or 
may act in “self-proclaimed defensive actions” in order to maintain its sphere of influence 
(Larrabee, 2010:36). Baylis (2014) and Russell (2014) note that the disregard and trampling of 
international law is also a current feature of geopolitical insecurity as it highlights the 
willingness of nations to become “rogue states” in order to ensure the advancement of its own 
interests. Lastly, Larrabee (2010:44) points to the use of economic instruments and assertive 





resources as a political weapon to erode another nations’ independence. In summary, these 
actions create geopolitical insecurity by way of ensuring there is no trust or special 
relationships between nations, but rather every nation is focused on itself and gaining an edge 
over the other (Albright, 2018:218). For Bremmer (2018b:3), this international fragmentation 
could mean the irreparable damage of the current global regime and a resulting system that is 
far more erratic and anarchistic.  
Ian Bremmer (2018b:5) points to several key elements that have emerged unrecognisable and 
sometimes dysfunctional that point to a geopolitical order characterised by insecurity. Firstly, 
for Bremmer (2019), he argues that the breakdown of long-standing political frameworks in 
advanced economies is causing greater uncertainty over what falls within the realm of probable 
political outcomes. Bremmer (2018b:5) gives the examples of the failure of mainstream parties 
and candidates in liberal democracies across the globe, the increasing populist message of 
centrist leaders in order to out-manoeuvre increasingly intransigent constituencies and the 
election of fringe candidates into office. For Bremmer (2018a), these events are characteristic 
of the radicalisation and disintegration of politics which makes traditionally stable countries 
struggle to deliver the type of governance required for markets to succeed. Problematically, for 
Bremmer (2018b:10) this also means the fraying of important values such as openness and 
integration and, therefore, the possibility for more autocratic, egotistical policies from 
important nations that have long been positive beacons for the world. Another element 
characteristic of the geopolitical insecurity is the unravelling of international alliances. Where 
alliances were once the backbone of the post-World War Two era, they are now characterised 
by mistrust, unreliability and hollowness, only further entrenching a sense of global insecurity 
(Bremmer, 2018a).  
Lastly, an important factor highlighted by these authors (Baylis, 2014; Bremmer, 2018a; 
Russell, 2014), while the message of geopolitics is becoming increasingly self-seeking, this 
does not diminish the role of geopolitics. The reason for this is that some states believe the best 
way to advance their own security and prosperity is through either interfering in other states, 
creating regional or national alliances, or/and even possibly invading another nation. The issue 
with this type of geopolitics is that it centres on competition between regions which involves a 
“predisposition to follow narrowly defined national interests down the rabbit hole will only 
worsen and prolong the effects of a broken global governance system” (Bremmer, 2018b:15). 
Amid this vacuum, consumed by a shortage of trust and collaboration, rising alternatives and 






2.3.2. “Strongman” Leadership  
In modern society, the presence of ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse people 
surrounds the political culture of any context in complexity. Despite this heterogeneity in 
democracies across the globe, authors (Brown, 2014; Roxburgh, 2012; Prashad, 2018) have 
tended to put forward in broad agreement that a ‘strong’ leader is a positive thing. One who is 
strong enough to ensure positive public policy is formulated and put into practice, is successful 
in creating foreign policy and in securing constructive relationships with international states 
and organisations and ultimately ensures the prosperity of the state. Within a democracy, 
leadership is not everything, and only part of the story. However, it is important to understand 
as it can make a significant difference and ultimately affect the prosperity of a nation and its 
citizens (Brown, 2014; Zonis et al., 2011:111). 
Leadership has numerous dynamics and facets which are important to understand when 
examining a leader’s role in the welfare of a state. The basic understanding of democratic 
leadership and the role it is intended to play is characterised as featuring core values that the 
leader possesses and what the leader does for their citizens. Diamond (2015:35) argues that a 
good democracy is a function of a leader who “accords its citizens ample freedom, political 
equality and control over public policies and policymakers through the legitimate and lawful 
functioning of stable institutions”. Critically, a democratic leader governs a political system 
that ensures there are periodic free and fair elections, fair competition among political parties 
and candidates, the fundamental protection of civil liberties and the independence of key 
democratic institutions, such as the judiciary and the legal system (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; 
Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Young, 2002; Schedler, 2001). Durable democratic institutions 
that ensure checks and balances are an essential element to democracy (Albertazzi & Mueller, 
2013; Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Young, 2002; Schedler, 2001) as they ensure legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency, all the while ensuring the power of the majority is constrained.  
Citizens’ ability to be represented as well as for the regime to be held accountable can only 
occur when there are the necessary institutions available. Inglehart and Welzel (2003:64) 
suggest that a political culture governed by a democratic leader is supportive of participation, 
liberty, self-expression and tolerance of diversity. Rothstein and Teorell (2008) argue that a 
democratic leader is one who abides by the value of political equality. This principle legitimises 
democracy as it gives citizens access to political power and ensures their voices are heard in 





impartiality; when a person executes their political power with fairness and objectivity. For 
Young (2002), Gibson (2011) and Diamond (2015), the central value of democracy and a 
democratic leader is inclusivity. This principle ensures that all those within a state are included 
in the political marketplace, no matter their ethnicity, religion or class. 
Although the term is open to more than one interpretation, from a general understanding, a 
“strong” leader, according to Brown (2014:27), is commonly taken to imply an individual 
concentrating power in his hands and exercising it authoritatively. However, this becomes 
problematic when the more power and authority one person accumulates, the more that leader 
is likely to believe in his unrivalled judgement and indispensability. Leaders who amass this 
authority will set themselves apart from other elected politicians, creating the grounds to 
consent to the idea that one leader can be elevated far above others (Brown, 2014:93; 
Roxburgh, 2012; Prashad, 2018).  
Although these Strongmen are being found across the globe in different nations with very 
different histories and cultures, for all their differences, authors find consensus on clear links 
that connect these figures into what can be understood as the “Strongman mould”. Thus, by 
placing these leaders into a specific category of leadership, one can identify their similar traits 
and why this type of leadership can be problematic. Ivan Krastev (2017) defines the Strongman 
as one who uses a more confrontational style of politics, in which charismatic leadership 
matters more than policy. Albright (2018), Kearns (2018) and Temelkuran (2019) note that 
these leaders nudge followers away from the consensus of support for democratic norms; 
whether the country has always been or is recently democratic. Access to high office is not 
seen as a temporary privilege but as a means of imposing their own desires for as long as they 
can through the powers of government. Strongmen politicians tend to represent a specific group 
in their society, traditionally it is the majority and display no interest in cooperation outside the 
specific groups they purport to speak for and represent.  
Paul Lendvai (2017: 10) begins his description of the Strongman regime as perfectly 
summarised by Max Weber’s well-known definition “power is the opportunity, within a social 
relationship, to have your own will prevail even against resistance” as “ruling should mean the 
opportunity for an order of a particular content to be obeyed by the assigned person”. 
Continuing, Lendvai (2017) prescribes a few key aspects that pertain to the power and political 
ideology of the Strongman. Lendvai (2017:19) argues that this type of leader is often admired 





their regime to depend upon, but rather it is the assembly of a great number of devotees. Further, 
the Strongman is someone who almost automatically believes in the veracity of whatever he 
considers to be politically useful to him (Lendvai, 2017:52). Lastly for Lendvai (2017:187) the 
most important feature is the unparalleled concentration of power and the way the power is 
executed as the state becomes synonymous with its leader and his political, social and economic 
power. For the assertion of power has priority over the constitutional state and any existing, 
important issues. 
In his examination of the top political risks for the world in 2019, Ian Bremmer (2019) argues 
that these Strongmen leaders will cumulatively have an increasingly disruptive effect on the 
international order. Bremmer (2019a:18) explains that this coalition of world leaders are 
authentic nationalists, unwilling to uphold the current global liberal order, who challenge 
institutions and the consensus they represent. Referred to as “the coalition of the unwilling” 
(Bremmer, 2019a:18) for the reason that they will not form an actual alliance, Bremmer argues 
that in the aggregate, this coalition will speed the erosion of the international system. These 
Strongmen are referred to as malcontents, as Bremmer (2019a) reasons all these leaders are 
unpredictable and have a penchant for the unexpected. The most worrisome characteristic of 
these Strongmen, Bremmer argues (2019a), is that all these coalition members have outsized 
egos which means that the need to feed the political base – not the greater good – will play 
outsized roles in their decision making. 
Madeline Albright (2018:5) equates the strongman with clear autocratic tendencies, and what 
she argues as fascism in its earliest stirrings. She argues that a strongmen politician can be 
identified as an “apprentice autocrat copying repressive tactics that have been used before”. 
Around the globe, these early stirrings can be seen through the identification of strongmen 
politicians. Albright (2018:40) describes these men as leaders of autocratic temperament, too 
sure of the superiority of their own judgement who will attempt to railroad a policy against the 
wishes of most of their colleagues (Brown, 2014:40). And, in the process, they systematically 
degrade political discourse through the disregard for facts and the honest truth, while proving 
simple and satisfying answers to tangled questions (Albright, 2018:250). They solicit cheers 
by speaking casually and with pumped up machismo laden rhetoric of daring nationalism and 
using violence to blow enemies away (Albright, 2018: 253). 
When we awaken each morning, we see around the globe what appears to be fascism 





who seek to divide rather than unite, the pursuit of political victory at all costs, and the 
invocation of national greatness by people who seem to possess only a warped concept 
of what greatness means. Most often the signposts that should warn us are disguised: 
the altered constitution that passes for reform, the attacks on free press justified by 
security, the dehumanisation of others marked as a defence of virtue, or the drawing 
out of a democratic system so that all is erased but the label. (Albright, 2018:118) 
As noted in the above quote, Albright (2018:9) further argues that the current form of leadership 
can even be likened to the facets of fascism. As often fascism concerns itself less with specific 
policies and more with finding a pathway to power; the tactics of leadership. Fascist chiefs are 
remembered best for their charisma, and through various methods, each establishes an 
emotional link to the crowd and most often brings unpleasant feelings to the surface. “This is 
how the tentacles of fascism spread inside a democracy” (Albright, 2018:10). For Albright 
(2018:20), why this current political leadership is of such concern is because it can be likened 
to the twentieth-century fascism in which magnetic leaders5 exploited widespread 
dissatisfaction and were able to gain immense power.   
For Robert Kagan (2019), the Strongman signifies the return of authoritarianism as an 
ideological and strategic force, emerging as the greatest challenge facing the liberal democratic 
world. Its re-emergence is seen as a geopolitical force as strong nations across the globe are 
championing anti-liberalism as an alternative to wavering liberal hegemony. Kagan (2019) 
argues that the world is least prepared for these leaders and their authoritarianism ideology as 
the liberal order has never considered authoritarianism as a distinct worldview that offers a real 
alternative to liberalism. For Kagan (2019), these Strongman are fundamentally in antagonism 
to the liberal democratic system championed by the west. Their anti-liberal critique is not just 
an excuse for Strongman rule, it is a full-blown indictment of what many regard as the failings 
of liberal society, therefore the Strongman simply wishes to defend their own unique cause and 
perspective against the proponents of the liberal empire.   
2.3.2.1. Four Defining Characteristics of the Strongman  
The next section will focus on four characteristics/traits that can be identified at the core of the 
Strongman’s policies, actions and ideologies. These four characteristics, namely the violation 
of human rights, erosion of democratic institutions, nationalistic populism and breaking 
 
5 Albright (2018) specifically refers to Adolf Hitler and Andrea Mussolini in her reference to the fascist leaders 





sovereignty and international law, were identified as the core tenants as they were most 
reflective of the essence of this type of leadership. These four traits highlight the Strongman’s 
political style and give understanding to why their sudden ascension across the globe is of 
importance to research.  
2.3.2.1.1. Violation of Human Rights  
Strongmen are likely to use creeping authoritarianism which in some way or another will 
violate the human rights of its citizens. Many Strongmen will give permission to the police and 
the military to use unnecessary violence towards anyone who voices their disagreement with 
the regime. This is often seen in the brutality of the police towards citizens during riots and 
citizen protests. Naim and Toro (2018:135) argue that states under Strongman leadership 
ensure heavy-handed policing and repressive violence in order to control opponents and anyone 
who shows resistance to the regime. Naim and Toro (2018) continue, stating that in the face of 
mass protests or opposition, the government is more likely to respond with thousands of arrests, 
torture, brutal beatings and killings of protestors as well as the assassination of opponents and 
critics.  
For their desire to control the state, authors (Burleigh, 2017; Mounk, 2018) argue that the 
Strongmen will curtail several political freedoms, specifically showing a disregard for 
individual rights. The Strongman follows a hierarchical democracy; which allows popularly 
elected leaders to enact the will of the people as they interpret it, without having to make 
allowances for the rights or interests of obstinate minorities. The political instincts of the 
Strongman are to radicalise rather than moderate while their hateful invective of either/or 
woman, gays and minorities sees open bigotry and xenophobia towards minority groups 
(Albright, 2018:57). Thus, when the Strongman targets a specific group, it poses a fundamental 
challenge to the respect for individual rights. Through this type of leadership, the broad 
protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association collapse.  
2.3.2.1.2. Undermining Key Democratic Institutions 
For Albright (2018), Kearns (2018) and Lendvai (2017), a key defining characteristic of the 
Strongman as a political leader is their renunciation of key democratic principles. This is argued 
to first be perceived in their dismissal of important democratic institutions which are critical in 
ensuring a fair and liberal society. Albright (2018) argues this can easily be seen in their 
reference to mainstream media and political journalists as the enemy. Albright (2018) reasons 





to muzzle the free flow of information. For Albright (2018) and Mounk (2018) this is 
problematic as the media plays a vital role in informing citizens about public affairs and 
monitoring the actions of government at all levels, it enables conversation on public affairs and 
enables the people to hold those in office to account. Free media and political journalists are 
critical institutions of democracy and by labelling these organizations as the enemy, it takes 
away the public’s trust, disaffecting an important facet of democracy (Mounk, 2018).  
Albright (2018), Kearns (2018) and Lendvai (2017) argue that this is often taken one step 
further by the Strongman through the process of controlling information through 
disinformation campaigns. These leaders will do whatever it takes to make their regime look 
good in the public eye, ensuring media is manipulated into propogandists for the regime 
(Lendvai, 2017:119). These leaders have shown the ability to use phony websites and social 
media in order to construct echo chambers of support for conspiracy theories, false narratives, 
and ignorant views on important topics. Each year, more and more states employ squads of 
opinion shapers to flood online sites (Albright, 2018:114). Repeated often, these deception 
tactics can start to sound plausible to the average citizen (Albright, 2018:11). What makes this 
so effective and yet very problematic is that the average citizen has no reliable way to determine 
whether their source of information is legitimate and thus can believe in falsehoods. Therefore, 
the advantage of free press is diminished as society battles to discern falsehoods from the truth, 
destroying faith in essential contributors to democracy.  
Aided in the attack of democratic institutions, these leaders have been noted to speak harshly 
about the institutions and principles that make up the foundation of open government and 
ensure those in power are held accountable and cannot overextend their power (Albright, 
2018:5). Ikenberry (2018:2) argues that these leaders pose a challenge to the liberal order 
because “it comes with a casual disrespect for the norms and values of liberal democracy itself”. 
These politicians have a habit of questioning the legitimacy of federal judges, showing little 
regard for the rule of law or the constitution, attacking the idea of the separation of powers, 
guaranteeing efforts to limit the legislative powers of elected parliaments, dismantling 
institutional checks and balances and the pervasive influence of corruption (Kearns, 2018:209). 
Rule of law checks and balances, and a sophisticated state apparatus help ensure that policy is 
of high quality and that the business of government is accomplished, even if political leadership 
is less than inspiring. Rule of law and division of power ensure that stability is maintained, and 
power struggles do not get out of hand. “A government of laws and not of men” (Zonis et al., 





very little else to hold him accountable and ensure the persistence of democratic values. While 
these institutions may stand in the way of the strongman receiving complete control and power 
over the state, over time they come to regard these institutions as an “illegitimate perversion of 
the people’s will” (Mounk, 2018:46).  
Bremmer (2019:4) strongly agrees with these sentiments and argues that the Strongman across 
the globe has weaponised the divisions between those that support their regime and those who 
oppose it, transforming governing institutions into political battlegrounds, weakening the long-
term functionality of representative democracy, and persuading a larger percentage of citizens 
that the system is “rigged” against them.  
2.3.2.1.3. The Imitation of Populist Nationalism  
A core identifying feature of the Strongman is that one can often find traces of populism 
throughout their rhetoric, action and ideology (Albright, 2018; Bremmer, 2019a; Mounk, 2018; 
Lendvai, 2017; Kearns, 2018). Cas Mudde (2017:30), a scholar focused on populism, begins 
his contextualization of populism noting that the issue with an ideology like populism is that it 
is “thin-centred” which means it does not possess the same level of intellectual refinement and 
consistency such as “full” ideologies such as Marxism or Liberalism. Mudde (2017:30) argues 
this leads to contestation between scholars of whether a leader and their political strategy may 
be defined as populist. None the less, Mudde (2017) concludes that with the rise of the 
Strongmen, it is easy to identify the elements of populism within their campaign for power and 
thereafter their use of their power once they are elected.  
A problematic characteristic found in common in these strongman leaders and central to 
populism, is their propensity to centre their campaigns around the view that previous politicians 
had been “co-opted to the socially privilege sphere” and consequently had no interest in 
“changing the social hierarchy” and merely wanted to be part of the “political caste” (Mounk, 
2018; Mudde, 2017:29). Scholars point to these leaders calling for the superiority of the people 
to be restored, while emphasizing the need to remind the elites about from whom they derive 
their power. The strongman claims to represent the rightful source of legitimate power – the 
people, while the political elite remain self-serving, undemocratic opponents and the “real 
people” need to be organised against them (Fitzgibbon & Guerra, 2010; Wilson, 2017). Thus, 
the leader becomes a voice for the real people, a spokesman against the self-interested 
politicians and economically powerful elite (Mudde, 2017:29; Mounk, 2018:40). The 





political elites “whose moral fibre had been rotted” and, as such, promises to be “the voice of 
the silent masses” (Cagaptay, 2017:73). This deep suspicion and resentment towards the 
existing establishment is rubbed raw by the strongman, nurturing their anger and their need to 
seek revenge (Albright, 2018:252; Inglehart & Norris, 2016:6).  
This rhetoric becomes further problematically characterised by the “us versus them” narrative. 
These leaders take on the proclivity to malign immigrants, all the while nurturing a paranoid 
bigotry of “outsiders” or any “other” that is not part of the “real people” that have been 
identified (Mudde, 2017:28-30). The “people” the strongman promises to represent are often 
confined to specific group in a society; a homogenous people, thus often excluding people from 
other countries and other cultures (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). The strongman argues that they 
are experiencing a disintegration of their identity; that multiculturism is not working and is 
instead leading to the growth of parallel, alien societies (Murray, 2018:137). Further, it is 
argued by these leaders that the established politicians have a misguided fetish for diversity; 
an explanation for why the establishment has been unable to deliver on their outsized problems 
(Mounk, 2018:8) and such the discourse soon becomes one of bigotry, xenophobia and hate 
(Albright, 2018:119). Scholars identify that those deemed as foreigners, members perceived to 
be on the margin of society and those who are not identified as part of the collective “common 
people” are identified as “other”, since they do not belong to the community (Albertazzi & 
Mueller, 2013:348). These leaders draw an explicit and direct line between issues faced in their 
nation and the influx of immigrants or any individual that is different from the majority 
(Kearns, 2018:78). It is argued that these minorities, immigrants and refugees who hold 
different cultural backgrounds, are a threat to the security and way of life of the “real people” 
and “are overrunning us and threatening our civilisation”. This culminates in what Mounk 
(2018) describes as the Strongman posting an in-group – united around a shared ethnicity, 
religion, social class – against an outgroup whose interests can be rightfully disregarded and 
thus has the right to “claiming a moral monopoly of representation”.  
Abts and Rummens (2007:421) furthermore, note that the identification of the real people may 
see the populist party or figure choosing to ignore or remove the constitution, parliament, and 
opponents in their pursuit of representing the “will of the people”. This can further lead to the 
continuous de-legitimisation of opponents, and suppression of any possible political 
divergence in order to ensure the survival of the populist regime and the endurance of the image 





Kurt Weyland (2017:57) argues that populism is often used by the Strongman as a political 
strategy revolving around an individual politician, giving rise to a “personalistic dictatorship” 
where power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Specifically, it rests upon 
“personalistic” leadership that “seeks to boost its autonomy and power; and contests, pushes 
aside, or dominates other types of actors, such as elite factions and organised political parties.” 
Weyland (2017:65) argues that these leaders are dangerous because, in their quest for power, 
they will adjust to contextual opportunities and constraints by avoiding commitment to any 
discourse, worldview or ideology. By not tying their political fate to any ideocratic vision, the 
Strongman becomes an uncertain and unpredictable force and pursues the most aggressive and 
risky policies without considering the long-term consequences (Weyland, 2017:66). Weyland 
(2017) summarises the issue of this leadership as “populism in power stretches toward an 
extreme and unfettered strong-man rule”.  
There is no doubt that national leaders have a duty to serve the best interests of their countries, 
however, strongmen politicians diverge in how the interests of their nation are best advanced. 
Albright (2018) and Lendvai (2017) contend that with the current rise of Strongmen leaders, 
there is a clear nationalistic streak through their political ideology. These scholars argue that 
these leaders tend to view the world with the belief that the globe is a battlefield in which every 
country is intent on dominating every other; where nations compete like real estate developers 
to ruin rivals and squeeze every penny of profit out of deals (Albright, 2018:6). These leaders 
ignore the stake that all countries have in the fates of others and rather see the globe functioning 
as a competitive struggle for advantage over all the nations across the world. The Strongman 
promises to act as a “heroic representative of the spirit of the nation” (Lendvai, 2017:120), to 
defend their state against all those that wish to undermine its dominance and sovereignty. 
Muller (2019: 350) argues that leaders described as nationalist are better understood as populist 
poseurs who have won support by drawing on the rhetoric and imagery of nationalism, 
responding to deep nationalist yearnings among ordinary people who crave to have their 
national identity recognised and confirmed.  
For Appiah (2019:25) and Rose (2019), nationalism’s largely unpredicted resurgence is 
sobering and “has come back with a vengeance”. The authors argue the current forms of 
nationalism used by the Strongman does not give rise to respect for other nationals but explodes 
instead into hostility and xenophobia. Rose (2019:8) contends that while states function as 
sovereign political structures, nations become about unified social groups and such the claims 





greatest crimes in history. For these scholars, the term nationalism has become a dangerous, 
divisive, illiberal impulse that should be treated with scepticism and disdain (Appiah, 2019; 
Rose, 2019; Tamir, 2019:48). Cederman (2019:61) and Snyder (2019:59) note that this current 
nationalism seen from these leaders tends to double down on some combination of 
manipulation chauvinism and repression, with the belief that state borders should coincide with 
national communities as a core source of political legitimacy.  
This nationalism also extends into economic and foreign policy. The strongman will advocate 
for protectionism, ignoring global institutional competition rules, no longer providing aid to 
foreign countries, the limitation of free movement of both goods and peoples across borders 
and will automatically take measures that primarily hit foreign investors and multinational 
concerns (Kearns, 2018:158; Lendvai, 2017:120). These leaders also often show either no 
understanding of, or no allegiance to, international organisations and what used to be described 
as shared values of the transatlantic space. These leaders can come across as ethnonationalist 
according to Cederman (2019:64), as they are typically hostile to international organisations 
that favour minority rights, multi-ethnic governance and compromise. In their eyes, calls for 
power sharing contradict their ethnic group’s rightful dominance. They view the protection of 
human rights and the rule of law, as well as humanitarian interventions, such as peacekeeping 
operations, as direct threats to their ethnonationalist agendas (Cederman, 2019:64). In a more 
transparent sense these views can come across as “un-American” or “un-European” as they go 
against the idea of a liberal democratic society for all those who live in it (Kearns, 2018:4). 
The attitude posed is often emblematic of a wider dismissal of multilateralism and multilateral 
institutions in which the ideas of integration are obsolete and detrimental (Lendvai, 2017:120). 
2.3.2.1.4. Violation of Sovereignty and International Law 
Cohen (2019:139) argues that a key variable that shrouds the Strongman is their erratic foreign 
policy, diplomacy and attitude towards global institutions and laws. The Strongman views the 
world in darkly narrow, zero-sum terms and, as such, will follow sporadic policy, as long as it 
ensures their survival and the prosperity of their nation. This leaves the Strongman grasping 
for any opportunity that will allow him to consolidate his grip on power at home, while 
overseeing opportunistic expansion abroad. Authors (Haass, 2019; Oliker, 2018) argue that the 
Strongman often shows his willingness to disrupt the status quo, whether it is using force, 
military intervention, invasion or aggressive cyberwarfare in nations across the globe. With 
strong nationalistic tendencies, the Strongman will often abstain from any form of multilateral 





nations in order to ensure personal expansion of power (Albright, 2017; Chertoff & Rasmussen, 
2019; Posen, 2018a, 2018b; Sampson, 2018:38-40). 
2.4. Conclusion  
Chapter Two has discussed the theoretical foundations and concepts that are critical to gaining 
a better understanding of this thesis and why this research is important. Francis Fukuyama’s 
thesis is used to bring awareness that the stability and security once envisioned may be under 
threat.  
Understanding Geopolitics and Geopolitical insecurity is important as each concept is defined 
very differently by numerous authors. As shown, authors tend to focus on very different 
elements of geopolitics and, by showcasing different understandings, a more complete picture 
is given into the understanding of geopolitics. This thesis will use the conceptualisation of 
geopolitics to mean the study and understanding of international relationships and the 
atmosphere between different states in a globalised and competitive world.  
In the examination of the definition of Strongman leadership, this thesis will examine these 
four aspects and assess to what extent they are present in the countries chosen. The first being 
the erosion of principal democratic institutions, secondly the disregard for human rights, shown 
by the intolerance towards certain groups/religions or people or/and their mistreatment. The 
third characteristic is that of populist nationalism, shown by ideology, rhetoric and action 
through the election process and once in power. The fourth characteristic is that of the violation 
of international laws and sovereignty of other states in order to achieve the goals of the nation. 
These characteristics are identified as the most centric of the Strongman as well as the most 
likely to create or lead to geopolitical insecurity. To follow is a table that highlights the four 
defining characteristics of the Strongman. In order to measure the presence of Strongman rule, 












Table 1. Measuring the Presence of Strongman Rule – Based on Four Defining 
Characteristics 
 
Aspect Indication it is present 
1. The Erosion of democratic institutions  • The failure to separate the three 
branches of government (the legislative, 
the executive and the judicial) 
• The violation of free and fair elections 
• The muzzling of independent media 
2. The violation of human rights • The use of violence and brutality 
against protestors and opposition 
• The assassination of opponents 
• The inability to use social media freely 
or voice one’s own opinion  
• Inability to criticise the current political 
regime 
• The attack of a specific minority group 
and possibly undermining their civil 
liberties 
3. Populist Nationalism  • Argues against the political elite and 
promises to act as a voice of the “real 
people” 
• Uses “us vs them” narrative, often 
leading to xenophobic attitudes towards 
immigrants, refugees and ‘outsiders’ 
• Proposes protectionist policies and is 
against international cooperation  
4. Break Sovereignty and International 
Law  
• Will disobey international law and 
signed treaties 
• The illegal invasion of other states 
• The use of hybrid-warfare: 
cyberwarfare, disinformation, and/or 
military force in other states to advance 
own agenda  
• Diminish a system of global alliances 






Compiled by author for use in this study. Assembled with reference to the following authors: 
Albright, 2018; Banos, 2017; Bremmer, 2019a; Lendvai, 2017; Kagan, 2018; Kearns, 2018; 








Chapter Three: The Rise of the Strongman – Russia, Hungary and Turkey 
3.1. Introduction 
The following chapter seeks to explore three nations, namely Russia, Hungary and Turkey and 
the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orban and Recep Erdogan respectively. Each state 
will be examined under four previously identified Strongman leadership characteristics in order 
to determine the presence of Strongman leadership. Each nation and their leaders will be 
examined regarding whether their actions have violated key democratic institutions, eroded 
human rights and civil liberties, whether the leader espouses nationalistic populism and lastly, 
whether the leader has broken international law and sovereignty. 
3.2. Russia – President Vladimir Putin  
In March 2000, Vladimir Putin won the first of what would be four presidential elections, gave 
the impression that even the most difficult problems could be resolved, and set about rebuilding 
the Russian state (Glasser, 2019:14). Putin believed that in order to restore Russia’s standing 
as a global power, Russia needed to be built on a foundation of strong, effective government 
and centralised leadership (Eltchaninoff, 2018). Although Putin fundamentally believes in the 
prosperity of the Russian people and the Russian state, the nation’s state of democracy is 
questionable. Examining the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who has been at the forefront of 
Russian politics for twenty years, this section will attempt to determine to what extent he 
embodies the characteristics of the political Strongman.  
3.2.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions  
Durable democratic institutions are important in the functioning of a liberal democracy as they 
ensure legitimacy, accountability, transparency and that the power of the majority is restrained. 
Specifically, the Judicial and Legislative branches help ensure horizontal accountability – 
office holders behave lawfully and appropriately, that the law is fairly and consistently applied 
to all and all political actors are held liable for their actions (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; 
Diamond, 2015; Kapstein & Converse, 2008; Schedler, 2001). Strongman leaders have 
repeatedly shown their rejection of these institutions and their principles, following policies 
and actions to undermine the checks and balances that may hold them in contempt. Vladimir 
Putin’s actions towards Russia’s democratic institutions will be studied in order to determine 






3.2.1.1. Complete Control of the Media  
In Russia, the media acts as a powerful political tool used to influence citizens through 
propaganda, assert state control, prevent opposition from gaining momentum and to regulate 
the information received by citizens (Eltchaninoff, 2018; Isikoff & Corn, 2018; Nance, 2016). 
Nance (2018:65) and Sakwa (2008) refer to Russia’s democracy as a “Sovereign Democracy”, 
which “is a political system which ensures effective management of all public affairs” and, as 
such, media intervention is a central element. Examining the research conducted by other 
authors, evidence points to the actions undertaken by Putin in order to curtail the freedom of 
the media (Bindman, 2013; Isikoff & Corn, 2018; Nance, 2018). By limiting the freedom of 
the media, Putin has been able to assert more authority over what information citizens receive, 
shaping political opinion and limiting public access to opposition parties. Putin’s strategy 
towards the media is reflective of a broader policy – concentrating various powerful resources 
into the hands of a federal elite loyal to Putin (Bindman, 2013; Eltchaninoff, 2018).  
The entirety of the Russian state media, including numerous agencies, magazines and 
newspapers, have come under control of Putin and the Kremlin. Russian state media now 
produces more than 80% of all television in the nation. Putin co-ordinates state disinformation 
campaigns, giving clear-cut instructions on what to expose, who to attack, and what narrative 
will work best (Nance, 2018:128). Free independent media companies that go against Putin in 
any way often become targets of the state, either being forced to terminate or purchased and 
turned into state allied media.  
Mass media inside Russian borders is under complete control of the state; citizens’ social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, as well as internet usage, are consistently 
monitored (Nance, 2018; Roxburgh, 2012). Roskomnadzor, the Kremlin agency, controls all 
access to the internet, giving the Russian state the power to monitor, limit, block or cut off 
anyone who incites dissent or even criticises the Kremlin (Nance, 2018:134; Roxburgh, 2012). 
A law approved in 2014 by Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, requires domestic and foreign 
companies to store the personal data of Russian citizens on servers in Russia. Those who refuse 
can be fined or prevented from operating in the country (Bennetts, 2019).  
3.2.1.2. The Vertical of Power 
One of Putin’s earliest decisions as president was to start creating what he termed the “vertical 
of power” – the gathering of all political power to the centre, and effectively into his own hands 





previously weak leadership. Just six days after his inauguration – Putin announced that Russia’s 
89 regions would be placed under control of seven ‘super governors’ who were personally 
chosen by the president. Five of the enforcers turned out to be men who had had careers in the 
secret service and armed forces. This was followed by reform in the upper chamber of 
parliament (the federation council/the senate). Previously elected regional governors were 
replaced by nominated representatives, allowing the Kremlin to fill the council with ‘friendly’ 
senators (Partlett, 2013:37).  
Through the appointment of trusted colleagues from various aspects of his life, Putin could 
ensure he centralised power. Many of them were also given directorships in state companies, 
enmeshing the country’s political and business structures in a vast web that centred around 
Putin himself. Old colleagues and KGB6 associates were placed in key political positions 
(Roxburgh, 2012). In doing this, Putin ensured all representatives were subject to pressure from 
the Kremlin. In addition to this, Putin pushed laws that permitted the president to remove 
governors under certain circumstances and he eliminated the direct popular election of 
governors, in effect taking on the power to appoint and dismiss regional leaders (Herspring, 
2009:154-155). Today, scholars (Kendall-Taylor et al., 2017) estimate that Putin has a circle 
of 20-30 trusted advisors with close ties to the security and military services, ensuring that the 
real power resides with an inner circle of just half a dozen individuals. The appointment of 
Putin’s associates to key jobs is reflective of his failure to adhere to the principles of the 
separation of powers and a fair and just system. It has also ensured his effective removal of 
channels for possible opposition against his political leadership. By centralising power around 
him, Putin has removed horizontal accountability, and has ensured there are very few limits 
placed on his political power. 
3.2.1.3. The Erosion of Free, Fair and Competitive Elections 
Under the leadership of Putin, the existence of free and fair elections comprising of several 
competitive opponents has often come into question. Scholars also suggest that despite 
democratic elections, Putin has systematically turned elections into a process in which the 
public is given a chance to validate decisions already made in the Kremlin (Glasser, 2019:15; 
Herspring, 2009:168). For instance, the creation of the political party Rodina is popularly 
believed to have been created by Putin advisor Vladislav Surkov, in an effort to erode the voting 
 
6 Translated in English as Committee for State Security, was the main security agency for the Soviet Union from 






base of the communist party. Surkov supposedly established Rodina7 to make Putin’s United 
Russia party look moderate next to the ultranationalist coalition of the right and left (Nance, 
2018:82). This would ensure more public support and legitimisation for Putin’s campaign. 
After Putin finished his two presidential terms in 2008, newly elected President Dmitri 
Medvedev was chosen personally by Putin and argued to be his political puppet (Herspring, 
2009). According to one poll, 67 percent of Russians believed Medvedev would continue to 
“act under the control of Putin” and his inner circle (Herspring, 2009:170). This is indicative 
of Putin’s centralising of power across Russia’s political domain and his ability to influence 
political events even after conceding power.  
Opposition leaders and parties have often been intimidated and threatened at the request of 
Putin. If an opposition party or opponent does run for office, Putin ensures  extremely limited 
availability to state resources and state media in order to campaign to the Russian people. In 
2016, Putin prevented a possible opposition party – Peoples Freedom Party – from registering 
based on a technicality (Eltchaninoff, 2016). Putin also recently created the All-Russian 
National Front, a political party which consisted of numerous state and public organisations in 
order to maximise the pro-government vote (Besemeres, 2018).  
The legitimacy of elections has also been questioned by Russian citizens and international 
organisations. In early December 2011, Russia held nationwide parliamentary elections. 
According to election monitors, there was blatant cheating, including the brazen stuffing of 
ballot boxes. A video, which quickly went viral, surfaced of an election chairman’s marking 
off a stack of ballots (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:35). Independent election observers were also 
reportedly harassed and received several cyberattacks on their websites during the election 
cycle. 
3.2.2. The Violation of Human Rights 
In the creation of his own interpretation and version of democracy, Putin has demanded the 
prerogative to reinterpret in his own way the notions of human rights or freedom of expression 
(Eltchaninoff, 2018:81). Examining Putin’s actions regarding those who have openly critiqued 
his leadership, as well as the actions he undertook in Chechnya, can give evidence to the 
question of his position with regard to citizens’ rights and liberties.   
 
7 Rodina or Motherland-National Patriotic Union is a nationalist political party in Russia and was a coalition of 





3.2.2.1. Political Murder 
Argued by Biden, Jr and Carpenter (2018;46), Herspring (2009), Nance (2018) and Isikoff and 
Corn (2018), Russia has often made use of problematic policies towards those that have openly 
criticised or antagonised Putin. Evidence points to the willingness of Putin to ask his comrades 
to harass and murder opposition politicians and journalists, stepping up efforts to eliminate and 
silence anyone who opposes his leadership.  
Journalists who oppose the Putin regime, or openly criticise its actions, are often a target for 
assassination. In 2006, Russia’s most prominent journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, was murdered 
outside her Moscow apartment. She had been a Putin critic and persistent chronicler of Russia’s 
human rights abuses in the war-torn Russian Republic of Chechnya (Bindman, 2013:1957; 
Nance, 2018:57; Isikoff & Corn, 2018:20). A few weeks later, Alexander Litvinenko, a former 
officer of Russia domestic intelligence service, died of heart failure after digesting radioactive 
poison. According to Litvinenko, it was Putin who had ordered his assignation after Litvinenko 
had grown more critical of the corruption of Russian Law enforcement. Working with British 
intelligence to expose Russian corruption, Litvinenko was murdered for what Putin saw as 
betrayal to the Russian regime (Herspring, 2009; Nance, 2018:114-116).   
Natalya Estemirova was abducted and murdered on July 15, 2009, after having covered the 
human right abuses in Chechnya, including kidnapping, torture and executions by the Russian 
government (Nance, 2018:117). On March 4, 2018, former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his 
daughter were found poisoned after ingesting a military grade nerve agent (Nance, 2018). 
Opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was gunned down and murdered crossing a bridge one block 
from the Kremlin in February 2015, with the usual patrols and cameras unavailable on the night 
in question (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:57; Herspring, 2009; Nance, 2018). These political murders 
are evidence of the lengths Putin is willing to go to in order to secure his political power and 
what he believes is the protection of the Russian state (Nance, 2018:120).  
Recently, in July 2019, in the run up to Moscow City Council elections, Russian electoral 
authorities took the decision to bar independent and opposition candidates from running. With 
protests prompted, the Moscow police cracked down hard on those who turned up, leading to 
the arrest of nearly 1,400 people, while anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny, who had urged 
people to attend the protests, had been jailed for 30 days in the run-up. This was the most arrests 
at a Russian protest in more than a decade, signalling that the Kremlin had decided to extend 





3.2.2.2. Chechnya  
Russia’s abuse of human rights is most evident in the case of Chechnya and the violations 
committed against civilians. What started as a military operation in December 1994, the 
Russian army aimed at crushing the secessionist regime that had been ruling the North 
Caucasian Autonomous Republic of Chechnya since late 1991. Based on countless evidence, 
Russia was said to have conducted grave human rights violations against Chechen civilians 
during the two wars between 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 (Bindman, 2013; Cornell, 1999; 
Kumar, 2000). Evidence suggests Putin gave his security officials the right to indiscriminately 
bomb civilian areas, follow through with extrajudicial executions, torture, massacres, and the 
spreading of land mines (Bindman, 2013; Cornell, 1999; Evangelista, 2002:64; Eltchaninoff, 
2018; Kumar, 2000; Roxburgh, 2012). 
Unwilling to reach a power-sharing agreement and the desire for Chechnya to remain part of 
the federation, Russia bombarded the Chechen capital of Grozny, subjecting the city to 
relentless bombing raids, and killing thousands of citizens (Eltchaninoff, 2018; Jonson, 2001). 
For instance, on October 21st, Russian missile strike on a market in Grozny killed over 100 
civilians. Citizens of Chechnya were driven away, or disappeared into internment camps and 
mass graves, while frequent guerrilla attacks, assassinations and abductions continued 
(Bindman, 2013; Cornell, 1999; Evangelista, 2002:64; Kumar, 2000; Roxburgh, 2012).  
Since 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has issued more than 100 rulings 
against Russia, however, Russian press, supported by Putin and his government, have 
continually attempted to frame the court’s work in establishing the human rights violations in 
Chechnya as flawed or motivated by some form of anti-Russian bias (Bindman, 2013; 
Mendelson, 2002). Russian justice minister Aleksandr Konovalov even told reporters “there 
are serious reasons to doubt the impartiality and full objectivity of the European court” 
(Bindman, 1963, 2013). Russia has also gone as far as ensuring the “securitization of 
information on Chechnya” (Mendelson, 2002:64), restricting any reporting of events and even 
telling journalists and media agencies that events must be portrayed in a specific way 
(Bindman, 2013). Putin’s disregard for the lives of Chechnyan civilians and his refusal to 
acknowledge the events that took place, is reflective of his wider dismissal of human rights and 
humanitarian law. Further, it shows his casual disrespect for human rights in order to maintain 
his political power and rebuild Russia’s position as a regional power through destabilising other 





3.2.3. Nationalistic Populism 
Putin and his United Russia party have consistently extoled virtues of strong, divisive 
leadership, openly shown a disdain for established institutions, and expressed a deep mistrust 
of perceived experts and elites. Putin has built the political regime around him, personalising 
the Russian system so much so that its stability is contingent on Putin’s own popularity 
(Kendall-Taylor et al., 2017; Mamonova, 2019). Examining the leadership style of President 
Vladimir Putin, there is evidence to suggest that he has followed the “populist playbook” in 
cementing his powerful position as Russia’s leader. 
Throughout his tenure as the President of Russia, Putin has strongly spoken about the national 
interests of the state and its citizens as well as showing a nostalgia for past glories. Populist 
nationalistic leaders promise to return the nation to ‘greatness’ and Putin’s nationalism 
embraces a deep-seated desire to restore Russia to the greatness of its Soviet years, especially 
through the exercise of state power (Eltchaninoff, 2015; Herspring, 2009; Mamonova, 
2019:564). Putin often evokes feelings of patriotism as he promises to restore Russia to its 
“former glory” and status as a great power player (Roxburgh, 2012). His rhetoric is instructive 
and promising, “Patriotism is a source of courage, staunchness and strength of our people. If 
we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which relate to it, we will lose ourselves as 
a nation capable of great achievements” (Herspring, 2009:157). As such, he postulates that any 
action against him or his political policies is “national treachery” and an attack against the 
future of Russia (Eltchaninoff, 2018:63).  
Putin’s rhetoric and leadership often calls for the populist unity between the ‘people’ 
(Mamonova, 2019:562). Since his rise to power, Putin has referred to Russian citizens as the 
silent majority – those people whose interests have been overlooked in favour of the economic 
and political elite. Before Putin’s election in March 2000, Putin spoke about outlawing the 
elites, or in Russia’s case, the oligarchs: “Those people who fuse power and capital – there will 
be no oligarchs of this kind as a class” (Roxburgh, 2012). When addressing the ‘real people’, 
Putin blamed Russia’s poor economic and political environment on the actions of the oligarchs, 
arguing it was there lack of understanding the true Russian people that had left ordinary 
Russians in financial predicaments with no access or means to change it. Asserting that the 
system has been rigged against them, Putin managed to rise to national leadership through this 
populist, divisive technique (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2016). Putin has also ensured that his 
image is that of one of ‘the people’. He has established himself as the image of an ordinary 





undying commitment to the Soviet Union and then the new Mother Russia (Herspring, 2009; 
Sakwa, 2008). 
What makes Putin part of the list of populist predecessor Strongmen is his long, slow and steady 
approach to dismantling democracy. Putin has gained his power through consistent democratic 
elections, while using widespread discontent to gradually undermine institutional constraints, 
marginalise the opposition and erode civil society. He has deliberately installed loyalists in key 
positions of power, has neutralised the media by ensuring it is state owned or owned by friendly 
oligarchs and enforcing censorship. Populist leaders often first come to power through 
democratic elections and subsequently harness the widespread discontent that got them elected 
to gradually undermine institutional constraints on their rule, erode democratic institutions, 
erode civil society and marginalise the opposition (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2016). 
3.2.4. Break Sovereignty & International Law 
Consolidating his grip on power at home, President Vladimir Putin has overseen an 
opportunistic expansion of influence operations, specifically targeting vulnerable states on 
Russia’s border. Hoping to restore Russia to its former glory, Putin argues that in order to re-
establish Russia’s sphere of influence, it must co-ordinate a nationalist, conservative movement 
that encroaches on military, political, economic and informational domains of former Soviet 
countries and beyond (Biden, Jr & Carpenter, 2018; Oliker, 2018; McFaul, 2018a). In the 
examination of Putin and Russia’s actions, specifically in its use of information warfare across 
nations, the invasion of the Ukraine in 2014 and its involvement in the US 2016 presidential 
election, evidence will suggest whether Putin has broken international law and the principle of 
sovereignty.  
3.2.4.1. International Interference 
Putin and the Kremlin’s disruptive efforts centre around a vast array of tactics, penetrating 
government, business, and media networks all over the world (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:44). These 
tactics range from covert and overt support for anti-establishment political parties spanning 
from the far left to the far right, funding front groups, interfering in elections and referendums 
and making donations and investments into key economic sectors to build political influence 
over time (Albright, 2017; Cohen, 2018; Sampson, 2018:38). The Russian government has 
made use of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and financial influence to meddle in the 
internal affairs of at least 24 European countries and North America since 2004 (Albright, 





the EU such as Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, Russia has financed and organised internet 
discussion outlets to cast doubt on the value of EU membership, suggesting that the EU is 
unsafe and does not offer the prosperity it markets (Biden, Jr & Carpenter, 2018; Snyder, 
2018:100). In Sweden, Russia flooded the nation with fake news and disinformation, 
attempting to smear the government, all in the desire to discredit NATO and keep Sweden from 
formerly joining the alliance (Nance, 2018:216). In France, Putin has formed a burgeoning 
relationship with the right-wing party National Front, led by Marine Le Pen. So much so that 
a Russian bank with close ties to the Kremlin loaned the party a reported sum of $9.8 million 
(Isikoff & Corn, 2018:53). Although these actions are not direct challenges to international law 
and sovereignty, they do interfere in the affairs of sovereign states and hope to influence events 
towards anti-liberal, autocratic destinations. These actions reflect Putin’s deliberately 
established system of clandestine interventions in democratic processes far from Russia’s 
borders.   
3.2.4.2. Invasion of Ukraine & the Annexation of the Crimea 
The independent Ukrainian state was seen as a barrier to Putin’s desire to create a “Slavic 
Union” and restoring Russian hegemony (Larrabee, 2010:38) and, as such, Putin openly argued 
that the invasion and annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia was a “necessary condition”  
to which they were rightfully deserving (Eltchaninoff, 2018:76; Snyder, 2018:97). Beginning 
in 2013, at a time when Ukraine was in negotiations with the EU over the terms of an 
association agreement, Putin feared this would lead to the Ukraine moving out of Russia’s 
influencing orbit and align itself with the West. After discussion with Ukrainian president 
Viktor Yanukovych, Putin convinced him to abandon the agreement, leading to the sudden 
declaration that Ukraine would no longer be signing the agreement. This severely angered the 
Ukrainian people, erupting in civil unrest and political instability (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:45; 
Nance, 2018; Polyakova & Haddad, 2019:118). 
With the rise of protests and mass unrest in Ukraine, Yanukovych abruptly fleeing Kiev and 
opposition forces taking over, Putin believed the United States had mounted a coup to 
overthrow his ally and impose an anti-Putin government on Russia’s border. Determined to 
reassert Russian dominance, Putin saw an inopportune moment for the Russian invasion and 
dismemberment of the Ukrainian state (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:45; Polyakova & Haddad, 2019; 
Snyder, 2018:135). Russia’s main goal became centred on the “disintegration of the Ukrainian 
state”, tactically done through discrediting both Yanukovych and the opposition by violence, 





Ukraine on the 24th of February, sending some ten thousand Russian special forces northward 
through the Crimean Peninsula, officially engaging in the illegal invasion of the Ukraine 
(Kearns, 2018; Polyakova & Haddad, 2019). By the night of the 26th, Russian soldiers had 
seized the regional parliament building and on the 28th, the Russian parliament endorsed the 
incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the Russian federation (Snyder, 2018:138-139). On 
March 16, the Ukrainian citizens of Crimea took part in an electoral farce that the Russian 
occupiers called a referendum, giving them the option to either vote for the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia or to restore the autonomy of the Crimean authorities (who had just been 
installed by Russia and requested annexation by Russia). In a ceremony in Moscow, Putin 
accepted what he called the wishes of the Crimean people and officially extended the 
boundaries of the Russian Federation (Kearns, 2018; Polyakova & Haddad, 2019).   
Currently, Putin has been adamant in his and Russia’s implausible deniability, claiming the 
invasion must be understood as the righteous rebellion of an oppressed people against an 
overpowering global conspiracy (Albright, 2017:166; Nance, 2018:53). Putin also justifies his 
actions on the basis that he has every reason to assume the policy of containment continues 
today (Eltchaninoff, 2018:76).  
The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces violated basic consensual principles of international 
law, the United Nations charter, every treaty signed between independent Ukraine and Russia, 
as well as a number of assurances that Russia had offered Ukraine about the protection of its 
frontiers (Snyder, 2018:142). Russia’s breaking of sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and the 
illegal annexation of the Crimea has also fermented a slow-burning war that has killed 13,000 
Ukrainians and displaced 1.5 million (Polyakova & Haddad, 2019:112). Russia’s invasion and 
annexation of Crimea wholly violated international law, broke the inter-state consensus that 
had guaranteed European stability since the end of Nazism while simultaneously undermining 
international human rights.    
3.2.4.3. Interference in the US 2016 Presidential Election  
To safeguard Russia and its kleptocratic system, as well as continue to secure a future of soviet 
hegemony, Putin decided to attack what it perceives as the greatest external threat to its 
survival: Western democracy. By attacking the West, the Kremlin and Putin can consolidate 
power at home, shift attention away from corruption and economic malaise, activate nationalist 
passions to stifle internal dissent, and keep western democracies on the defensive and 





Vladimir Putin was able to exert untrammelled influence over western democracies, disrupting 
US politics and discrediting the US democratic process (Biden, Jr & Carpenter, 2018:45; 
Cohen, 2018:2). 
A report delivered by special counsel Robert Mueller to the Department of Justice to investigate 
“any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated 
with the campaign of President Donald Trump” (Kotkin, 2019:62; Mueller, 2019) is indicative 
of Russia’s willingness to unlawfully influence the foreign affairs of other nations. In the first 
volume, evidence is scrutinised on the possibility of criminal conspiracy between Trump’s 
political campaign and the Russian government. The report states that Russia did indeed 
interfere in the 2016 US presidential election “in sweeping and systematic fashion” (Mueller, 
2019) through spreading disinformation over social media and disseminating illegally obtained 
emails from opponent Hilary Clinton and her senior advisors. The Mueller report clearly 
establishes that the Russian government believed it would benefit from a Trump led American 
presidency and, as such, worked to secure that outcome (Kotkin, 2019:63; Mueller, 2019). 
Russian intelligence organisations, under the instructions of Putin, used a variety of strategies 
to influence American citizens and the democratic political process in the run up and during 
the 2016 presidential election. The Russian intelligence community made use of kompromat – 
compromising information usually obtained through furtive means – as a weapon throughout 
American politics in order to affect the outcome of the election (Isikoff & Corn, 2018:141). 
They hacked emails, used online platforms such as WikiLeaks to disseminate damaging 
material of opponent Hilary Clinton, and they impersonated Americans on social media 
(Cohen, 2018; Isikoff & Corn, 2018:135). Russian media was also clearly given instructions to 
show Trump in a positive way while Hilary Clinton was portrayed negatively. Hacked political 
material was weaponised by Russia to ensure Hilary Clinton was seen as a “war hawk and a 
bought and sold phony” while becoming synonymous with the term “crooked Hilary” (Nance, 
2018:12; Isikoff & Corn, 2018:136). Putin also made use of Russian linked hackers to probe 
computers of state election systems, particularly, voter registration databases during the 
election. Reports came from all over the nation; Illinois, Arizona and Florida indicating the 
probability that Russians could fiddle with the national vote count (Nance, 2018:12; Isikoff & 
Corn, 2018:136). 
In 2015 and 2016, during the lead up to the presidential campaign, Russia based their attack on 





American citizens to Russian propaganda (Cohen, 2018: 2; Isikoff & Corn, 2018:135; Snyder, 
2018:227). According to a New York Times investigation, in 2015 hundreds of young Russians 
were employed in a “troll farm” in St Petersburg known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), 
where the staff on the “foreign desk” were responsible for meddling in other countries’ 
elections. In the run up to the US presidential election of 2016, a staff member reportedly 
trained to incite Americans further tried to “rock the boat”. The Employee noted that “our goal 
wasn’t to turn the Americans towards Russia. Our task was to set Americans against their own 
government: to provoke unrest and discontent” (Sampson, 2018:45). According to research 
conducted, the messages employees were to disseminate were spelled out by management: 
promote Vladimir Putin, ridicule Russian opposition leaders, deride the European Union, insult 
Barack Obama, smear Ukraine’s new president, Petro Poroshenko and promote Donald Trump 
(Isikoff & Corn, 2018:57). These internet trolls were used to promote the Kremlin’s narrative, 
specifically a massive covert influence campaign aimed at disrupting the US political system 
and electing Donald Trump as the president of the United States (Isikoff & Corn, 2018; Biden, 
Jr & Carpenter, 2018:50; McFaul, 2018b:83). 
Putin’s covert and overt operations to influence the American presidential election is reflective 
of Putin’s indifference towards the sovereignty of nations. Operating with impunity, not only 
did he break international law, but he showed disregard towards the democratic principle of 
citizens being free to elect their own government and in doing so, undermined America’s 
democratic legitimacy.  
3.2.5. Reflection of Vladimir Putin  
Examining the four key characteristics of a political Strongman, evidence suggests President 
Vladimir Putin is emblematic of such a description. Over his two-decade rule of Russia, Putin 
has used a ‘macho’ style of leadership, using authoritative and nationalistic policies in order to 
return Russia to a great power state, all the while reasserting state control and cementing his 
hold on power. Putin’s actions are reflective of his own form of Russian democracy, in which 
despite the presence of democratic procedures and institutions, he has used his position as the 
executive of the state to undermine the rule of law, amass power over all spheres in Russian 
society and erode Russian citizens’ civil liberties and human rights. Putin’s foreign policy is 
most indicative of his Strongman status as he uses his vision for Russia as a reason to erode 
international law and the liberal democratic order. His invasion of the Ukraine in 2014, hand 
in the US 2016 election and aggressive use of cyberwarfare all over the world all represent a 





Fundamentally, the question of Russia’s policy of foreign meddling, is its impact on the 
discreditation of the entire democratic process (Biden, Jr & Carpenter, 2018; Oliker, 2018; 
McFaul, 2018a; Haass, 2019). What warrants the most concern is the accumulating evidence 
of Putin’s aggressively revisionist, inevitably zero-sum vision of the world in which Russia’s 
national revival is done so only at the expense of other states. 
3.3. Hungary and Prime Minister Viktor Orban 
In Hungary, liberal democracy was a much more recent – and rather more brittle – transplant. 
Yet, despite this, throughout the 1990s, political scientists and academics were sure of its 
prospects (Bozoki, 2015; Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2016; Lendvai, 2017; Muller, 2014). 
According to their theories, Hungary had all the attributes that favoured a democratic transition; 
it had experienced democratic rule in the past; its totalitarian legacy was more moderate than 
many other Eastern European countries; old communist elites had acquiesced to the new regime 
in a negotiated settlement; and the country bordered several stable democracies. Hungary was 
“the most likely case”: if democracy did not make it there, it would have difficulty making it 
in all other post-communist countries as well (Mounk, 2018:9). The prediction seemed to hold 
up well enough throughout the 1990s; the economy in Hungary grew, the government 
peacefully changed hands and it had a lively civil society which featured an independent critical 
media, NGO’s and one of the best universities in Central Europe. It was agreeable that 
Hungary’s democracy could be said to be consolidating.  
However, with the rise of strongman leadership across the globe, one of the most alarming 
developments has been the change of the political landscape in eastern Europe. Hungary, one 
of the region’s poster children for post-communist democratisation, has also fallen prey to the 
fundamental shift of politics despite the previous hope and belief in its consolidating 
democracy. This section will examine the leadership of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orban and his nationalist party Fidesz in order to determine whether it is through his authority 
that the prospect of Hungary’s liberal democratic future is now in question.  
3.3.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions  
With the victory of the Fidesz party, under Viktor Orban’s leadership, in the April 2010 
elections with a 53 percent victory, this translated into a two-thirds majority in Parliament 
(Bozoki, 2012:16). Orban has claimed that the 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary 
constituted a “revolution at the voting booths” and that Hungarians had endorsed what he has 





2017:172; Kirchick, 2019:13; Mounk, 2018:10; Muller, 2019:37). In order to replace what he 
saw as a troubled history under liberal democracy, with his own form of illiberal democracy, 
Orban openly stated that the first step would be a fundamental restructuring of the political 
system in order to enact his plan (Albright, 2017:173). This next section will examine the 
policies Orban undertook in order to realise his illiberal democracy, to determine whether there 
was a clear erosion of democratic institutions.  
3.3.1.1. The End of the Separation of Powers  
In February 2011, Orban announced the drafting of a new constitution called the ‘Fundamental 
Law of Hungary’ and within two months this new constitution had been adopted in a fast-
tracked procedure with the votes of the governing party. The new constitution was passed 
through parliament in only nine days, without any previous national debate, political or legal 
discussion and without plebiscite (Margulies, 2018:7; Scheppele, 2015:30).  
In lightning speed, Orban and his Fidesz party ensured steps were taken to halt and undermine 
those institutions which could possibly prevent him from undertaking his campaign for an 
illiberal democratic Hungary. The main target for the Fidesz campaign was to destroy the 
central authorities of the separation of powers and the constitutional court which since 1989 
had always acted independently towards whichever government was in power. The first step 
altered was the selection procedure for the justices of the constitutional court (Margulies, 
2018:7-8). Previously, an all-party parliamentary committee had proposed candidates who 
were then accepted or rejected in a parliamentary vote. Now, it is the governing faction that 
can nominate a candidate which is then submitted for a parliamentary vote. Their appointment 
then becomes a decision of parliament – a parliament in which Fidesz holds the majority 
(Scheppele, 2015:29-30).  
In order to achieve a pro-government majority on the court bench as quickly as possible, Orban 
increased the number of justices from eleven to fifteen. As one position became vacant, Fidesz 
was able to immediately appoint five new justices, all men with close ties to Orban and his 
Fidesz partners. Orban’s first choice for constitutional judge after his 2010 election caused 
considerable surprise when Istvan Stumpf, a man who had known Orban since his student days 
and had no experience of legal practice, was chosen. In recent years, Orban has continued the 
practice of choosing men close to him and his political parties for places on the benches of the 
constitutional court (Krastev & Van Til, 2015; Lendvai, 2017:160-163). Orban’s destruction 





reflects his failure to act in good governance and impartiality. Impartiality helps prevent the 
misuse of public authority, however, through actions undertaken such as those of Orban’s, he 
removes any channels that may prevent him from enacting his illiberal, authoritative policies, 
thus he undermines the legitimacy of the separation of powers and in doing so undermines 
Hungary’s democracy.  
Beyond the constitutional court, Orban made quick decisions to ensure the judiciary, the civil 
service, the media and the financial sector fell under the control of Fidesz party-cadres or 
personal allies (Bozoki, 2012). A new regulation abolished the Supreme Court and renamed it 
the Kuria. This was done to ease the removal of the court’s independent president, and then 
replace him with a pro-Fidesz justice as the head of the new body. The courts were then 
liquidated of their administrative autonomy and in its place the National Judiciary Office was 
created and anchored in the new constitution (Lendvai, 2017:162; Bozoki, 2012). Through the 
placement of loyalists in all leading positions in ‘independent institutions’ Orban could ensure 
there would be little dissent to his authority, allowing him to continue enacting his steps 
towards creating an illiberal democracy.  
The end of separation of powers in Hungary under the Orban regime between 2010 and 2014 
has essentially been in effect an “unconstitutional coup under the cover of constitutionality, 
with constitutional means” (Scheppele, 2006). Fidesz has used its constitutional majority to 
rewrite the rules of the game: Orban’s tinkering with the country’s electoral system has turned 
his plurality to a supermajority (Krastev, 2018:50). Orban and his Fidesz party have followed 
a “highly centralised, illiberal democracy which systematically undermines the structures of 
checks and balances, which intimidates or directly controls the media, which weakens civil 
society, and which makes it very likely that Fidesz will elections in the foreseeable future” 
(Lendvai, 2017:106).  
3.3.1.2. Weakening the Opposition 
When it comes to political opposition and fair election campaigns, Orban has also undermined 
the opposition to ensure his political advantage. Fidesz has adopted the use of government 
resources for election activities, undermining competitors’ ability to compete on an equal basis. 
Scheppele (2014) notes that during the 2014 election, the Fidesz government had an undue 
advantage in the whole election process, from writing the rules to conducting the campaign. 
Just a year before the election, a new election law was passed tailor-made solely for the benefit 





onwards from 386 to 199, and redrew constituency boundaries. This gerrymandering was 
determined exclusively by Fidesz officials. What this policy did was that by redistributing the 
seats in such a way, a left-wing alliance would have needed 300,000 more votes than Fidesz to 
win a majority (Lendvai, 2017:199). The governing party also abolished the previous two-
round system in the individual constituencies, thus forcing the divided left-wing opposition 
parties to rally an uneasy relationship behind a common candidate in order to have any success 
in winning a single constituency.  
Fidesz also passed a new Law on Election Procedure, which regulates media access during the 
campaign period. The law only allocates 600 minutes total for all parties and it requires that 
these minutes be divided equally. For instance, during the 2014 election, there were 12 national 
lists contesting in the April election which only entitled each party 50-60 minutes to be used 
over fifty days. That equates to only one minute per day on television (Scheppele, 2014). This 
law evidently was designed to ensure unequal access to the media for opposition parties, thus 
limiting the access of other parties to citizens.  
Orban and his Fidesz government have also gone about weakening the media and the free press. 
State news agency and public broadcasting have all become government mouthpieces. 
Government-friendly cronies have strategically acquired private media outlets in order to 
further eliminate any possible critical voices (Bozoki, 2012:17; Bozoki, 2015:20; Lendvai, 
2017; Lamour & Varga, 2017; Scheppele, 2014). When it comes to campaigning through 
newspapers and billboards, Fidesz also benefits over other political parties. Fidesz has a large 
group of party-friendly newspapers, owned by their oligarch allies. This contrasts with the 
opposition party Unity Alliance who had to make use of sympathetic smaller, poorer 
newspapers. Thus, in the run-up to the election, Fidesz managed to secure advertisements in 
both Fidesz-friendly media as well as in the opposition papers as they could not afford to turn 
down paying adverts (Scheppele, 2014). News media is a “critical component of democratic 
accountability”, however it must be free and open to all political actors and opponents (Mickey, 
Levitsky & Way, 2017:26). Orban’s actions have secured the position of his Fidesz party while 
ensuring no other political party has been able to amass any political or social power.  
3.3.2. Violation of Human Rights  
The concern over a leader like Viktor Orban’s Strongman leadership is that he is representative 
of a growing revolt against mainstream politics and liberal values. The illiberal democracy that 





citizens (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:3; Krastev, 2018:49). Although Orban speaks of a society 
that centres around the supposed needs of the community and respecting the will of the 
majority, some actions bring this into contestation. This section will examine whether the 
policies of Orban and his Fidesz government give evidence of the negation of human rights 
and civil liberties.  
3.3.2.1. Closing the Border – Keeping out the ‘Enemy’  
Viktor Orban’s violation of human rights is most evident in his and his Fidesz government’s 
brutal treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. Orban’s European Union is characterised by 
the collapse of the internal state border (enabling the mobility of Hungarian diasporas) and the 
creation of an iron wall on the margins of Europe to protect the European-Christian civilisation 
from the threat of the diasporas of a Muslim-Orient (Lamour & Varga, 2017:5). In February 
2017, at the state of the nation address, Viktor Orban offered his vision for the country in the 
coming year, claiming that Hungary would only let in “true refugees: Germans, Dutch, French, 
and Italians” (Schaeffer, 2017) and thus promised to seal the Hungarian Serbian/Croatian 
border to prevent the flow of non-European migrants. The Hungarian government’s disregard 
for the rights of refugees presages its disregard for the rights of its own citizens.  
Hungary has taken a very hard line against the illegal entry of refugees and migrants into the 
state. They have used water cannons and tear gas on crowds of migrants at the border and have 
also gone so far as to put up a 175km razor wire on the border fence in Serbia and Croatia to 
keep migrants and refugees out. Budapest authorities made it clear that they would prosecute 
any migrants found to have entered the country illegally, forcing any found migrants into closed 
migrant camps (Kearns, 2018:130-132; Lendvai, 2017:289; Scheppele, 2015). Hungary under 
Orban has chosen to portray the migrant crisis across Europe as an opportunity for outsiders to 
invade and has even refused to participate in an EU backed quota scheme that allocated a 
proportionate number of refugees to individual member states (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:152).  
Since 2015, the Hungarian parliament has passed/declared a state of migration emergency in 
order to cope with the thousands of refugees crossing the Hungarian border (Scheppele, 2015). 
With the state of emergency enacted, it has allowed Hungary to promote a severe military and 
widen police powers, giving the police and military the ability to “use force” and “restrict 
personal liberty” (Scheppele, 2015). The law permits soldiers to be sent to the borders fully 
armed and has given them the authority to use dogs, rubber bullets, tear gas and nets to 





have been given permission to use deadly force against migrants. The emergency has also 
allowed the government to follow their own process when it comes to handling refugees that 
enter the country. Refugees are usually detained until their asylum applications are processed 
— and almost invariably rejected — and then expelled back along the route from which they 
came (Scheppele, 2015). Since the Hungarian government has criminalised migrants, 
government can also detain them against their will. 
These actions taken against refugees must be condemned as illegal, deeply inhuman and in 
violation of international law. Orban shows a clear disregard for the rights and liberties of these 
migrants simply because they do not originate from Hungary. Orban dehumanises and 
demonises the refugees without substantiation, rejecting that any actions taken against them is 
against human rights and instead arguing that refugees represent a security issue and a “Trojan 
horse for terrorism” (Lendvai, 2017:214).  
3.3.2.2. Political Incarceration – The Roma People  
While the government has created a new variation of a neoliberal regime, it did so while using 
strategies such as increasing employment through state funded public work, reducing social 
welfare expenditure, creating new identity politics, while economically and socially supressing 
large populations not viewed as compatible with the government’s politics. Prominent among 
these disadvantaged individuals are the ethnically distinguished Roman people (Kocze, 
2015:92) who have become excluded from Hungary’s ‘democracy’. Without mainstream 
political representation by political parties and the lack of state support in ensuring 
representation and fair treatment, Roma people have been continually excluded from 
mainstream politics. Instead of state redistribution, democratic participation and social 
responsibility, the government has left the Roma people marginalised and excluded. Orban has 
argued that their marginalisation and exclusion is a result of their own problems with morality 
and cultural traditions, suggesting that the problems they face today need to be addressed and 
solved by Romani themselves (Kocze, 2015:92; Kertesi & Kezdi, 2011; Sigona & Trehan, 
2009).  
In the ultra-right wing, pro-government newspaper Magyar Hirlap, which has close ties with 
the Orban government and is said to express the views of the Prime minister and Fidesz, writers 
have explicitly supported the extermination of the Roma people quoting that “a significant part 
are unfit for coexistence” (Kocze, 2015:97; Subert, 2019:3). These comments were neither 





uncertainty compared to non-Roma in the labour market, they have a lower level of income 
(often due to the absence of work protection), Roma children are segregated from Hungarian 
education and are often turned away from health and housing benefits (Kocze, 2012; Kocze, 
2015:92; Kertesi & Kezdi, 2011).  
In a democracy, a key principle is affording every citizen and group political equality, ensuring 
they have the same rights and legal protections, as well as access to justice and power, as the 
larger majority in a nation (Diamond, 2015:40). Orban’s government, however, has completely 
negated this principle and has instead continued to create exclusionary social and economic 
patterns that ultimately lead to a dispossessed Roma population, politically and socially.  
3.3.2.3. Authority over Everyday Life  
In his creation of Hungary’s illiberal democracy, Orban has turned the country into a 
surveillance state that continually limits the rights of Hungarian citizens. The Orban 
government has not only extended its rule to all sectors of the new ‘party state’, but has also 
been controlling more and more of the society, fundamentally eroding the democratic rights 
and liberties of its citizens. Since its re-election in 2014, Fidesz has progressively exercised a 
“dictatorship over everyday life” (Ludtke, 2016:847), with increasing penetration into the 
everyday life of all citizens.  
It has built an extensive system of state corporatism through state-controlled organisations for 
all public employees, with mandatory memberships in professional corporations. In addition, 
the state-directed social movements have been organised into a large pseudo civil society 
organisation, the Civic Unity Forum (CÖF). Unions were forced to merge with an emerging 
corporate structure and limits were placed on union rights, curtailing the rights of workers to 
call for a strike. It has also taken several steps to prevent people from expressing dissatisfaction 
in a formal fashion: it made the labour code stricter, which hurt workers and abolished 
traditional forms of dialogue between employers and employees (Bozoki, 2015:23).  
The government has also passed new legislation which has ensured public education is 
managed and controlled by central government. Local government and foundation schools 
have been nationalised, and a significant number of schools were placed under the leadership 
of churches. Through these new laws, the government has also been homogenising the 






The government has also gone into the religious sphere of citizens’ lives as Catholicism has 
been a powerful influence on Fidesz and Orban in Hungary. The two seek to preserve religious 
and traditional beliefs in what they view as an increasingly liberal and secular world (Eatwell 
& Goodwin, 2018:142). It went as far as deciding which religions could be regarded as 
established, with Islam being denied status. Orban has also created what Attila Agh (2016) 
calls a “cultural dictatorship”. The Orban government has established the Hungarian Academy 
of the Artists (MMA) which has taken complete control of the cultural sector of Hungarian 
society, becoming what authors have coined as the state’s ideological arm (Agh, 2016; Bozoki, 
2015). In many towns, relatives of the Fidesz circle have become directors of theatres and 
cultural programmes and those that aimed to decrease cultural inequality were terminated. The 
government also stopped the activities of the Motion Picture Public Foundation of Hungary for 
three years, halting one of the most successful branches of cultural life in Hungary – film 
production (Bozoki, 2015:25).  
Through the control of employment, removing the ability to protest and oppose the 
government, the taking control of all cultural elements as well as through the nationalisation of 
education, Orban has evidently limited the Hungarian citizens’ civil liberties and human rights. 
He has removed their freedom of expression, association and assembly in order to secure his 
public authority.  
3.3.3. Orban’s Nationalistic Populism  
Orban’s rhetoric and policies throughout his political career are representative of his 
nationalistic populism, which he has used to create his illiberal democracy and entrench his 
personalistic power within Hungary. Orban’s populism can be classified as “national 
populism” as he prioritises the culture and interests of the nation, promising to give a voice to 
a people who feel they have been neglected (Cederman, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:1; 
Kearns, 2018; Muller, 2019).  For Orban, what he envisions for Hungary is unity, however, the 
togetherness he envisions is defined by heritage, not borderlines. For Orban, a person raised of 
Magyar origin living in Serbia or Romania is more authentically Hungarian than a Roma or 
Turk born and raised in Hungary (Albright, 2017:172). He urges citizens to protect themselves 
from threats to their collective identity and appeals unceasingly to ethnic pride based on shared 
identity, common history, values and religion.  
Viktor Orban’s right-wing populist discourse is mixed with an agenda of anti-immigration and 





‘the people’ (Taggert, 2004:271). Orban speaks strongly about ethnonationalism, a belief in 
the creation of an ethnically homogenous nation state, “Hungary for Hungarians” (Schaeffer, 
2017). The ‘us vs them’ narrative is a key component of populist discourse and can be seen 
throughout Orban’s political rhetoric. Orban has consistently given discourse on the 
threatening ‘other’ to Hungarians national identity, identifying mass migration and its resulting 
multiculturalism as the end of the Hungarian nation state.  
National populism across Europe has been propelled by an intense public angst over 
immigration and ethnic change (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:36; Kearns, 2018). The narrative 
focuses less on the detail of policy and far more on claims about national decline and 
destruction, which they link not only to immigration and “hyper ethnic change” but also to 
what they see as culturally incompatible Muslims and refugees (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:37). 
Viktor Orban primarily gives a narrative rooted in fears of destruction, presenting refugees as 
“a Muslim invasion force” who present an imminent risk to Hungary’s distinctiveness, national 
values and ways of life. Orban continually argues that through the expansion of the rights of 
minority groups and promoting multiculturalism, Hungary’s religious values and traditional 
family life is under threat; “migration will destroy us” (Lamour & Varga, 2017:8). Instead of 
the term racist and its implication, Orban’s national populism is seen as nativist, referring to 
the belief that a country (in this case Hungary) should be inhabited exclusively by members of 
the native group, and that any others are threatening (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:76; Lamour & 
Varga, 2017:8). This can be seen in Orban’s attempts to ensure Hungary’s ethnic homogeneity, 
and his persistent resistance to the intake of refugees following the on-going refugee crisis in 
Europe (Lamour & Varga, 2017:4-6). Orban’s othering of migrants and those who are not 
“Hungarian” has led to increased intolerance, islamophobia, racism and xenophobia across 
Hungarian society (Lendvai, 2017:307). A stable, fair and cooperative society is one where 
every citizen, no matter their political and social beliefs, is accepted and tolerated, however, 
Orban’s actions have allowed for the creation of the tyranny of the majority, where intolerance 
towards minority groups has become normalised and accepted.  
Based on unity against the enemies of the nation and messages based on the notion of national 
unification, Orban has managed to successfully suspend liberal institutions, principles and 
relevant practices in order to build up his illiberal/autocratic system, using the refugee crisis as 
social cement for communal and national cohesion – as a unifying bogeyman (Lendvai, 
2017:296). By defining the Hungarian ‘people’ not as a group of individuals or social classes 





(Bozoki, 2015:14), Orban has been allowed to dismantle democracy in order to protect the 
aspirations of the majority.  
National populists feed on deep dissatisfaction, and further weaken the bonds between 
mainstream politics and the people. This de-alignment is making political systems across the 
west far more volatile, fragmented and unpredictable (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018:1; Kearns, 
2018).  Orban makes use of the refugee crisis across Europe to cultivate strong, irrational fears 
about the possible destruction of the national group’s historic identity and established ways of 
life. Orban continually attacks the core foundations of the global liberal order, culturally liberal 
politicians, transnational organisation, and global finance, arguing that by encouraging mass 
immigration and support for refugees, these groups only want to erode the nation and 
Hungarian national identity. This type of nationalist populism cultivates strong fears amongst 
ordinary citizens and ensures support for both Orban and his political party Fidesz. Also, by 
creating an irrational, highly emotional fear among citizens it gives populists, like Orban, the 
ability to then dismantle democracy’s checks and balances and pass through quick legislation 
with the argument that it is all to ensure the protection of Hungarians and their national identity.  
Orban’s populism is seen in his belief and rhetoric that by maximising power and centralising 
government around him and through tight-fisted leadership he can assure order and bring 
prosperity to the Hungarian people and protect them from the ‘aliens’ – the enemies of 
Hungary. Throughout his tenure as the Strongman of Hungary, Orban has asked for total 
loyalty and devotion in order to forge a spiritual community that will protect the interests of all 
‘Hungarians’. This can be seen in Orban’s ‘holistic nationalism’ which typically holds that the 
nation has a close and ethnically pure foundation and is thus wrapped in authoritarian policies 
(Albright, 2017; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2013:59).  
Combining all the elements of Viktor Orban’s nationalistic populism, it is evident it lends itself 
to be problematic. These elements pose numerous threats to the state of liberal democracy, 
specifically the rights and freedoms of groups within Hungarian society. Orban’s populism has 
allowed him to amass huge public authority which he has used to dismantle Hungary’s 
democracy, centre his personalistic authority and diminish the positive aspects that liberal 
democracy affords citizens.  
3.3.4. Break Sovereignty & International Law 
Under the leadership of Viktor Orban, Hungary has often openly come into conflict with the 





Counsel of Europe. Although Hungary under Orban has not broken the principles of 
Sovereignty, as Russia has in its illegal occupation of the Ukraine, the country’s repeated 
conflicts with the bodies of the EU indicate a larger issue at hand. This section will determine 
the foundation of these conflicts and if they lend themselves as evidence to Orban’s failure to 
uphold international law.  
3.3.4.1. Failure to Adhere to the EU Criteria & Rule of Law 
As enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, “the Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (European Union, 2019:17). Member 
states of the EU are thus accustomed to conducting themselves according to the values of 
pluralism, tolerance, justice, non-discrimination, solidarity and equality; making these values 
an integral element of European way of life. These values also help ensure that European 
citizens enjoy political rights and civil liberties, that human dignity is respected and protected, 
and all citizens are seen equal before the law (European Union, 2019).  
The concern of the Hungarian case is that is raises serious challenges for the European Union 
and its governing institutions. Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is often accused of 
promoting a form of ‘illiberal democracy’, where governance is rooted in the popular support 
of a majority of the country’s citizens, but without a strong guarantee of minority rights and 
the rule of law. However, it is not only liberal principles that are being trampled on, but also 
the notion of popular sovereignty and the international laws and treaties it has agreed to live 
by. Individual steps taken by Fidesz and Orban are thus formulated in such a way as to evade 
uncompromising legal sanctions. Thus, with The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and European Parliament having limited legal instruments at their disposal to remedy 
democratic backsliding and cases of quasi-authoritarianism actions, the Hungarian government 
as continually undermined the expression of popular sovereignty and thus the characteristically 
democratic quality of the Hungarian political system. Orban and his government’s actions 
continually undermine the very principles prescribed by the EU, it subverts the rights of 
minorities and continually stretches the meaning of the rule of law, and by subverting the 
principles of liberal democracy, it goes directly against the mandate of the European Union and 






To highlight Hungary’s failure to live by the laws and values that underpin the EU, in 
September 2018, members of the European Parliament voted to censure the Hungarian 
government for eroding democracy and failing to uphold fundamental European values (Gall, 
2019). The measure to trigger Article 7 sanctions procedures garnered the necessary majority 
needed to pass; voting to launch political sanctions on Hungary and Orban’s government. 
Orban’s governing of Hungary puts the values of the EU and its institutions at risk and thus 
breaks the very international order it agreed to be a part of.  
The European Commission and the EU have also continually disagreed with Hungary over its 
brutal treatment of refugees and failure to offer them any refuge. In July 2019, The European 
Commission filed a case against Hungary at the CJEU over the “Stop Soros” law, which makes 
it a crime to help asylum seekers and enforces new restrictions on the right to claim asylum. 
“The Hungarian legislation curtails asylum applicants’ right to communicate with and be 
assisted by relevant national, international and non-governmental organisations by 
criminalising support to asylum applications”, the Commission said (Aljazeera, 2019). It added 
that it believed Hungary was in breach of EU asylum laws as well as the bloc’s charter of 
fundamental rights, failing to abide to both EU and international law.  
3.3.5. Reflection of Viktor Orban  
Under the leadership of Viktor Orban, Hungary has witnessed the gradual undermining of its 
hard-won democracy (Kirchick, 2019:13). Examining the above data, evidence indicates that 
Orban embodies the core characteristics of a Strongman leader. Using nationalistic populism, 
Orban has managed to win sweeping electoral victories, all while demonising the political 
opposition and the liberal democratic world order, scapegoating minorities, muzzling the 
independent media, building a kleptocratic system that rewards cronies and undermining 
institutional checks and balances (Krastev, 2018:49; Mounk, 2018:2). Through these actions, 
Orban has abused the principles of good governance and impartiality, abusing his public 
authority for his own gains and undermining the legitimacy of Hungarian public office.  
Although coming to power democratically in both 2014 and 2018, Orban has used his 
personalistic power to turn Hungary’s political landscape into a de facto presidential and 
centralised government, with him as its sole and its head. He has suspended liberal democratic 
institutions, principles and practices in order to create his own illiberal/autocratic system. 
Despite being a member of the EU, Orban continues to defy the principles to which Hungary 
lawfully agreed to adhere. This in itself is problematic as it shows Orban’s willingness to 





citizens. Altogether, Orban’s actions demonstrate his willingness to follow through with any 
policies in order to maintain his power grip on Hungary.  
3.4. Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan  
When Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 
Turkey in late 2002, there were high hopes about the growth of democratic governance and 
positive economic reforms as Erdogan looked to create “the new Turkey” (Genc, 2019:26). 
Erdogan hoped to forge an economically self-reliant country, while securing European 
integration and achieving a liberal consensus through ‘demilitarization and normalisation’. 
Erdogan came to be seen as a bridge between the establishment and “the organisational power 
and dynamic voting base of Islamists” (Genc, 2019:30), as he signified an Islamist movement 
compatible with the liberal democratic order. This section will examine Erdogan’s policies and 
presidential rule since his accession to power in order to determine whether or not he can be 
described as a Strongman political leader.   
3.4.1. Erosion of Democratic Institutions  
In 2004, Erdogan pledged to curtail the military’s long-standing dominance of politics, winning 
him mass support amongst liberals and Turkish citizens across the political spectrum. However, 
Turkey’s military tutelage was not replaced by democracy; rather by AKP patrimony and 
autocracy (Genc, 2019:30; Waldman & Caliskan, 2017). This section will examine key 
democratic institutions; the separation of powers, free press and the presence of a functioning 
opposition, and Erdogan’s actions towards them in order to determine if he follows a key 
characteristic of the Strongman.  
3.4.1.1. Undermining Checks and Balances 
In the July general election of 2007, Erdogan and the AKP won 47 percent of the vote. With a 
strong standing in the election, curtailing of the military and massive economic growth in 
Turkey, it can be argued that Erdogan saw these successes and popular support as an 
opportunity to attack the checks and balances of the Turkish political system (Cagaptay, 
2017:205). In September 2010, Turkey held a referendum to decide whether or not to carry out 
26 proposed amendments to the military-drafted constitution instituted in the aftermath of a 
1980 coup. Although the referendum came to be seen primarily as a vote of confidence in the 
Erdogan government, opponents maintained that progressive amendments were unlikely to be 
executed while judicial reforms were dangerous as they could possibly give the ruling 





referendum, the amendments made to the constitution soon demonstrated Erdogan and the 
AKP’s willingness to undermine democracy.  
The changes made to the judicial system following the passing of the referendum quickly 
demonstrated the potentially destructive impact Erdogan was willing to make to Turkey’s 
democracy (Cagaptay, 2018:121; Cinar & Sirin, 2017:135; Wallander, 2018:77). The first 
included increasing the number of judges in the constitutional court, which saw more AKP 
loyalists placed within. The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which provides 
peer oversight to judges and prosecutors, was amended so that its membership doubled in size, 
and it continued to be led by the AKP justice minister. By placing AKP loyalists within the 
judicial branch of government, Erdogan could ensure that there would be few who would 
oppose his policies or prosecute him for autocratic activities. This effectively handed control 
of the most powerful court in Turkey to Erdogan and the AKP, extinguishing any possible 
formal opposition to his rule. Undermining the Judicial system would thus ultimately erode 
any formal checks on his use of executive power going forward. Erdogan soon parted ways 
with liberals and became increasingly inclined to autocratic policies, and he thus soon started 
making moves towards establishing a presidential system, which would present fewer obstacles 
to his exercise of power. 
Following the July 2016 coup attempt, which was widely blamed on military officers and 
civilians frustrated with Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian rule, Erdogan described the failed 
coup as a “gift from God” because it allowed him to cleanse the army and widen his response 
to crush any remaining opposition (Kirisci & Sloat, 2019:10). Erdogan was able to formally 
consolidate his de facto presidential rule in April 2017 when Turkish citizens voted in a 
disputed constitutional referendum on a set of measures which changed the political system to 
a presidential structure. This allowed for the elimination of the office of prime minister and 
enabled the president to serve as the head of the ruling party (Cinar & Sirin, 2017:135; Kirisci 
& Sloat, 2019:10). The president was given new powers; the right to issue decrees, propose the 
national budget, appoint senior officials and cabinet members as well as appoint members of 
the high court. After Erdogan won snap elections in 2018 and amid the post-coup state of 
emergency, the government further cracked down on democratic institutions and channels for 
possible opposition. Erdogan appointed his former chief of staff as the defence minister, thus 
he can manage all military promotions, the police have been given heavy arms and brought 
under close government control. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has lost its influence over the 





presidential palace, gaining the power to appoint personnel of his own choosing (Kirisci & 
Sloat, 2019:10). 
Erdogan made sure to create his secure grip over power by creating his own group of state elite, 
outsourcing many social responsibilities of the state to the AKP, Islamic charities and 
individual politicians. When Erdogan privatised massive amounts of state property, he ensured 
AKP and pro-Erdogan supporters became propertied and acquired massive amounts of 
economic power. The AKP also spearheaded the shift of vast amounts of land and capital to 
supportive business elites, fostering corruption and undermining social justice and democracy. 
Erdogan’s government has ensured the creation of intricate networks with favoured companies 
that cover a wide range of different sectors including energy, communication, the media and 
mining. The government has also frequently taken control or influenced the management of 
mega companies involved in media and communication in order to take control of a central 
democratic centre piece (Cagaptay, 2017; Somer, 2016:493).  
Through the creation of his own kleptocracy and securing all government positions with 
loyalists, Erdogan has been able to extend government oversight and erode the ability of the 
high courts to block governmental legislation. These actions have diminished vertical and 
horizontal accountability, hampered government transparency and by stretching the 
constitutional powers of his office as well as his personal influence over state and party 
institutions, Erdogan has secured the concentration of power into his hands. 
3.4.1.2. Taming the Media  
Once Erdogan established his grip over the three branches of government, his next target 
became the media and business community. By attacking the media and securing control over 
the business community, Erdogan could further silence any opposition to his rule, minimize 
the possibility of dissent, while using the media to promote the government’s political line. 
Fundamentally, the concern over his actions is his complete removal of channels that safeguard 
accountability.  
Popular television networks as well as large independent or/and anti-government newspapers 
such as Aksam, Star and Vatan were seized by pro-government watchdogs who afterwards 
installed Erdogan-approved management and ownership (Cagaptay, 2018:122). Further 
evidence of Erdogan’s need to silence any opposition, was his acquisition of the media firm 
Dogan Yayin, a conglomerate owned by Turkish billionaire Aydin Dogan who had long 





billion fine and an excruciating and politically motivated tax audit, calling for the boycott of 
the Dogan-owned media, Dogan had no option but to sell some of his media companies in order 
to continue his business operations (Cagaptay, 2018:124-125; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Tas, 
2015:786). In the successful subjugation of Dogan and his media corporation, Erdogan was 
able to have a lasting effect on the broader media and business community. This signalled to 
the entire business community that any organisation, family or person who supported secular, 
liberal causes or ideas and showed open antagonism to Erdogan and the AKP would come 
under similar investigation. Erdogan has also ensured the creation and expansion of privately 
and publicly owned pro-government media. By corporatising the nature of Turkish Press and 
its increasing polarisation along party lines, Erdogan has managed to use the power of the 
media to affect election results and contribute to political polarisation (Somer, 2016:495; Tas, 
2015:783). 
The government has also blocked social media websites such as Twitter and Wikipedia, and 
has even prosecuted citizens for their media postings, becoming distinguished as the world’s 
top jailer of journalists (Cinar & Sirini, 2017:137; Kirisci & Sloat, 2019:11; Somer, 2016:495; 
Tas, 2015:783). Besides journalists being detained, numerous media organisations such as tv 
channels, news agencies, magazines, newspapers and radio channels have been closed, silenced 
or have even had their licenses revoked.  
By placing the bulk of the media into the hands of owners friendly to his agenda, Erdogan has 
also managed to prevent any media support for his opposition and has ensured his ability to 
manipulate and instrumentalise the industry. Today, the Turkish media cannot discuss, criticise 
or satirise Erdogan nor bring attention to any corruption allegations of his government 
(Cagaptay, 2018:123-124; Waldman & Caliskan, 2017:88). Through this process, Erdogan has 
been able to ensure the gradual surrendering of the business community and the silence of any 
opposition to his rule. These actions are thus reflective of further actions taken by Erdogan to 
block any institution that may challenge his authority or hold him accountable.  
3.4.1.3. Weakening of the Opposition 
AKP rule in Turkey today resembles a dominant-party political system, one set on carrying out 
its own revolution. Erdogan and his ruling AKP have ensured little to no opposition by 
portraying his opponents as traitors and collaborators of external forces seeking to undermine 
Turkey’s prosperity and stability (Kirisci & Sloat, 2019:11). Through government control of 





Prior to the general elections of 2015, opposition parties accused Erdogan of breaching 
constitutional rules against partisan activity and complained about the inability to use state 
media as they were granted limited access (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Kirisci & Sloat, 2019:12). 
In the 2017 referendum, international bodies criticised the government’s use of state resources 
and their actions to deny opposition a level field of coverage and the ability to campaign freely. 
The pro-Kurdish party People’s Democratic Party (HDP), following the coup, co-leaders, 
parliamentarians and elected mayors of the party were arrested on false terrorism charges, done 
so the AKP could ensure its majority while the HDP saw its votes fall (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; 
Kirisci & Sloat, 2019:11). The HDP has also seen growing attacks on its opposition activities 
in the course of election campaigns (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016). Throughout the election 
campaign of 2015, HDP experienced 176 attacks, ranging from bomb detonations, mob attacks 
and outbreaks on HDP pre-election rallies. Security forces also detained several party members 
of the opposition HDP weeks before the November elections in four different cities without 
any pretext. 
With politicised state institutions, uneven access to the media and uneven access to state 
resources, Erdogan has severely skewed the playing field in favour of the AKP, eroding 
electoral fairness. Free and fair elections constituting of a pluralistic political system are critical 
to democratic rule and constitute a key democratic institution. A fair and pluralistic political 
system helps ensure that the ruling party and its leader can be held accountable. Further, 
allowing more political parties within a system ensures every citizen can vote for a political 
party they believe represents their political ideas. An active opposition also ensures the ruling 
party can be held accountable for its actions. In undermining the opposition of Turkey’s 
political system, Erdogan has further eroded another channel which may offer any opposition 
or accountability to his rule.  
3.4.2. Violation of Human Rights  
Under the AKP government and Erdogan’s rule, the trajectory of the nation has polarised 
society socially and politically, to create what Cagaptay (2017:193) calls “the crisis of modern 
Turkey”. With the erosion of core democratic institutions as identified above, many observers 
are left concerned over the possibility of the failure of Erdogan to safeguard citizens’ 
fundamental rights. Henceforth, this section will examine if Erdogan’s leadership has led to 





3.4.2.1. Islamic Social Engineering  
With democratic institutions under Erdogan’s personal rule, Erdogan has been able to mould 
Turkish society into a more religious, Islamic society. Besides the construction of 9000 
mosques over a ten-year period, Erdogan has taken overt steps towards the Islamisation of 
Turkish society, most notably through education policy, taking any opportunity to dismantle 
secularist education. An example is the issuing of a policy which suggests mandatory courses 
on Islam be taught to all students as young as six in public schools (Cagaptay, 2018:129; Somer, 
2016:487). As a result, children of other faiths or no faiths are forced to take courses in Sunni 
Islam in publicly funded schools. Religiously focused programmes replaced extracurricular 
activities involving arts and athletics across publicly funded secular schools. Secular schools 
were also forced to provide elective courses on the Qur’an and the teachings of the prophet 
Muhammed. Erdogan has also gone after academics who have opposed his Islamification of 
education. A larger number of teachers were fired, while numerous educational establishments, 
universities and secular academic courses have been terminated and/or closed (Cagaptay, 
2017:337; Cinar & Sirin, 2017:134). 
Under Islamic social engineering (Somer, 2016:487), women’s rights have increasingly been 
disregarded and remodelled. Women’s rights have been repurposed as family rights, shifting 
the focus away from the woman as an individual and instead ensuring her traditional role as a 
mother and a wife (Cagaptay, 2017:188; Cinar & Sirin, 2017:133). Women have also lost the 
right to choose to have an abortion or to have a caesarean birth; it is only in medical 
emergencies that a woman may have a caesarean (Tas, 2015:782). Removing this choice from 
a woman is reflective of Erdogan’s wider dismissal of woman’s rights. Erdogan’s attitude 
towards woman can be seen in statements he has made such as, “You cannot put women and 
men on an equal footing. It is against nature”, and, “In the workplace, you cannot treat a man 
and a pregnant woman in the same way”, including that the “delicate nature” of women 
prevents them from doing the same work that men are capable of (Wagner, 2016: 47).  
Erdogan’s Islamic social engineering of society goes against freedom of expression, 
association and assembly as he diminishes their ability to form and express their own political 
and religious beliefs. Erdogan forces families of secular beliefs into a religious teaching which 
they may not agree with, removing the ability of people to formulate their own religious beliefs. 
Further, by forcing religion into political beliefs Erdogan has undermined the rights of woman 





3.4.2.2. Freedom of Political Opinion and Expression  
The ability of the Turkish people to freely express themselves and their opposition to the 
government is also consistently obstructed by the Turkish government. At rallies and 
demonstrations, police often use disproportionate force with the use of water cannons, tear gas, 
beatings, forced dispersal and unjust arrest (Cinar & Sirin, 2017:138; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; 
Tas, 2015:782). In the summer of 2013, the government’s commercial plan for Gezi Park, the 
only green space in Taksim Square, saw demonstrations ignite across the country. Erdogan 
reacted to the Gezi protestors with a heavy-handed crackdown on the protests and by organising 
counter demonstrations. Erdogan gave the police the green light to make use of police tanks, 
armed police jeeps and gas bombs against demonstrators which left several dead and thousands 
injured. The large-scale protests alone are representative of the increasing opposition to 
Erdogan’s government by the Turkish citizens. Citizens evidently felt that government was 
becoming increasingly authoritative and oppressive, and feared for their rights and freedoms 
under Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian government.  
After the Gezi protests, Erdogan ensured any further opposition activities were delegitimised, 
taking away the right of citizens to protest government activities. Activists found guilty in the 
participation of anti-government protests are often arrested and detained and brutally treated 
by police forces. The AKP-controlled parliament has also expanded the authority of the riot 
police during protests, including the right to open lethal fire at protestors, extend legal detention 
periods and limit the scope of court approval for police searches, detainments and wiretapping 
(Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; D’Elia, 2016:190; Tas, 2015:782). This brutal repression by Erdogan 
and his police forces goes against the rights of citizens to express their political opinion and to 
protest peacefully against government. These actions show Erdogan following a further course 
of action which ensures the silencing of civil society and any possible challenge to his 
autocratic, undemocratic rule  
Many journalists, academics, students and human rights defenders have been imprisoned with 
criminal charges or have seen the government apply legal pressure through defamation suits. 
The arrest of journalists and sentencing to jail along with large figure fines charged, these 
practices have established a deep culture of censorship and self-censorship (Esen & Gumuscu, 
2016). The actions of the AKP government and Erdogan have also seen substantial curtailing 
of freedom of expression. Restrictions on social media as well as government surveillance and 





minimising citizens’ ability to openly express themselves and their opposition to an 
increasingly autocratic government.  
3.4.2.3. The Kurdish Minority 
The Kurdish issues have been a central economic, political and social issue in Turkey for 
decades, specifically Kurdish minority rights. The Kurdish population, a minority in Turkey, 
continue to be supressed militarily, culturally and economically (D’Elia, 2016:186). Over the 
course of Erdogan’s rule, more than a million people have been forcibly replaced and more 
than 40,000 people have died in conflict, creating what authors have deemed an act of war 
against the Kurds (Cinar & Sirin, 2017:138; D’Elia, 2016:186; Phillips, 2017:41). In July 2013, 
Kurdish politicians were given more than six years in prison for belonging to an illegal 
organisation. At present, Erdogan continually targets the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), 
making the eradication of the PKK a national policy, promising to cleanse the country of PKK 
supporters and the party’s elements (D’Elia, 2016:186-190). In January 2016, more than 
fourteen hundred academics signed a “peace petition” calling for the end to Turkey’s deliberate 
massacre and deportation of Kurdish people” (Phillips, 2017:41). Erdogan referred to the peace 
petition as a “betrayal”. He called its dignitaries “darkest of the dark” and a “fifth column” for 
terrorists” (Phillips, 2017:41).  
Erdogan’s attack of the Kurdish minority is unjustified and in violation of liberal democratic 
principles. Democracy is a system “that must grant unimpaired opportunities for all full 
citizens” (Dahl, 1989) and ensure “every citizen and group has the same rights and legal 
protections as well as access to justice and to power” (Diamond, 2015: 40). Thus, Erdogan’s 
refusal to acknowledge the Kurdish population as equal, has contributed to an unstable and 
uncooperative society.  
3.4.3. Erdogan’s Nationalistic Populism 
Before his election, the Turkish state failed to include the majority of society under its poorly 
developed and poorly managed formal umbrella of social protection and welfare. There was 
general dissatisfaction with the availability and quality of social services such as housing, 
health care and education (Somer, 2016:489). Erdogan thus pulled the archetypal populist 
narrative by promising to restore prosperity and to bring about democracy for the Turkish 
people. He tapped feelings of inadequacy, alienation and frustration. He appealed to the pride 
of Turks, asserting Turkish nationalism (Phillips, 2017:9). Erdogan and his AKP party once in 





services, social welfare provision and poverty reduction. However, although Erdogan 
improved the lives of many Turkish citizens from the beginning of his leadership, the model 
failed to create and secure citizenship rights and instead created a typical ‘top-down’ manner 
by state elites to citizens instead of citizen mobilisation (Dorlach, 2015; Eder, 2014; Somer, 
2016:490). Services were also distributed in a discriminatory fashion in order to punish 
opponents and rewards supporters. 
Legitimised through a crisis-driven narrative, Erdogan has been able to democratically 
centralise his strong personalised rule over Turkey (Tas, 2015:777) and subsequently, in any 
further crisis, Erdogan has responded with further authoritarian measures to strengthen his grip 
on the state. After the failed 2016 coup, Erdogan used the crisis and the façade of populist 
rhetoric to deal lethal blows to human rights, curtail freedoms, silence the press, ram through 
constitutional changes, manipulate elections, and facilitate backsliding into electoral autocracy. 
This is also tied to populist discourse which often calls for root-and-branch political reforms – 
but it does not suggest a coherent blueprint for what policies the people’s revolution should 
advance (Norris & Inglehart, 2019:68). As such, Erdogan and the AKP’s policies made in 
office have often not represented or resembled those promised during elections campaigns.  
Populists also reject pluralism and claim to be the exclusive and moral representatives of the 
people and their interests. Recep Erdogan has often called his opponents unpatriotic and 
implied they were guided by foreign interests. He has also described those who oppose his 
government as illegitimate, immoral and enemies of the people (Stuenkel, 2018:765). Further 
any actions or wrongdoing that occur within Turkey, Erdogan blames “foreigners” and 
“outsiders” (Tas, 2015:784). He has also argued that protests have been organised and 
compensated by unnamed foreign agents or were organised assaults at the behest of the 
Western and Jewish world (Tas, 2015:784). Erdogan deemed the Gezi protestors as anarchists 
and vandals, painted Kurds as terrorists, and Gulen’s followers as blood sucking vampires. In 
Erdogan’s discourse all opposition figures are dehumanised, demonised, and excluded from 
the Turkish nation (Cagaptay, 2017; Cinar & Savin, 2014; Somer, 2016:487). 
Behind the populist façade of Erdogan and the AKP there has evidently been a far more 
troubling set of authoritarian values. Erdogan has made use of the populist playbook to justify 
his policies, erosion of democracy and his attack on minority groups across Turkey. He has 





of ordinary people, and has attacked democracy through gradual degradation, despite claiming 
to be democracy’s best friend.  
3.4.4. Break Sovereignty and International Law 
Although Erdogan espouses a “zero problems with neighbours” policy, Turkey has found itself 
in conflict with several neighbours in the region, specifically as bilateral relations between 
Russia, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Armenia all sit in crisis (Cagaptay, 2017:28; Phillips, 2017:329). 
Its failure to adhere to democratic principles and civil liberties as well as Erdogan’s increasing 
authoritarian policies, the EU has also removed itself in accession talks with the possibility of 
Turkey joining the union. The next section will examine Turkey’s involvement with the Iraq 
and Syrian civil war, as well as the EU’s decision to halt accession talks in order to determine 
if Erdogan shows a disregard for international law and the principle of national sovereignty.  
3.4.4.1. Iraq & Turkey Subjugation  
Excluded from post-war arrangement following the Iraqi civil war, Turkey’s hostility towards 
Iraqi Kurdistan had a destabilising effect, leading Turkey to attempting to influence events 
through subterfuge and add to the bloodshed. A Turkish Red Crescent convoy was stopped at 
a checkpoint in 2003. The contents were marked as humanitarian supplies, however the bags 
contained weapons, ammunition, and flags of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). The humanitarian 
workers were Turkish special forces infiltrating northern Iraq to assist the ITF and assassinate 
KRG8 politicians (Bekdil, 2015:2; Phillips, 2017:90).  
Turkey’s unauthorised involvement in Iraq has only continued. Turkey has maintained 
armoured battalions at various regions while as of May 2016, approximately three thousand 
Turkish personnel were in Iraqi Kurdistan, having the third largest force of foreign soldiers 
after Iran and the US (Phillips, 2017:91). Bagdad strongly objected to Turkey’s deployments, 
calling them a “violation of sovereignty” and “Turkish forces entered Iraqi territory without a 
request or authorisation from federal authorities” (Phillips, 2017:92). Erdogan dismissed Iraqi 
authorities’ concerns about Iraq’s sovereignty, responding with “you are not at my level, you 
are not my equivalent. You should know that we will go our own way” (Kouskouvelis, 
2013:52). Turkey’s continued involvement and entry into Iraq is clearly against the principles 
of sovereignty and international law as the state’s involvement was given no authorisation by 
any international body or by Iraq. Further, Erdogan’s refusal to remove Turkey’s forces from 
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the country shows his disregard for both the authority of another nation and the principle of 
sovereignty.  
3.4.4.2. Syria & Turkey Illegal Occupation  
The PKK was a pan-Kurdish liberation and human rights movement rooted in Turkey and Syria 
where clan groupings stretched across the border. According to PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan, 
most Syrian Kurds are immigrants who fled to Syria from the oppression and violence of the 
Turkish government (Cagaptay, 2017:186). Over years of steady interaction and bilateral 
relations, Erdogan and Syria’s Bashar al ’Assad developed a close personal relationship, 
helping Turkey and Syria deepen and institutionalise their cooperation. However, 
rapprochement between the two nations ended abruptly with the onset of Syria’s civil war 
(Aras, 2011; Kouskouvelis, 2013:53; Totten, 2018). Erdogan consistently tried to dissuade 
Assad from further aggression. Growing increasingly exasperated, he admonished Assad and 
likened him to Moammar al-Qhaddafi of Libya, telling him to remove himself from power. 
Erdogan’s’ criticism of Syria was repeatedly broadcast on state media, enraging Syrians and 
unravelling years of confidence and trust between the two nations (Aras, 2011; Phillips, 
2017:122).   
The battle for Kobani, a medium sized city on the Turkey-Syrian border and inhabited mostly 
by Kurds, was a turning point for Turkey and its involvement in the civil war. The Peoples 
Protection Units (YPG) of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) fought bravely but were no 
match for ISIS and their tactics. Ankara turned a blind eye to the slaughter and moreover it 
actively obstructed Kobani’s rescue by blocking Kurds who tried to cross the border to help 
fellow Kurds on the battlefield. Concerned by the risk of empowering ISIS, the US decided to 
give support to the YPG. Erdogan, however, tried dissuading the US from supporting the YPG 
as he held deep suspicions over Syrian Kurds because of their ties to the PKK (Phillips, 
2019:127; Spyer, 2018).   
In July 2015, following a bomb exploding and killing thirty-three Kurds, two young hotheads 
killed two policemen they accused of complicity. Erdogan exploited the situation and launched 
an intense air campaign against the PKK in Kurdish communities in Iraqi Kurdistan and along 
the Turkey-Iraq border. Hundreds of mayors were removed from their posts. Further members 
of the PKK, local politicians, human rights defenders, and civil society were jailed. While 
western leaders defended Turkey’s right to fight terrorism, they were increasingly concerned 





2017:71). Turkish officials denied that civilians were affected in its counter-terrorism 
clampdown. However, a video captured the killing of ten Kurdish civilians in Cizre by Turkish 
troops on January 20, 2016. However, Turkey only continued its front against Syria and the 
Kurds. Turkish Special Forces, fighters and tanks launched “Operation Euphrates Shield” 
invading and occupying Syria in August 2016. Erdogan said the cross-border tactic was to fight 
ISIS, but it was really targeting the YPG. Opening another front in its war against the Kurds, 
Turkish forces crossed the border gate, attacking civilians in Kobani on September 2, 2016 
(Cagaptay, 2017:257-258; Orton, 2017, 2018; McCabe, 2019; Phillips, 2017:130; Totten, 
2018). 
3.4.4.3. Failure to Adhere to the Copenhagen Criteria 
The EU recognises the principle of democracy as a fundamental principle for the Union and as 
a common principle to member states. The principle of democracy, as a common value of the 
Union, should be respected not only within in its borders but also in the context of the Union’s 
external relations, particularly, the common foreign and security policy and in the development 
and cooperation policy with third countries (D’Elia, 2016:184). It involves the extending of 
peace, stability, prosperity, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law across Europe 
(Huizinga, 2016:10; Philips, 2017:33). 
Turkey became a candidate for EU membership at the Helenski summit in December 1999 and 
accession negotiations with Turkey continued until recently (Altunisik, 2016:173; Phillips, 
2017:22). Europe initially felt positive towards Turkey and its membership of the EU as 
Erdogan had initially shown himself as a moderate Muslim, inclined to democratic principles 
and good economic policies that saw the advancement of Turkish economy and its citizens. 
However, with Erdogan’s increasing regression away from meeting the Copenhagen criteria to 
which candidate countries must adhere, the EU has moved away from possible Turkey 
accession. Turkey’s suspension towards EU membership is indicative of the serious concerns 
international bodies have towards Erdogan’s increasingly authoritative rule and disregard for 
liberal democracy. Citing the illiberal state of democracy, deteriorating human rights and 
committed human right violations as well as the increasing violation of international law and 
sovereignty, The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad al-Hussein, found 





3.4.5. Reflection of Recep Erdogan   
Examining the four characteristics in relation to Turkish leader Recep Erdogan, the evidence 
indicates he strongly embodies the Strongman leader. However, Turkey is still a democratic 
state, a republic with institutions that work within a democratic structure. There is a parliament, 
a presidency and a judiciary and regular elections which has seen Erdogan and his AKP be 
elected into power four times, through landslide victories (Waldman & Calsitan, 2017:86). 
However, as shown above, the democratic structure and weak liberal institutions serve as a face 
for an increasingly authoritarian-minded government, which seeks to dominate all aspects of 
government and civil society. Coming to power on centre-right appeal, Erdogan quickly 
abandoned this platform and instead moved to secure his absolute control over executive 
power. Erdogan’s Turkey under his Strongman policies is ruled with little separation of powers, 
cronyism and corruption, the lack of press scrutiny, and the erosion of human rights. Through 
the concentration of power in one man’s hands, Erdogan continually uses his power to dictate 
the direction of the state. Through his subversion of democratic institutions, specifically the 
judiciary, his attack on the freedom of expression, association and assembly of citizens, 
dismantling the rights of women and minorities, as well as the disregard for international laws 
and state sovereignty, Erdogan has successfully moulded Turkey into an autocratic, illiberal 
democracy. 
3.5. Comparing Putin, Orban and Erdogan and Their Leadership  
Comparing the three leaders, there are many similarities in how they have approached their 
leadership mandate. Examining their policies towards democracy, all three leaders have 
followed actions and policies that have led to the dismantling of democracy and the 
centralisation of power into their hands. Similarity can be seen in their use of democratic means 
to come to power, creating a sense of legitimacy, however, once in office, they were quick to 
amend the constitution and curtail any possible limits and separation of power that could hold 
them to account. Putin, Orban and Erdogan have also similarly endorsed the suppression of 
independent media, the forging of a close elite group and the prisoning of journalists in order 
to entrench their political rule and illiberal democracy.  
Although manifesting in different ways, such as Erdogan targeting the Kurdish population, 
Orban the Roma people and Putin towards the citizens of Chechnya, the actions taken by these 
leaders towards these groups show their similar violation of human rights. All three have 
ensured the creation of a ‘surveillance state’, limiting the ability of citizens to critique the 





the jailing of citizens and journalists, as well as the mistreatment of those deemed as ‘other’. 
Comparing the actions of Putin, Orban and Erdogan with regards to the human rights of their 
citizens, these three leaders once again show similarities in their disregard for the protection 
and security of civil liberties and political freedoms. 
An important comparison, however, is that of Orban and Erdogan compared to Putin and their 
respective nationalism. Orban and Erdogan have specifically targeted minority groups in their 
nationalism – Orban’s rejection of immigrants and Erdogan’s dismissal of the Kurds – 
advocating for a unification of only those that are considered part of the ‘real people’. However, 
Putin’s nationalism is less xenophobic, nor does he make use of identity politics. Instead he 
sees all those part of the Russian society as the ‘real people’ hoping to unite the entire nation, 
despite cultural, ethnic or religious differences. Thus, one could argue that Orban and 
Erdogan’s nationalistic populism, compared to Putin, is problematic to a greater extent for it is 
often more exclusionary, xenophobic and discriminatory. 
The foreign policy and actions undertaken by Putin, Orban and Erdogan are reflective of their 
willingness to erode international law and break sovereignty in order to further their political 
cause and legitimacy. Comparing the policies of these leaders, differences can be seen in their 
respective approach to the disregard for international law and breaking of sovereignty. Orban 
is yet to directly violate sovereignty as he has not encroached on another state. Unlike Putin 
and his actions in the Ukraine, and Turkey’s illegal involvement in Syria and Iraq, Orban has 
not involved Hungary in nations who have not requested it. Orban’s most notable rejection of 
international law has been his refusal of supporting an EU backed quota scheme and rejecting 
the EU Copenhagen criteria to which it agreed. Putin, however, takes it one step further than 
both Erdogan and Orban as he used a variety of methods – hybrid warfare9 – to influence other 
nations. His influence in the US elections specifically highlights his violation of international 
law.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Examining the rule of Vladimir Putin of Russia, Viktor Orban of Hungary and Recep Erdogan 
of Turkey, these men display evidence of extensive Strongman leadership. Although their 
actions differ in context, these three leaders not only express the four core characteristics, but 
 
9 Hybrid warfare, first termed by US military theorist Frank Hoffman, was defined in order to bridge the gap 
between the original, linear characterisation of warfare and current warfare in the context of the 21st century 
(Fridman, 2018). Simply defined, hybrid warfare is a military strategy which uses a blend of techniques such as 





their policies and actions are reflective of each truly embodying the Strongman mould. Each 
leader has used this assertive, nationalistic, authoritative ‘macho’ style of leadership to cement 
their political power and create their own form of illiberal democracy. Through the 
concentration of power in one man’s hands, these leaders have continually used their power to 
dictate the direction of the state.  
Having shown that these leaders embody these four characteristics, Chapter Four will link the 
findings of Chapter Three to Francis Fukuyama’s thesis The End of History. The evidence 
gathered in Chapter Three sits in conflict with Fukuyama’s thesis, indicating the importance of 
acknowledging the rise of these political Strongmen. This will then be followed by the possible 
implications for geopolitical security Strongman leadership can create in reference to the four 






Chapter Four: The End of History and Implications for Geopolitical 
Security 
4.1. Introduction 
Building on from the previous chapter, Chapter Four will first offer a reflection on Francis 
Fukuyama’s End of History thesis. With the rise of the political Strongmen across the globe 
and their growing form of illiberal democracy, it brings into question the stable, democratic 
future that was previously imagined. Reflecting on Fukuyama’s thesis is not to critique nor 
object with his original argument, but rather to highlight that the rise of these Strongmen may 
act as an obstacle to the achievement of his hypothesis. Following this reflection, Chapter Four 
will centre on these Strongmen, specifically in reference to Putin, Erdogan and Orban, and how 
their policies and actions may contribute to increased geopolitical insecurity. Comparing these 
three leaders shows that their similar views and actions towards democratic institutions, human 
rights, as well as their use of nationalistic populism and their tendency to break sovereignty 
and international law will pose a risk to global political security.  
4.2. The End of History – A Reflection of Fukuyama in light of the Strongman Rise 
Acknowledged in Chapter Two, this study refers to Francis Fukuyama’s fundamental End of 
History thesis, in which after decades of geopolitical turbulence, following the end of the Cold 
War, free-market capitalism had finally triumphed and would become the final form of human 
governance (Fukuyama, 1992). The end of communism portended a new era of stability and 
growth, in which, for Fukuyama, liberal democracy had shown to be ‘the only coherent political 
aspiration’ and would become universalised as the “final form of human government” 
(Fukuyama, 1992: xi). It is important to note that for Fukuyama, this end did not mean 
‘termination’ but rather target or objective; that a liberal state linked to a market economy was 
the plausible outcome (Fukuyama, 2018). Fukuyama argued that, “There is no ideological rival 
to liberal democracy. There is no alternate, comprehensive set of political and economic ideas 
poised as a rival to liberal democracy with universal aspirations and global appeal” (Miller, 
2019:1; Fukuyama, 1992). In summary, Fukuyama believed that free-market liberalism 
showed itself to be the best and most sustainable political and social model (Emmott, 
2017:208). This new era would be one of development and prosperity as the ‘Washington 
consensus’ provided the toolkit for both economic success and the protection of human rights 





What made Fukuyama’s thesis so important was that it provided a sense of security and created 
the image of a stable future after decades of political turmoil. It gave a sense of permission to 
believe in a positive, cooperative, and prosperous future, one that would bring “peace and 
prosperity in our time” (King, 2017:8). He highlighted that liberal democracy provided both 
economic prosperity while promising to ensure the protection of human rights, central aspects 
the entire globe was looking for. It also provided a sense of confidence and insurance, in that 
he argued that once a democracy was consolidated, the chance of its reversal was nearly non-
existent (Mounk, 2018:4). 
At the time, Fukuyama’s thesis was convincing for various reasons. One reason is that as 
human beings we cannot help but believe in progress. Liberal democracy seemed like the 
progressive step that made the most sense (Krastev, 2017). Another answer is simply that the 
enemy in the Cold War had been defeated. Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe quickly became 
members of the EU, the Russian empire crumbled, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia became 
independent states – and Russia itself was converted into a free-market capitalist society. With 
the Soviet Union defeated and soviet communism’s reach around the world rapidly shrinking 
– democracy and free market capitalism had self-evidently triumphed (King, 2017:31). Further, 
more and more nations signed up for the western model. The western model seemed to have 
defeated all comers, thus it made sense for everyone to sign up to its political and economic 
model.  
When the “third wave of global democratisation” began in 1974, only about 30 percent of the 
world’s independent states met the criteria of electoral democracy (Diamond, 2015:141). In the 
subsequent three decades, democracy had a remarkable global ascension as the number of 
democracies essentially held steady or expanded every year from 1975 until 2007, until the 
world reached nearly 120 democracies (Freedom House, 2019; Fukuyama, 2018:3). This was 
paralleled by a similarly stable and substantial expansion in levels of civil liberties and political 
rights. 
However, as previously examined in Chapter Three, the current rise of the political Strongman 
across the globe contrasts with what Fukuyama conjectured. The rise of leaders like Recep 
Erdogan, Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin – just a few of the many Strongmen currently in 
office around the world – do not fit into Fukuyama’s thesis and thus this current phenomenon 
is important to take notice of. The rise of these Strongmen and current instability across 





their prominence suddenly, combined with their form of illiberal democracy, contrasts with the 
belief that the future would be one of democracy, stability and security.  
Instead, the global surge towards democracy has rather gone into what Larry Diamond calls a 
“global recession” (2015), in which the aggregate number of democracies fell from their peak 
in virtually all regions of the world. The trend of democracy ascending has since reversed itself, 
as the total number of democracies have since declined, while several of what seemed like 
successful democracies during the 90s slid backward towards a more authoritarian government, 
including Hungary, Turkey, Thailand and Poland (Fukuyama, 2018:5). Authoritarian states, 
led by China and Russia, have become more aggressive and self-confident, a model for 
countries wishing to turn away from the Washington consensus (Fukuyama, 2014:399). The 
concern for geopolitical security is that a lack of democracy can lead to instability of the nation, 
the lack of human rights and the protection of civil liberties (Glasser, 2019:16). 
This mild but protracted democratic recession is of concern for several reasons. First, there has 
been a significant accelerating rate of democratic breakdown, second, the quality/stability of 
democracy has been declining in a number of important emerging-market countries, third, 
authoritarianism has been deepening, and fourth, established democracies increasingly seem to 
be performing poorly and lack the will to promote democracy effectively (Diamond, 2015:144; 
Luce, 2017; Mounk, 2018:138). According to Freedom House, 2018 was the 13th consecutive 
year in which global freedom declined, hinting that global democracy is in retreat across the 
world (Freedom House, 2019:1; Walt, 2019:28). The reversal spanned a variety of countries 
across various regions, from longstanding democracies like the US to consolidated 
authoritarian regimes like Russia and China. Although the overall decline is shallow compared 
with the gains of the late 20th century, the pattern is consistent and of concern, hinting that 
global democracy is in retreat across the world.  
While it may be understandable that new would-be democracies are struggling to consolidate 
their liberal democracy, what is/was far more unexpected was that threats to democracy would 
arise from within established democracies themselves. For instance, Hungary had been one of 
the first countries in Eastern Europe to overthrow its communist regime, thereafter it joined 
NATO and the EU, establishing itself as a consolidated liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2018). 
While although Fukuyama faced intense criticism for his thesis, those who argued that liberal 
democracy might not triumph around the world were just as sure that it would remain stable in 





But there is evidence to suggest the decline of democratic efficacy, energy and self-confidence 
(Cornish & Donaldson, 2018:13; Diamond, 2015:152; Emmott, 2017; Mounk, 2018). Citizens 
are less committed to democracy and more open to authoritarian alternatives than they once 
were. With increased geopolitical anxiety and worsening economic conditions, many people 
are becoming less concerned about how government came to power and a lot more about 
whether the government can provide jobs, education and health care (Moyo, 2018:112). With 
this reality, Fukuyama perhaps side-lined the consideration that increased geopolitical 
uncertainty and economic volatility may lead to a rebuttal of the current economic and political 
model. With increased political instability, slowing economic growth, failed wars and a 
financial crisis, many people are highlighting what they believe are the fundamental 
weaknesses with Western democracy and market capitalism (Cornish & Donaldson, 2018:15; 
Emmott, 2017; Moyo, 2018:120). Henceforth, as discontent stretches across the world, people 
are becoming increasingly sceptical of the ability of democratic governments to act effectively 
and respond to the people’s aspirations, leading to more and more citizens turning against 
democracy.  
The rise of the political Strongman signals that liberal democracy is currently facing a backlash 
in the present era of geopolitical, economic, and technological upheaval. Although these 
Strongmen may reject several foundational principles of liberal democracy, they have offered 
a different type of political governance that many people find value in. With the current 
turbulent environment, citizens are increasingly emphasising their desire for a strong leader 
who will unite the nation and bring back political stability and economic prosperity. The rise 
of these illiberal Strongmen has thus allowed for the deepening of authoritarianism as more 
authoritarian states are becoming resourceful, sophisticated and successful, questioning 
whether democracy needs to be prioritised in the quest for economic growth (Moyo, 2018:118). 
Citizens are thus increasingly showing support for leaders that promise to bring a broader set 
of values back into the agenda; to reassert the primacy of the nation over distant and 
accountable international organisation, to reassert cherished and rooted national identities, 
secure economic prosperity and infrastructure and to ensure the popular will reigns supreme 







The rise of nationalistic populist Strongmen across the globe gives evidence to alternative 
models flourishing, offering formidable challenges to free-market liberal democracy. The 
Western model of liberal democracy has seemingly lost its global credibility, as many citizens 
and political leaders turn to their own alternative form of democracy (Cornish & Donaldson, 
2018:15; Frankopan, 2018:143). For instance, many nations and citizens point to the success 
of the political and economic model of China (Frankopan, 2018:148; Moyo, 2018:118). Thus, 
although democracy is de-emphasised and political rights are superseded, citizens do not have 
to worry about employment, income inequality, infrastructure, or social challenges.  
This brings another concern to the forefront. Perhaps Fukuyama overestimated people’s deep 
commitment to the fundamental values of liberal democracy. Instead, this evidence suggests 
citizens have built up loyalty to their political system based on the economic rewards. This 
suggests liberal democracy has only been dominant because it delivered good economic results 
and geopolitical success. Thus, now that economic growth is in decline and there are increasing 
socioeconomic inequalities, people are turning towards political and economic alternatives, 
irrespective of whether they value civil liberties or not. Thus, as liberal democracies have 
become unsuccessful at improving their citizens’ living standards, movements and leaders that 
disavow liberalism are emerging all over the globe.  
With the rise of Strongmen like Orban, Putin and Erdogan, where these populists have accessed 
government, a subsequent erosion of liberal democratic principles has been followed 
(Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:350). Authoritarian countries are openly challenging global rules 
and ideas about freedom and making the case that their socio-political systems work better than 
liberal democracy. These Strongmen pose a “substantial negative effect on democratic quality” 
(Huber & Schi`mpf, 2017:146 as they “increasingly reject liberal values” (Cederman, 
2019:61).  
Even if one disagrees with Francis Fukuyama’s thesis, there is still evidence that highlights 
that, despite its shortcomings, democracy inherently has important tenants that other regimes 
do not offer. Democracy stresses the intrinsic importance of transparency, civil liberty, rule of 
law, horizontal accountability, and minority rights. It guarantees fundamental rights and civil 
liberties – freedom to pursue one’s legitimate interests, to hold political, social and cultural 
beliefs, and to be able to express them without interference from the state (Albertazzi & 
Mueller, 2013:350; Mounk & Fao, 2018). High-minded defenders of liberal democracy argue 





they claim, ensures citizens’ equality, while its liberal element ensures citizens’ freedom. As 
such, the genius of liberal democracy is that it can honour both these values simultaneously. It 
allows each citizen access in the public sphere while giving them the ability to have a private 
life; “only liberal democracy can fulfil some of the deepest and most universal human 
aspirations” (Mounk, 2018:129-130). 
Thus, in conclusion, the use of Fukuyama’s original essay The End of History and the Last 
Man is not to disagree with or critique his thesis. It is rather a reflection on his thesis and posits 
that political events currently arising pose an obstacle to this perceived future. Rather, to 
highlight that current events, specifically the rise of political Strongmen, are incompatible with 
a future that was believed to be marked by democracy, stability and security. The turbulence 
of current geopolitics does not have to be read as a rebuttal of Fukuyama’s original thesis, 
however, an assessment of Strongman leadership and the fluctuations such leadership may 
bring towards geopolitics are an important contrast to what Fukuyama predicted. The next 
section will examine more specifically the possible outcomes these Strongmen could have on 
geopolitical security – the ramifications of their tendency to erode democratic institutions, to 
violate human rights, promote nationalistic populism and break the principle of sovereignty 
and international law.  
4.3. The Strongman’s Ramifications for Geopolitical Security 
Although the rise of the Strongman and their illiberal democracy offers an alternative to 
democracy, their actions, policies and leadership style indicate that they pose a risk to 
geopolitical security. In an increasingly connected and globalised world, what appears to be 
local in nature is in fact global in impact as most elements contain global dimensions (Kaldor, 
2001). These rising and existing Strongmen across the globe and their leadership style has the 
potential of negative ramifications for global security. The actions undertaken by leaders such 
as Putin, Orban and Erdogan towards democratic institutions, human rights and international 
law, as well as their nationalistic populism will likely have a far-reaching impact. As noted in 
Chapter Three, in a regional capacity these leaders have not only undermined their nations’ 
democracy but have also created an environment of hostility and insecurity. Reflecting on 
Chapter Three, the next section will examine how these Strongmen’s ability to create regional 





4.3.1. A New Global Order  
US Hegemony or “the American century” was born amid the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and the end of the Cold War (King, 2017:215; Zakaria, 2019:10). Following the collapse 
of communism, it seemed the West’s model of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism, 
supported by a clear set of US-sponsored international rules, would spread across the globe. 
Under the guise of the Washington Consensus, it laid the foundations for recommendations on 
how nations should interact with one another on the premise of creating wealth and 
championing liberal democracy (Banos, 2017:92; Rose, 2019:11). In the advocating of the 
Washington Consensus, the foundation of international law was said to be based on the 
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression towards 
others, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful 
co-existence, respect for human rights and basic freedoms and national self-determination 
(Banos, 2017; King, 2017; Rose, 2019:11).  
However, politically and economically, the West’s vision has seemed to reach its limits, as 
geopolitical and ideological rivals undermine the foundations of the liberal world order 
(Frankopan, 2018:52; Kazan & Park, 2019; Russell-Mead, 2018:15). Mounting opposition 
from emerging superpowers, increasing resistance to globalisation and the core tenants of 
liberal democracy from emerging political movements, and the rise of political Strongmen 
across the world, could lead to the creation of a new world order. This rebalancing of power 
with Strongmen at the helm could have potential implications for global security, as nations 
like Russia, Hungary and Turkey forge their own political orthodoxy (Banos, 2017:121; 
Frankopan, 2018:147; Weiss, 2019:92).  
Evidence suggests that the new world order, one not championed by a liberal consensus, could 
potentially lead to a more insecure geopolitical future. This argument extends from the 
Strongman’s tendency to reject the international rules-based system, as previously noted by 
Putin, Erdogan and Orban’s dismissal of international law, treaties and the core principle of 
sovereignty. While the new world order will still be based on a foundation of rules, scholars 
argue that with Strongmen becoming more prominent and powerful, the resulting new norm 
will be characterised by geopolitical competition, doubts about security commitments to allies, 
challenges to the fundamentals of the global trading regime and the abandoning of the 
promotion of freedom and democracy; these will become the defining features of a new foreign 
policy (Daalder & Lindsay, 2018:72; Haass, 2019:30; Kazan & Park, 2019). As Orban, Putin 





civil rights and political freedoms will be restrained while international law and the principle 
of sovereignty will hold little value. This could have the potential of escalating rivalries and 
thus create unstable implications for global security (Frankopan, 2018:144).  
This new global order could also potentially see the end of important international institutions 
and treaties, such as the Trans-Atlantic partnership, the EU, the World Trade Organisation and 
the International Monetary Fund. International institutions are important as they provide the 
framework within which countries can happily engage with each other and, help co-ordinate 
the actions of different countries in order to set stable expectations (Blackwill & Harris, 
2016:74; Frankopan, 2018:237). Treaties and international institutions also help to foster 
security as they provide frameworks through which countries interact, creating cooperation, 
helping to foster mutual understanding and stability (Haass, 2019:30; Frankopan, 2018:222; 
King, 2017:225). They also help foster global security as through their creating of cooperation 
they help to ensure a global response to the creation of solutions for global problems.  
Many global issues and threats such as climate change, the refugee crisis, growing terrorism 
and rising socioeconomic inequalities require the harmonizing of domestic and foreign policies 
and the willingness of countries to work together. Therefore, without established and agreed 
upon institutions, the way in which states interact with each other could potentially be 
characterised as strained and difficult. Future security threats demand a more pluralistic 
response that can be best accomplished by combining resources (Drozdiak, 2017:91; 
Frankopan, 2018:74). Prosperity and well-being may depend on global solutions. However, 
under the guise of leaders like Orban, Putin and Erdogan, many politicians and governments 
are taking steps to diminish co-operation with each other, disengaging from bilateral 
agreements and international co-operation. Instead these leaders erode confidence in 
international institutions and perceptions of stability as they “operate on a tornado of impulses” 
(Frankopan, 2018:157).  As the Strongman is more likely to choose aggression and isolationism 
over collaboration and cooperation, the world could possibly descend into further conflict as 
frictions are elevated (Haass, 2019:30; Kazan & Park, 2019; King, 2017:244).  
A world order led by Russia under Vladimir Putin, with the support of Turkey’s Erdogan and 
Hungary’s Orban, would possibly be one characterised by competition over cooperation, 
protectionism rather than free trade, authoritarianism rather than democracy. Henceforth, 
evidence suggests that the possible thawing of the liberal democratic world order could be 





An extension of this new global order and how it could potentially lead to increased geopolitical 
security is that the Strongman’s disregard for democratic norms is contributing to a growing 
sense of license among autocrats worldwide (Diamond, 2019:20). As more Strongmen come 
to power and are able to enact their policies, their ‘successful run’ at authoritarianism is making 
it easier for it to thrive elsewhere. Albright (2018:246) argues that herd mentality is powerful 
within international affairs and if one leader can follow a specific form of leadership, other 
leaders around the world are likely to observe and mimic. Thus, with growing assertiveness, 
disregard for international law yet few consequences and increased economic success, more 
leaders are turning towards the ‘Strongman playbook’. Strongmen such as Putin, Orban and 
Erdogan look to others for help in endorsing their regime, favouring one’s authoritarian 
adversaries over democratic allies (Albright, 2018:246; Mounk, 2018:2). Nudging followers 
away from the consensus and support for democratic norms, these leaders portray an image 
that this type of illiberal, autocratic leadership is acceptable (Lendvai, 2017:198). Once where 
a nation may have consistently held another nation and its leadership in discontent, once in 
power, the strongman may reverse this decision and instead seek to build a trusting, cooperative 
relationship (Kearns, 2018:4). For instance, despite the actions of some states towards the 
negation of human rights and democracy, Russia under Putin has increasingly used its power 
status to shield other authoritarian states from international demands to protect human rights 
and block interventions that would force governments to end abuses (Weiss, 2019:95). By 
allowing nations to continue with their erosion of human rights and political freedoms of its 
citizens without consequences, it signals to other authoritarian states and Strongman leaders 
that their actions are acceptable. This then can potentially lead to the possibility of an increased 
scale across the globe of human rights abuses as autocratic states are not fearful of harmful 
consequences. Henceforth, this could have serious implications for geopolitical security as 
more states negate human rights.  
When these actions come from democratic countries that have before been strong advocates of 
democracy, this reversal can have a harmful effect (Albright, 2018:218), particularly in 
countries where there are already few checks on executive power. The issue with a leader 
showing these characteristics, especially in a free, liberal and democratic society, is that it 
signals to other leaders all over the world with these autocratic tendencies are acceptable. If 
one leader can argue that the press always lies, or the democratic institutions are erroneous, it 
becomes difficult to fault another across the globe when they make the same claim (Albright, 





For example, on the invasion of the Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea, leaders 
across the globe praised Russia’s decision. The leader of the Hungarian fascist party Jobbik 
praised Putin and Greece’s Golden Dawn praised Russia for defending Ukraine from “ravens 
of international usury” and France’s Front National lauded Putin’s courageous position against 
the international lobby (Snyder, 2018:149). With Putin’s actions, and the endorsement he 
received from other nations, the impression is given that breaking international laws and 
sovereignty is acceptable.  
Together, these Strongmen are creating an alliance of nations led by strong authoritarian 
leaders who will increasingly pose a risk to the liberal, democratic world order as democratic 
states fail to stand up to this alliance or prove to be more successful (Lendvai, 2017:214; Nance, 
2018). The current world order has not completely eroded but is spearheaded by the rise of 
Strongmen into political power. The possibility of a new global order emerges – one that 
appears to create significant geopolitical insecurity. While the Washington Consensus may be 
faulted, it did help foster a global environment of cooperation and consideration between states, 
while helping to promote the principles of liberal democracy. A stable world order requires a 
stable distribution of power and broad acceptance of the rules that govern the conduct of 
international relations (Haass, 2019:22). However, what the Strongmen champion poses a risk 
to increased geopolitical insecurity as their policies and ideologies are often centred on conflict, 
isolationism and protectionism. Instead, they foster a world of unbalanced power and the 
formulation of their own rules. Further, as more and more nations create a coalition of 
Strongmen, it will become increasingly difficult to not only stand up to them but also to foster 
democracy and stability (Kazan & Park, 2019). In a world of ‘complex interdependence’ (Rose, 
2019:19), nations cannot fully operate in isolation and such attitudes that fail to acknowledge 
this and instead foster relationships based on self-interest can only create instability. 
4.3.2. European Uncertainty  
Unity between the nations across the EU is withering away while the future stability of the 
continent is clouded with uncertainty. With growing uncertainty, and the more internally 
divided Europe is, the more it will find itself at the risk of greater threats and vulnerabilities 
(Kearns, 2018:107; Polyakova & Haddad, 2019:112; Wright, 2017:62). Insecurity surrounding 
the refugee crisis, the rise of populist, right-wing challenger parties and the increasing illiberal 
democracy found across the continent pose significant threats to geopolitical security. With 
Europe and the cohesion of the Union in a critical situation, evidence suggests that the EU may 





current failings, their ascension across Europe and their leadership style are likely to create 
further instability. In reference specifically to Putin, Erdogan and Orban, these Strongmen’s 
dismissal of the EU and its institutions, willingness to breach sovereignty and neglect 
international law, as while as their tendency to oppose the entry of refugees and migrants, can 
entrench further insecurity in the region. Europe and the European Union play a fundamental 
global role, both politically and economically. Henceforth, with the possibility of European 
collapse and the rise of other instability issues on the continent, this would have a substantial 
effect on geopolitical security (Gillingham, 2018).  
4.3.2.1. European Union Instability 
The growing phenomenon of political Strongmen and the resulting growing illiberalism present 
an increasing dilemma for the EU. Strongmen across Europe are also in strong opposition to 
the principles that underpin the foundation of the Union. In their hope to defend their national 
independence and sovereignty, these leaders repeatedly ignore the Union and the very 
principles they agreed to abide to. Orban has repeatedly ignored the EU’s refugee quota scheme 
and its democratic criteria, while compared to Erdogan, although Turkey is not officially a 
member, his continual negation of democratic principles is evidence of his refusal to adhere to 
the institution’s foundation values. While Russia under Putin has no desire to join the EU, he 
continually openly rejects the viability of the institution, going as far as to encroach on the 
sovereignty of European nations in order to influence and foster instability in the region.  
The EU has traditionally functioned by making other countries work better than they would 
have done on their own – by stopping them imposing trade barriers against each other, 
subsiding industries, devaluing currencies against those of their neighbours, or being 
deliberately laxer on specific issues (Drozdiak, 2017:213; Emmott, 2017:124; Gillingham, 
2018). The Union also exists to ensure the values of liberalism, social democracy and 
integration are fostered not only in Europe but across the continent and the world. As a post-
war institution, it was established to make it harder for nationalists to subvert the rights of 
neighbours and of citizens within nations. The denunciation of these values by Strongmen, 
directly threatens the democratic laws and foundations of the EU, posing a risk to its 
institutional power, status and its ability to help ensure co-operation between nations (Albright, 
2018:97; Emmott, 2017:124; Lendvai, 2017:201).  
A power like the European Union can export stability to its surrounding neighbours, but once 





entire region (Drozdiak, 2017:213; Emmott, 2017:125; Kearns, 2018:3-5; Wright, 2017:96). 
Evidence suggests that an unstable EU will likely lead to increased conflict, as unity between 
nations is no longer fostered – if the transatlantic relationship is badly damaged, a host of 
economic and security interests will be at risk (Gillingham, 2018). The rejection of 
organisations that seek to build and sustain the liberal, rules-based order is highly problematic; 
“were the EU to collapse, the pressure and restraint currently being applied, albeit weakly, to 
countries violating its values would disappear and the residual commitment to those values in 
some governments may well disappear” (Kearns, 2018:214).  
For instance, Hungary’s illiberalism fostered under Orban’s leadership particularly undermines 
the EU and is in clear breach of the values on which it was founded (Frankopan, 2018:49; King, 
2017:29). Hungary shows disdain of the Union’s democratic accession criteria, as it 
increasingly ignores the very laws it agreed to abide by once it was admitted as a member state. 
If a one-member state radically deviates from the EUs criteria and constitutional traditions, and 
undermines the rule of law, this poses a significant risk to the health of the EU. If Hungary can 
benefit from EU membership while following its own form of government, it allows other 
nations, whether members of not, to feel emboldened to do the same (Bugaric, 2014:25). The 
deviation of the Orban government has not only disrupted EU actions in many arenas, but it 
has also developed contaminating effects on other member states, representing a danger for 
democratic and liberal cohesion of the EU (Agh, 2016:286; Lendvai, 2017:54).  
Through the rise of illiberalism, the continuing conflict with Brussels and probing the limits of 
the EU’s power, the ramifications of the Strongmen’s actions could help foster EU 
fragmentation (Krastev, 2018:56). While the EU loses its credibility, not only are restraints on 
illiberal authoritarianism being removed, but it is being legitimised, giving it a massive boost 
across Europe and the world (Kearns, 2018:214). Leaders like Orban, Putin and Erdogan, along 
with rising European Strongmen, weaken the broader European convergence project. By 
asserting more national sovereignty and clawing back power from Brussels, Europe is 
undoubtedly heading towards a more fragmented future, or a long, slow collapse (Kagan, 
2019:119; Kearns, 2018; Krastev, 2018:56).  
The concern over European collapse is the volatility and insecurity it will likely create, as it is 
difficult to imagine a resulting liberal, open, tolerant and cooperative Europe. It will likely lead 
to difficulty in building consensus on key policy issues, including central issues such as 





Transatlantic relationship would likely be damaged, which can lead to a host of European 
economic and security threats as states increasingly fail to cooperate (Kearns, 2018). The chaos 
of collapse would undermine the validity and credibility of the values and institutions that have 
been the foundation of the EU. They would be subject to harsher scrutiny while the cessation 
of cooperation would serve as a rebuke to all those claiming that international cooperation is 
essential to future progress. “The collapse of the EU would therefore be a historic defeat not 
only for the idea of European integration and cooperation but for a Europe of pluralistic 
governing institutions, serving a society built on the primacy of individual freedom” (Kearns, 
2018:208). Without a democratic body like the EU monitoring the actions of Strongmen, it will 
become easier for nations to revert to illiberal forms of democracy. The current pressure and 
restraint being applied to countries violating its liberal democratic values would disappear and 
the residual commitment to those values in some governments may well disappear as well. For 
example, Hungary’s mistreatment of refugees and the Roma people would likely continue 
without consequence while Erdogan would be able to continue his mistreatment of human 
rights.  
Putin also represents a security risk to the survival of the EU. Under his “Axis of Autocracy”10 
strategy (Nance, 2018:195) Putin seeks to place all the world’s assets under his and Russia’s 
power, and his policy interventions, spy assassinations and cyberattacks across Europe 
highlight this. All resources short of open warfare, Putin has shown his willingness to use any 
means necessary in order to restore Russia’s power, world standing and influence. Hence, it is 
plausible to consider that he would not hesitate to go further in order to secure Russian 
hegemony. Putin’s willingness to follow these policies create a large degree of geopolitical 
uncertainty across the globe as state and non-state actors struggle to forecast what he may do 
next. 
4.3.2.2. Breakdown of Relations between Turkey and the EU  
The geopolitical position of Turkey, in addition to its role as a link between East and West, 
makes Ankara a big player on several fronts: Western Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, 
the Caucasus, and Central Asia. It plays a central role both in the North-South and in the East-
West. Its geographical position makes it an important bridge between Europe and Asia, and, as 
 
10 Putin’s “Axis of Autorcacy” strategy as defined by Nance (2018:195) centres around the strategic grouping of 
authoritarian states in which to establish a rival bloc of mounting geopolitical resistance to the West and 
democratic principles and values. Behind the strategy lies the desire to alter the balance of power and profoundly 





such, it plays a critical role in the security across the European and Asian continent (D’Elia, 
2016:183). 
A geopolitical risk rising out of Erdogan’s Strongman nationalistic, conservative politics, is the 
possibility of the complete breakdown of the relationship between Turkey and the European 
Union. There are compelling reasons as to why Turkey and the EU should cooperate and ensure 
their continued diplomatic support; the EU accounts for half of Turkey’s total trade, while 
Turkey is the EU’s fourth largest trade partner (Kearns, 2018:170). Turkey is also a key player 
within NATO and in the efforts to deal with the Syrian civil war. The EU also needs 
cooperation with Turkey for a variety of economic and political reasons, including security 
collaboration and continued participation in the customs union. Most critically, it needs Turkey 
to shoulder the burden of the ongoing refugee crisis (Kearns, 2018:170; Kreppel & Ciddi, 
2017). The relationship is already charged with tensions as both Erdogan and EU politicians 
see political advantage in confrontation (Cagaptay, 2017:186). For Erdogan, it allows him to 
claim the EU has no interest in curating a close-relationship and thus Turkey need therefore 
pay little notice to what the EU says on matters of democracy end economic reform (Cagaptay, 
2017:186; Kearns, 2018:170-171). If the relationship between these two bodies were to 
collapse, it would have far reaching effects as both are critical players on the continent and on 
a global scale. It would impact the entire Northern hemisphere and act as a symbolic message 
for the acceptance of the breakdown of relations between critical global players. It would 
deeply damage the EU’s standing and its perception of effectiveness as a democratic institution 
critical to the functioning of democracy across the continent (Gillingham, 2018).  
A key element of this relationship is the central role both states play in the current refugee crisis 
and thus the ensuing creation of a Turkey-EU migrant deal. Both nations are critical in 
alleviating the current migrant crisis which is impacting the entire European continent as well 
as the Middle East (Cagaptay, 2017:186; Green & Keleman, 2016). The European Union needs 
Turkey to willingly accept migrants and refugees as other European nations close their borders, 
while Turkey needs monetary and material resources from the EU in order to take in a vast 
number. While under Erdogan, Turkey is unlikely to accept the arrival of more refugees as 
amid deepening economic malaise, frustration with government policy and Erdogan’s illiberal 
policies to retain power, resentment towards the refugees has been growing. If the Turkey-EU 
migrant deal does break down, migrant and refugee flows to the EU will likely expand, which 
will elevate the crisis and could lead to the closing of borders inside of Europe (Green & 





heightened migration crisis could further fuel the nationalist populist and xenophobic views of 
political parties and leaders across the globe.  
4.3.2.3. The Refugee Crisis 
A central geopolitical concern currently is the large-scale migrant crisis across Europe. With 
millions of refugees attempting to enter European states across the continent, the EU has been 
a critical institution in ensuring the safe housing and protection of refugees (Murray, 2018:123). 
However, with the rise of Strongmen such as Orban and Erdogan across Europe, the ease with 
which the EU has been able to deal with an already difficult situation has become more strained. 
With the rise of nationalistic populism, the call of these leaders to close borders and refuse the 
entry of these refugees has become a problem felt across Europe. As noted previously, Hungary 
has taken a very hard line against the illegal entry of refugees and migrants into the state. Orban 
has tightened security and given police far more power in their control of refugees, even 
refusing to allow them entry. This is despite the EU calling for Orban to allow them entry, as 
a matter of protecting human rights (Kearns, 2018:130; King, 2017:29; Lendvai, 2017:289; 
Scheppele, 2015; Schaeffer, 2017). Every member and non-member of the EU is a critical 
player in ensuring the elevation of this issue, however, these Strongmen politicians are refusing 
to abide by the EU’s rules, only further exasperating what scholars are calling a humanitarian 
crisis (Brandt & McKenzie, 2017; Glover, 2019:308; Murray, 2018).  
The migrant crisis has had a destabilising effect across the European continent and runs the 
risk of creating further instability on a geopolitical scale. Large flows of displaced people into 
these neighbouring states causes real strains as “the sheer scale of the refugee crisis poses 
unparalleled humanitarian, economic, and political challenges in an already fragile region” 
(Brandt & McKenzie, 2017). Firstly, there is a considerable burden of care associated with 
extensive refugee resettlement as sometimes the logistical and organisational challenges of 
housing, feeding and processing refugees can exceed the arrival countries’ capabilities (Glover, 
2019:314). Refugees also need to be integrated into society through housing and employment 
and states that have struggled with the vast numbers have seen the creation of large refugee 
camps and informal settlements.  
Although political Strongmen are not the cause of the refugee crisis, identity politics and their 
use of nationalistic populism may worsen the situation or create further negative feedback 
loops. They often express the crisis through polarising debates about national identity and the 





across Europe. But most problematically, their strong anti-immigrant sentiment paralyses 
efforts to reform the EU and create effective migration policies that can help alleviate the issue. 
Co-operation between EU nations and non-members is needed for the creation and 
implementation of well-run, legal migration routes, reformed asylum procedures and proper 
treatment of refugees. Without joint initiatives, the crisis is only likely to worsen and create 
further geopolitical instability.  
4.3.2.4. The Rise of Challenger Parties  
Although already present and of concern to the consolidation of liberal democracy across the 
globe, the rise of these Strongman leaders has evidently generated further support for radical 
right-wing parties. Specifically across Europe, there has been a considerable increase and 
success of antiliberal populist far-right movements, parties and leaders – the Italian Five Star 
Movement (FSM), France’s National Front, Finland’s Finns Party, Poland’s  Law and Justice 
Party (PiS), Spain’s Podemos and Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party of the Netherlands, are just a 
few of the upcoming parties that speak the language of the Strongman (Albertazzi & Mueller, 
2013:343; Emmott, 2017:124; Judis, 2016).  
These parties and leaders have several problematic things in common; they often espouse 
nationalistic populism, condemn the traditional institutions of representative democracy, 
campaign for discontinued EU membership, are hostile to immigration, reject constitutional 
checks on the will of the majority and emphasise national sovereignty over internationalism 
(Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:346; Emmott, 2017:123; Freedom House, 2019:2; Franzosi, 
Marone, & Salvati, 2015:110; Hobolt & Tilley, 2016: 972; Judis, 2016). As they increasingly 
receive a substantial proportion of votes, they represent a new type of party politics across the 
globe. These populist parties consistently pursue and champion policies and initiatives that 
clash with fundamental tenants of liberal democracy (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:346). Under 
the banner of the Strongman, across the world these parties and leaders have consistently 
threatened the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers. 
As seen by Orban and Erdogan’s nationalistic populism and their treatment of minority groups, 
a major concern extending from the rise of these challenger parties and the championing of 
illiberal democracy, is the often-resulting nationalistic xenophobia (Krastev, 2018:52). Their 
nationalism and xenophobia is often exclusionary, making political space for the allowance of 
the “tyranny of the majority” (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016:976). Often associated with the radical 





Islam and immigration, creating a base of Islamophobia in order to sow fear and mistrust 
(Krastev, 2018:55; Murray, 2018:137; Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisianis, Kioupkiolis, & 
Siomos, 2017:428). These leaders consistently speak out against multiculturalism, arguing that 
it only creates parallel societies and undermines national identity (Murray, 2018:137). This 
also ties into the issue of the current refugee crisis as these populists push their citizens to 
believe closed borders are best. They spark demographic panic, creating the narrative that their 
national culture is under threat of vanishing. With this political imagination, cultural and ethnic 
diversity is seen as an existential threat, and opposition to this threat forms the core of the new 
illiberalism (Frankopan, 2018:49; Krastev, 2018:52). This nationalistic, xenophobic rhetoric is 
in violation of the principles of liberal democracy which claims every person is equal before 
the law (Judis, 2016).  
These challenger parties – who are often the voice of the Strongman – support vindictive 
approaches to immigration which are resulting in human right abuses that in turn offer excuses 
for more aggressive policies towards migrants and refugees elsewhere in the world. These 
leaders appeal to national values in democracies, threatening the protection of individual rights 
as a universal value, which allows authoritarian states to justify much more egregious human 
rights violations. And by unilaterally assailing international institutions like the UN or the 
International Criminal Court without putting forward serious alternatives, antiliberal 
governments weaken the capacity of the international systems to constrain the behaviour of 
authoritarian powers (Freedom House, 2019:3).  
These challenger parties also make it more difficult to reach agreements on political issues and 
have diminished the stability of governments as stable coalitions. These Eurosceptic, 
nationalistic, populist parties are increasingly being enabled, holding more decision making 
power and political influence, the likely result being the subversion of Europe’s ability to 
function. They undermine the EU’s ability to manage day to day affairs, and most importantly 
the clarity of its message among the European public, investors and the wider world. These 
parties are also at odds with the structures and process of European integration and the 
European Union. They propose a new era of political fragmentation, volatility and geopolitical 
insecurity (Taggert, 2004:279).  
European uncertainty and instability will have significant implications for geopolitical security. 
As both the continent and the European Union function on a global scale, current predicaments 





forged, the role the EU has played in the protection of human rights, advancement of liberal 
democracy and defender of international law and co-operation, will likely give way. This will 
evidently only give space for the rise of challenger parties, a worsening refugee crisis and more 
uncertainty, only creating further geopolitical insecurity.  
 
 
4.3.3. The Rise of Identity Politics  
Modern democracy is built on the recognition that everyone is inherently equal, such a central 
value that underlines liberal democracy is that of inclusion (Diamond, 2015; Fukuyama, 2014, 
2018; Gibson, 2011; Young, 2002). The legitimacy of democracy as well as why it is 
considered the best feasible political system is based on the degree to which all citizens are 
afforded tolerance, participation and human equality (Diamond, 2015:35; Dryzek & Dunleavy, 
2009:18; Fukuyama, 2014, 2018; Held, 2015:59). Inclusion helps to foster a system of 
compromise, conciliation and negotiation through which rivals can come to agreements to live 
in relative peace (Young, 2002). It helps create a system that fundamentally ensures the rights 
of political minorities are primarily respected, preventing the tyranny of the majority. 
Inclusivity can help create geopolitical security and stability as it simply requires people who 
differ through a variety of identities “put up with” one another in order to ensure a stable, fair 
and cooperative community (Gibson & Gouws, 2003: 3). Lastly, inclusion is an important 
element as it refers to the ability of the regime to include and recognise all social differences 
and cultures to create an equitable, fair society. Critically, it ensure cultural minorities are 
protected indirectly “by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all individuals regardless 
of group membership” (Chua, 2018:179).  
However, with the rise of political Strongmen, and their nationalistic, populist illiberal 
democracy, democracy is transforming into an engine of “zero-sum political tribalism” (Chua, 
2018:12). Under the leadership of Strongmen, political dynamics are increasingly becoming 
more insular, defensive and built upon an ‘us-versus-them’ narrative. The principle of equality 
is increasingly being undermined as minority groups become frequently marginalised and 
excluded (Fukuyama, 2018:74). Rather, the world is seeing “a rebellion against a multi-ethnic 
democracy that recognizes all individuals as truly equal” (Mounk, 2018:201). 
Liberal democracy does not organise itself around a series of proliferating identity groups 





they claim their rights to social recognition based on race, ethnicity, or gender which are fixed, 
unchangeable characteristics (Fukuyama, 2018:122). Claiming superiority of a national 
identity can lead to violence and intolerance once it becomes associated with an exclusive, 
ethnically based sense of belonging (Chua, 2018:35). Examining history11, evidence suggests 
that the use of ethno-nationalism led to the persecution of people who were not part of the 
‘group’, as the group became increasingly aggressive towards those who did not fit their 
identity. The problem was that ethno-nationalism often took a narrow, ethnically based, 
intolerant, aggressive and illiberal form. This only led to the further creation of a violent and 
chaotic society as one group quickly turned nationalism into militant assertion of the rights of 
the nation (Fukuyama, 2014:428-433).   
Today, the rise of identity politics and the use of this aggressive ethno-nationalism seems to be 
on the rise. As Strongmen retreat into ever narrower identities, the possibility of deliberation 
and collective action by society becomes threatened. Strongmen across the globe are 
increasingly becoming advocates of tribal politics; exclusionary nationalism that rejects the 
ideal of a multi-ethnic democracy (Chua, 2018:5; Mounk, 2018:201). Nationalism can be a 
troubling ideology as it promotes casual loyalty to a country over deeper commitments to 
justice and humanity. Currently, Strongmen have claimed the mantle of nationalism, promising 
to defend the interests of the majority against immigrant minorities and marginalised groups 
(Chua, 2018; Wimmer, 2019:27).  
Previously in this study it was discussed how Turkey and Hungary specifically showed the 
danger of the use of ethno-nationalism. Hungary, under Orban’s leadership, increasingly 
attacks refugees, migrants and non-Christian Hungarians. Paying little head to the humanitarian 
crisis in the Middle East and the resulting refugee crisis, Orban instead declares “the masses 
arriving from other civilisations endanger our way of life, our culture, our customs and our 
Christian traditions” (Albright, 2018:184). Orban has built a fortified barrier along his 
country’s southern border to keep out Syrian refugees and other migrants and his government 
has pushed through a law criminalising any individual or organisation that aided undocumented 
migrants. Instead of finding solutions to the crisis and fostering peace, Orban’s ethno-
nationalism is instead worsening the refugee crisis. Forcing migrants into detention camps, 
firing water cannons and teargas at refugees and creating a razor wire along its border has only 
 
11Syria offers an extreme example of this scenario. Much of the government (presidency, cabinet, bureaucracy) 
was dominated by Alawites who made up just 12% of the population. This eventually led to the current ongoing 






created further violence and instability in Europe. His policies against migrants and blocking 
of sensible reforms of the EU’s immigration and asylum system has only led to further 
instability across the EU’s borders. Orban’s nationalism also poses a threat to the European 
Union as Hungary continues to act as a hostile member state actively seeking to undermine it 
(Kelemen, 2015). 
Erdogan’s ethno-nationalism and refusal to recognise the Kurdish minority may seem a 
regional security threat, however, it does in fact pose a threat on a geopolitical level. In 2014, 
Erdogan abandoned his negotiations with the PKK and began a policy of outright conflict with 
both Turkish and Syrian Kurds. He has sought to delegitimise all Kurdish political activity by 
associating it with the PKK, arresting large numbers of Kurdish activists and politicians. The 
Turkish Kurds have endured relentless assaults from Erdogan and his government for years, 
including a renewed military campaign against the PKK. In return, Erdogan’s refusal to 
acknowledge the independence of the Kurdish population has only led to increased Kurdish 
revolts and insurgency (Barkey, 2019:108). This conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish 
government has only led to increased instability and insecurity as the conflict stretches across 
the whole Middle East. With Kurds stretched across Iraq and Syria, the whole region has 
become subject to the on-going conflict.  
Hence, the identity politics that these Strongmen champion can create geopolitical insecurity 
as it will most likely lead to polarisation, growing lack of consensus, instability and possible 
violence. If minority groups in a society do not have institutionalised channels of participation, 
this can generate instability and disorder as they attempt to find ways for their political 
freedoms to be heard (Fukuyama, 2014:410). Research suggests that when ethnic groups lack 
these channels, they are especially likely to seek it through violence (Cederman, 2019:64). It 
is also not just a lack of political power that can motivate ethnic groups to take up arms against 
nationalism; economic, social and cultural inequality can too. Inequality along ethnic lines 
increases the risk of rebellion (Cederman, 2019:64) and because it is easier to mobilise people 
along ethnic lines, it is more likely to lead to violent conflict. This ethnic nationalism could 
bring a return to the ills that accompanied its past ascendance: major violent upheavals both 
within and among countries. Should it continue, it risks fuelling destabilising civil unrest in 





4.3.4. The Emergence of Hybrid Warfare 
Although hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon, the Strongman shows an increased 
propensity for its use. The concern for the advent of hybrid warfare for geopolitical security is 
that it creates more uncertainty as various tools can be used that do not fall into the more 
traditional use of lethal military technology (Cornish & Donaldson, 2017:19). With its 
increasing use by nations led by Strongmen, hybrid warfare has emerged as an increasing threat 
on a geopolitical scale (Wither, 2016:76; Wright, 2017:203). In an already complex 
geopolitical environment, the growth of hybrid warfare makes it more difficult to be confident 
of future security trends and forthcoming events.  
Nations such as Turkey, Hungary and Russia show they are willing to go beyond the usual 
lines of warfare in order to achieve their goals. Russia under Putin has acted against the West 
in the Arctic, through restricting the supply of energy to other nations, by taking advantage of 
the instability caused by the migrant crisis in Europe and by making it difficult to achieve a 
durable solution in Syria (Diamond, 2019:21; Fridman, 2019). Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine 
and subsequent annexation of Crimea can best be described as hybrid warfare as not only was 
military forced used but the Kremlin made use of cyber-attacks and coercive information 
operations (Fridman, 2019; Wright, 2017:76). Russia’s use of hybrid warfare has become 
increasingly difficult to foresee or prevent, as the variety of methods it uses are often concealed 
and difficult to discern (Gillingham, 2018). Wright (2017:201) identifies cyberwarfare as “an 
unambiguous national security threat” as it is a difficult tool to foresee and prevent. 
Conventional strategy and deterrence will no longer suffice in the prevention of conflict 
between and within nations, as Strongman led nations become increasingly volatile in their 
ambition and conviction. As the origins of confrontation become increasingly diverse, strategic 
challenges are more likely to arise in many more places – further increasing a geopolitical 
environment characterised by instability and unrest (Cornish & Donaldson, 2017:37; Wright, 
2017:194). Substituting twentieth-century mass warfare for cyber-attacks and cybercrime may 
reduce the number of battlefield casualties but it nevertheless leads to heightened mistrust 
between the world superpowers, and it threatens personal privacy, intellectual property and 
national security (King, 2017:178) 
Russia’s pioneering use of social media and technology as a weapon reflects the understanding 
of the powerful art of spreading disinformation. The impact within the current globalised and 





accessible (Albright, 2017:164; Fridman, 2019). Russia’s cyberwarfare has penetrated 
democratic institutions, helped movements across the political spectrum, inflamed public 
opinion and ignited conflict while distorting the political environment, and in doing so has 
influenced instability and insecurity (Diamond, 2019:21-22).   
Through Russia’s involvement and meddling in the US 2016 presidential election, Russia 
conducted a cyber assault on US democracy, demonstrating for other potential adversaries that 
it could be done (Kotkin, 2019:67). By using disinformation campaigns and cyberwarfare in 
the US, Russia was able to polarise society. This polarisation only leads to further dysfunction 
as polarisation often leads to gridlock, which in turn erodes public institutions and public trust 
(Mickey et al., 2017:26). It also created a sense of vulnerability on a geopolitical level as, by 
showing its capability in attacking an advanced and developed nation such as the US, it was 
able to show nations all over the world its power and willingness to reject the status quo of 
sovereign law (Biden, Jr & Carpenter, 2018:52). 
4.3.5. Deteriorating Economic Conditions  
A core concern for geopolitical security is the possibility of exacerbated economic conflict and 
Strongmen leadership fomenting an economic downward spiral that will be felt by the entire 
globe. Economic warfare merits particular attention, undertaken for financial interests and 
fought using financial tools – such confrontations are growing, and all countries are participant, 
whether or not they choose to be (Banos, 2017:303). The result of open-economy 
macroeconomics is that countries operate in an environment of “international economic 
integration” and such countries cannot maintain complete independent economic policies 
(Rodrik, 2000:180). Hence, it is impossible to separate the economic from the geopolitical 
(Wright, 2017:174).  
Often characterised by erratic foreign policy and a unilateral view towards diplomacy and 
global institutions, the Strongman often follows economic policies that solely benefit their 
nation, without regard for the possible far-reaching consequences (Cohen, 2019:139; Haass, 
2019; Moyo, 2018:8; Oliker, 2018). Strongmen leaders are often viewed as policymakers who 
feel the need to satisfy the electorate to remain in office, implementing the populist policies 
they used in order to get elected. They tend to favour short term policy responses which often 
ignore the costs and consequences, and follow a policy of coercive geo-economics against other 
nations (Blackwill & Harris, 2016:50). These politicians are pivoting towards lesser political 





global economic growth, increase poverty, and spur more political and social unrest (Moyo, 
2018:91).  
4.3.5.1. Protectionism & Isolationism  
The Strongmen of leading nations are pivoting towards greater isolationism, abandoning 
globalisation and returning to an era of mercantilism and protectionism (Wright, 2017:253). 
They are moving towards protecting local industries through higher trade tariffs, and their 
labour markets, along with increased immigration control, in attempts to boost domestic 
employment (Moyo, 2018: 83). History has shown that when developed countries start on a 
path of protectionist policies that lead to greater isolationism, other countries are forced to 
follow suit. Under an isolationist approach, policy makers limit global trade, cap cross-border 
capital flows and curb immigration. These protectionist policies often lead to economic 
weakness, job loss and slow economic growth (Irwin, 2017; Moyo, 2018:84).  
Protectionist policies, for example discriminatory trade measures on other nations, threaten 
long-term economic prospects. Bad policy leads to the misallocation of scarce resources which 
not only has a negative effect on GDP in the long-run, but it kills off economic growth and 
foments political instability, which only further discourages much-needed investment. As this 
worsens economic growth, additional bad policy decisions aimed at short term gain will only 
worsen the cycle. These strongmen pursue misguided solutions that attempt to save society 
from chaos but only create further instability (Moyo, 2018: 88; Wright, 2018:253).  
Hence, although protectionist policies may appear to protect jobs in an economic down cycle, 
they are rather short-sighted decisions as in the long run, these policies not only harm the 
nation’s economy but can diminish growth globally as well. Economists Rudiger Dornbusch 
and Sebastian Edwards (1991:9) argue that the issue with populist governments is they seem 
to be “stuck on the same bad economic script”. Historically, countries that have followed 
populist economic policies run higher government budget deficits; end up with larger 
government debts; default on these debts more frequently; and under certain circumstances, 
run higher rates of inflation (Wilkin, 2018:155). “Populist policies do ultimately fail; and when 
they fail it is always at a frightening cost to the very groups who were supposed to be favoured” 
(Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991:10; Moyo, 2018:155).  
These states led by Strongmen are also increasingly airing disagreements with foreign policies 
in economic terms. As this occurs, economic and security tensions risk reinforcing each other, 





2016:47). Threatening trade wars and protectionist policies will have a detrimental impact on 
financial markets and economic stability (Emmott, 2017:123; Irwin, 2017). A trade war would 
be collective policy failure – tariffs not only lead to more expensive products and more limited 
choices, but they also prevent trade from playing its essential role in boosting productivity and 
spreading new technologies (Frankopan, 2018:162). Economic contraction can foster political 
and social unrest and breakdown in social cohesion (Moyo, 2018:6). A lack of economic 
success does far more than just diminish living standards; it promotes disaffected and 
impoverished populations and fuels destabilising anger (Moyo, 2018: 8). Essentially, a lack of 
success is a precursor for worsening living conditions and unrest. Economic growth resolves 
intractable challenges for several reasons. It enables a government to fund and enhance public 
goods – education, healthcare and security. It is a precursor to private investment and 
innovation that acts as a springboard for improved living standards and progress. Thus, not 
only will protectionist policies have a long-term negative effect on other nations, but soon the 
effects will be felt in the local nation.  
Under pressure to show results, evidence suggests Strongmen around the world are pivoting 
towards inferior political and economic models. The role of economic phenomena in shaping 
geopolitical outcomes is influential, and such unilateral economic decisions will only promote 
geopolitical insecurity. Unilateral actions “are not only against international rules and 
regulations, but also damage legitimate international trade” (Frankopan, 2018:162), affairs 
between states would be characterised by antagonistic interstate relations, found with new and 
bitter politics of trade (Blackwill & Harris, 2016:21: Kearns, 2018:214). The single market 
would unravel while other economic agreements are all likely to breakdown as states become 
increasingly isolationist. These models will only lead to the diminution of global trade and the 
collapse of cross-border capital flows, mounting constraints on the movement of labour and 
deglobalisation, ultimately leading to further deteriorating living standards and greater 
geopolitical unrest (King, 2017:244; Moyo, 2018:107).  
For example, Russia has often used coercive tactics on the Ukraine to pressure the nation away 
from signing an association agreement with the EU. In July 2012, Russia stopped imports from 
Ukraine’s main confectionary producer and intensified customs checks on Ukrainian goods at 
the border, which reportedly led to some $500 million in losses for Ukraine (Blackhill & Harris, 
2016:50). Russia has also followed discriminatory policies with EU countries that do not 
sympathise with its narrative of the Ukrainian issue. A year after Russia’s August 2014 ban on 





from the decrease in demand for their products.  While dealing a significant blow to the Ukraine 
economy, Moscow’s geo-economic policy served to remind Ukraine, and others in the region, 
of the consequences of decreasing ties to Russia in favour of the European Union; second to 
reinforce Russia’s role as an economic hegemon. When Turkey refused to release an American 
prisoner, the US issued sanctions which had an impact on the world beyond. The Turkish lire 
slumped to a record low for a few days, while currencies across the Caucasus slid as a result. 
The crisis even reached India where the rupee fell to record lows against the dollar (Frankopan, 
2018:163). This shows how one Strongman leader and his economic retaliation could lead to 
further destabilising effects for another nation (Blackhill & Harris, 2016:50).           
As noted previously in the examination of worldwide democratic decline, how citizens view 
their economic conditions is critical to the stability of the political regime. Hence, if nations 
under these Strongman decide to follow more protectionist and isolationist policies, the likely 
result will be further political unrest globally. Also, in the current world of “international 
economic integration” (Rodrik, 2000:177), as already discussed, states do not act in isolation. 
But rather what policies they decide to follow is likely to have a contagion effect, effecting 
developed and non-developed states in either positive or negative ways. The current system is 
buckling under the weight of new forces. Countries have increasingly turned to a host of 
market-distorting practices that are largely impervious to existing rules, including currency 
manipulation, the deliberate nonenforcement of intellectual property rights, and contemptuous 
regulatory regimes. (Frankopan, 2018:245).  
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter sought to examine whether or not the rise of Strongmen leaders would have 
consequences for geopolitical security. With the rise of a possible new global order, increased 
use of hybrid warfare, European instability, the use of identity politics as well as the possibility 
of worsening economic conditions, evidence would suggest that the Strongman does 
exacerbate geopolitical insecurity. Ramifications of the Strongman’s ideologies and policies 
tend to indicate a more unstable and ambiguous result, only creating more insecurity and 
uncertainty. While their actions may not directly create instability, they are likely to create 
ramifications that could then lead to increased insecurity. Operating in an interdependent 
world, the leadership style of the Strongman will hence not only have a regional effect but can 
influence security on a global scale. Specifically focusing on leaders Putin, Orban and Erdogan, 
these Strongmen and their policies will generate consequences towards geopolitical security. 





democratic institutions, disregard human rights, promote nationalistic populism and their 
growing propensity to reject international law, institutions and the principle of sovereignty, 






Chapter Five: Conclusion  
5.1. Introduction 
Subsequent to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the consensus 
between scholars was that liberal democracy officially reigned triumphant. Liberal democracy 
was championed as the best form of governance for it offered unrivalled human freedom and 
economic prosperity. Despite its shortcomings and inherent weaknesses, liberal democracy 
came to be believed as the ‘final form of human governance’.  
However, over the past decade, there has been increasing evidence around the globe of several 
democratic countries becoming increasingly authoritarian, while those that were argued to be 
consolidated have seen a growing distrust in this form of governance. This has been aided by 
growing populist, nationalistic movements, campaigns and political parties across long 
established democracies. The rise of increasing authoritarianism and illiberal movements has 
given rise to a democratic setback seen across the world. The most interesting element of this 
situation was the free and fair election by societies of political Strongmen who openly voiced 
illiberal, autocratic policies and ideology. Since the election of Donald Trump in the United 
States, Britain’s decision to leave the United Kingdom, and the success of challenger parties 
across Europe in recent elections, these events have raised the alarm across the Western world 
of the possible erosion of global liberal democracy. In this environment of concern, this 
research endeavoured to explore and understand a central element – the rise of the political 
Strongmen. Specifically, in the context of an interdependent world, it sought to determine 
whether Strongman leadership could contribute to increased geopolitical insecurity.  
This chapter serves to evaluate the research question and highlight the key findings that were 
established through the aims and objectives of this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter will offer 
an evaluation of the possible contributions this research will have in further studies as well as 
other avenues of research that may offer more insight into this study or/and be an important 
contribution to this growing development.   
5.2. Evaluation of the Research Question and Main Findings  
This research sought to assess how the rise of political Strongmen, with reference to three 
specific nations, Russia, Hungary and Turkey and their respective leader, threatens geopolitical 
security. In assessing the core characteristics of the Strongman leadership, inference could be 






The research referred to Francis Fukuyama’s essential thesis The End of History in order to 
demonstrate that the current trend of electing these Strongmen may act as an obstacle to 
achieving the future he characterised as stable and secure through the global governance of 
liberal democracy. Rather, the Strongman positions himself in contrast, as his leadership style 
and policies often contradict with the values of liberal democracy. The research viewed the rise 
of the Strongman as significant as they have often come into power in nations considered to be 
consolidated democracies. The Western world was so secure in the belief of the triumph of 
democratic liberalism, that no plan or solutions were envisioned in the event of democratic 
backsliding, especially in nations where democracy was deemed consolidated.  
The research examined the link between Strongman leadership and the probability of increased 
geopolitical insecurity, as a regional understanding of the effect these leaders have is most often 
already available. The research emphasised that in the current globalised world, characterised 
by growing interconnectivity between nations has resulted in a growing association between 
risks, thus instability in one country will often influence or trigger insecurity in another region. 
Nations cannot be viewed in isolation and such the researched inferred that the insecurity 
created by one leader will often influence instability on a wide scale.  
The research chose to examine and compare Russia, Turkey and Hungary as all three nations 
are critical players on a global level. Each nation is often an important piece in international 
policy, geo-economics, and geopolitics. Further, each state had the prospect of consolidating 
their democracy before their citizens made the democratic choice to elect a Strongman into 
office. The decision to examine the presence of Strongman rule in each nation was chosen in 
an attempt to provide more evidence of the policies, practices and ideologies these leaders 
followed. It also allowed for more evidence to be collected in order to establish if their 
leadership does threaten global security. The decision to focus on human rights, key democratic 
institutions and international law were chosen as three of the four key variables as they are 
based on their central role in liberal democracy as core tenants. When present in a society, they 
are often linked to the creation and fostering of stability and security within a nation. Populist 
Nationalism was chosen as the fourth feature as many of its defining features clash with the 
fundamental principles of liberal democracy. Examining Vladimir Putin, Recep Erdogan and 
Viktor Orban against these variables allowed for extensive research into each leaders’ 
governance of their respective nations. It also highlighted the extent to which these three 





Although very different nations, with varying histories, communities and ideologies, Russia, 
Turkey and Hungary were chosen for comparison as, despite these differences, the Strongman 
was shown to manifest in very similar ways. The similarities between how Putin, Orban and 
Erdogan embody the Strongman can show how the study presents itself as offering a general 
theory. Thus, despite the circumstances in which a Strongman may arise, their leadership style 
and policies will often manifest in very similar ways. Thus, if another three nations and their 
leaders were used and the same four characteristics were examined, similar evidence would 
come forward on how Strongmen fit into the four characteristics.  
Using the four variables as a base and the examination of each country under the direction of a 
Strongman, the research then established how Strongman rule could threaten geopolitical 
security. The main implications found were first, the erosion of the liberal world order and the 
current international rules-based system. The present era under the direction of these 
Strongmen can instead be defined by deteriorating relations between traditional allies and the 
development of an alternative international architecture. With rising Strongmen across 
continents, and their inclination to support one another, this could potentially lead to an 
increasingly polarised, uncertain environment that will have significant implications for 
geopolitical security. The liberal order showed itself as one that fostered co-operation and the 
elevation of global problems through global solutions, while the new order would potentially 
be characterised by aggression, protectionism and fragmentation. Further, the main concern of 
the erosion of the liberal order is the possibility of the global decline of the protection of human 
rights, civil liberties and political freedoms.  
European instability and uncertainty arose as another possible implication of Strongman 
leadership. As evidenced, the possible collapse of the European Union could lead to further 
insecurity as the continent would possibly fail to address its rising political, social and 
economic dilemmas. EU instability, breakdown of Turkey and EU relations, the refugee crisis 
and the rise of challenger parties all act as considerable threats to the stability of the region. 
Instrumental on a regional and global level, the instability of the EU will likely produce 
insecurity on a geopolitical level. While Strongmen are not directly responsible for some of 
these issues, the research indicates that they can potentially aggravate the situation or trigger 
other instability dilemmas.   
The research also suggested that a central element of further insecurity is the Strongman’s use 





often centres around a certain group making superiority claims over another. The danger from 
this claim is that it often extends to rhetoric and feelings of xenophobia and ethno-nationalism.  
From this, often resulting is the erosion of the principles of tolerance and political equality. 
Highlighted by Turkey and Hungary’s actions towards their respective minority groups, 
identity politics can lead to the creation of ethnically based intolerance and aggression, which 
if heightened can lead to political violence and civil unrest.  
Another concern that can arise out of Strongman leadership is the increased use and resulting 
uncertainty of hybrid warfare. An easily accessible tool for all social and political actors, hybrid 
warfare poses significant risks to geopolitical security. The ability of nations to make use of a 
variety of tools antagonistically against other nations, makes hybrid warfare difficult not only 
to envisage but also to prevent. Through means such as cyberattacks, propaganda warfare and 
disinformation campaigns, hybrid warfare has not only increased the ease with which states 
can get into conflict with one another but has also created numerous ways in which this can 
happen. Unsure how one nation might attack the other, or the impact an incursion could have, 
hybrid warfare can help foster an environment of insecurity and uncertainty.  
The last concern that arose was that of a possible worsening of falling economic conditions. In 
their attempt to appease their electorate and promote an image of legitimacy, these Strongmen 
often implement populist protectionist and isolationist policies. Their inclination to favour 
short-term policy responses often ignores the future costs; although these policies may offer 
quick economic gains, over the long term, they are more likely to reduce global economic 
growth. Protectionist and isolationist policies can shrink the economy, slow down growth, 
diminish living standards, and enlarge budget deficits which will only create further negative 
economic costs for citizens. Economic prosperity and how citizens view their economic 
conditions is fundamental in creating a sense of stability and security. Henceforth, if citizens 
become increasingly concerned over their economic circumstances, it may lead to an increased 
environment of instability and insecurity.  
5.3. Limits of the Study  
The first limit or critique of the study is the decision to evaluate Russia, Hungary and Turkey. 
All three nations are extremely different in their histories, ideologies and national identities. 
Thus, using very different nations in a comparative study could lead to over generalisations 
and simplifications, possibly leading to the issue of correlation and causality. By placing all 





similarities, there is a clear correlation. However, having first identified four specific 
Strongman characteristics, this limitation was overcome. The four characteristics were chosen 
as a base so that if other nations – who have elected Strongman – were used, the study would 
also be successful. For example, if one were to examine Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Nahendra 
Modi of India and Donald Trump of the US, a similar study could be conducted using the four 
variables and could also be compared. For future research, in order to limit this weakness, 
nations with Strongman leaders with similar histories or development status could be chosen, 
focusing on nations that perhaps were all considered consolidated democracies, Western and 
developed. This could provide for a better comparison on the effects of the Strongman leader 
and how their leadership can impact geopolitical security.  
Another limit to the study extends from the argument that Russia, Turkey and Hungary were 
never considered full-fledged, consolidated democracies. Russia after the Cold War had the 
intention of democratisation, but this never fully materialised. With history of military rule and 
a religious government, Turkey was also never considered a consolidated democracy. While 
although Hungary showed promise of becoming a consolidated democracy, democracy was 
never given the opportunity to become entrenched within its political system. Thus, as 
previously noted, many scholars were unconvinced that liberal democracy would become the 
ruling political system, specifically in nations that did not have a history of a consolidated 
democracy. This limit, however, was overcome as the study aimed not to show that liberal 
democracy would be the final form of human governance, but rather provides evidence of a 
Strongman in power and how, despite regional effects, a Strongman can create geopolitical 
insecurity.  
Lastly, a limitation of the study is that the threat to global security and increase of geopolitical 
security can be considered more of a forecast, instead of being based on concrete evidence. The 
possibility of a new global order, the collapse of the European Union, disintegrating Turkey 
and EU relations, increased protectionist and isolationist policies and worsening economic 
conditions are all events that have the possibility of occurring under the guise of Strongmen, 
but have not happened yet. This limit was overcome as the research made clear inferences 
based on understanding history, current events and the likelihood of what would happen if such 





5.4. Conclusion & Avenues for Future Study  
There is plenty of space within the question to garner more understanding of why citizens are 
choosing to vote for these Strongman leaders, despite their often-autocratic policies and 
ideologies. Understanding human behaviour in political science is always important as it can 
shed more light on why certain political trends may be taking place. Also, it creates more space 
for research to be done to find practical solutions that can be implemented across societies all 
over the globe. By understanding this phenomena, policy makers and scholars can use the 
knowledge to create and propose solutions in order to prevent increased geopolitical insecurity. 
There are also several nations of importance that were not covered in this study that would 
make for important case-studies to further understand this topic. Countries like Brazil, the 
Philippines, Thailand and the Czech Republic have all elected Strongmen into office recently. 
An examination of different, unique nations will give more insight into the election of these 
leaders and why they may pose a threat to geopolitical security. Another case-study that would 
pose interesting questions and needs more research is China under Xi-Jinping. China is 
becoming an increasingly prominent state as it increasingly becomes an economic and political 
rival. The rise of China poses a systematic question about the West’s future but also brings to 
the forefront that democracy is not a requirement of economic success. Research could 
determine if the Chinese political and economic model under the nation’s Strongman would be 
a regime option for other states all over the world. 
An interesting point of departure could be further examination into the weaknesses of 
democracy in the light of scholars assuming it is the best form of governance. Authors have 
suggested that when populist, nationalistic campaigns become prominent and successful, they 
often function as a warning sign of a political crisis. Thus, this ‘political crisis’ could be an 
important element of research. Chua (2018:8), for instance, notes that gaps in democracy are 
often what have ignited and galvanised group conflict. Further, it can be argued that democracy 
was seen as the best form of governance because it offered the best form of economic 
participation. However, with worsening economic conditions and the effects felt by the 2008 
global financial crash, societies where people fear for their safety or some struggle to survive, 
idealistic principles offered by liberal democracy will often ring hollow (Chua, 2018:8).  
Another avenue of research that will be critical in the current geopolitical climate is that of the 
influencing role of communication technologies, the internet and social media, data collection 





the way nations conduct their politics and economics (Kagan, 2019:13). Thus, the effect this 
technology could have on the future of liberal democracy and the way states are governed could 
be an interesting and important topic of study. For instance, Larry Diamond mentions the 
possible growth of “postmodern totalitarianism” (2019) in that individuals will appear to be 
free and to go about their daily lives but in fact the state will control and sensor everything they 
see, while keeping track of everything they say and do. Technology will have implications for 
civil rights and liberties, it transcends borders, making it more difficult to monitor and control 
and could thus have a critical impact on the geopolitical space.  
As these Strongmen lead the world into an era of illiberal hegemony, it is yet difficult to know 
what the exact consequences are going to be. However, acknowledging the policies, ideologies 
and principles these leaders implement is important in order to not only understand the 
complexity of this development but also how it is influencing politics. While the future is 
becoming increasingly difficult to foresee and plan for, the implications these Strongmen will 
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